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Abstract	  
During	   the	   2013	   general	   elections	   in	   Kenya	   the	   crowdsourced	   election	   monitoring	  
project	   Uchaguzi	   ran	   in	   parallel	   with	   ordinary	   domestic	   and	   international	   election	  
observations.	  Such	  monitoring	  projects	  have	  been	  performed	   in	  several	  countries,	  and	  
research	  on	  the	  methods	  and	  effects	  of	  crowdsourced	  election	  monitoring	  is	  increasing.	  
In	  particular,	  scholars	  are	  focusing	  on	  the	  political	  significance	  of	  such	  projects,	  whether	  
value	  is	  generated	  for	  citizen	  participation	  in	  democratization	  and	  political	  engagement.	  
Very	   few	   studies	   have	   looked	   at	   the	   actual	   content	   of	   the	   reports	   generated	   through	  
such	  projects	  and	  compared	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  crowd	  with	  official	  election	  reports.	  This	  
study	  investigate	  the	  content	  of	  2300	  sms	  reports	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset,	  and	  compare	  
the	   story	   revealed	   in	   these	   reports	   with	   the	   conclusions	   in	   the	   election	   observation	  
report	   from	  a	   recognized	   institution,	   the	  Carter	  Center.	   The	   report	   from	   the	  domestic	  
monitoring	  group	  ELOG	  is	  also	  used	  for	  reference.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  evaluate	  the	  relevance	  
and	  reliability	  of	  the	  crowdsourced	  reports.	  
The	  findings	  show	  that	  the	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  indeed	  presented	  a	  relevant	  picture	  of	  the	  
events	  on	  election	  day.	  The	  crowd	  focus	  on	  how	  smoothly	  they	  were	  able	  to	  perform	  the	  
voting,	  on	  security	  and	  injustice	  like	  bribery	  or	  intimidation.	  They	  are	  far	  less	  occupied	  
with	   electoral	   formalities	   and	   processes.	   Monitoring	   in	   near	   realtime	   enables	   the	  
platform	   to	   be	   an	   alert	   central	   for	   urgent	   reports.	   Logging	   time	   and	   location	   for	   each	  
message	   generates	   timelines	   and	   geographical	   overview	   that	   traditional	   reports	   does	  
not.	   The	   findings	   suggest	   that	   crowdsourced	   election	   monitoring	   project	   can	   benefit	  
from	  a	   further	  development	  of	   the	  questions	  asked	  to	  the	  crowd.	  Today	  these	  are	  to	  a	  
large	  extent	  inherited	  from	  traditional	  observation	  methodologies.	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Foreword	  
A	  growing	  crowd	  of	  people	  see	  social	  media,	  online	  mapping	  and	  the	  possibilities	  of	  the	  
Internet	   as	   tools	   to	   engage	   and	   contribute.	   During	   elections,	   disasters	   or	   enduring	  
conflicts	  we	   see	   crowdsourced	  projects	   created	   for	  documenting	   and	  visualizing	  what	  
goes	  on.	  You	  will	  find	  them	  from	  most	  corners	  of	  the	  world.	  And	  you	  will	  notice	  that	  the	  
online	  communities	   in	   this	   sphere	  easily	  engage	  with	  projects	  happening	  on	   the	  other	  
side	  of	   the	  planet.	  Notice	   also	   that	   these	   groups	   are	   frontrunners	   in	   contributing	  new	  
thinking,	   technologies	   and	   processes.	   	   Many	   of	   the	   projects	   represent	   expressions	   of	  
concerned	  citizens,	  sometimes	  against	  authorities.	  But	  often	  they	  represent	  an	  outlet	  for	  
ordinary	   citizens	   concern	   and	   engagement.	   Some	   of	   the	   projects	   are	   ignored	   by	  
established	   institutions,	   which	   hesitate	   to	   include	   amateurs	   or	   volunteers	   into	   their	  
traditional	   domains.	   The	   fact	   is,	   there	   is	   a	   new	  group	  of	   experts	   emerging	   from	   these	  
circles.	  You	  will	  find	  them	  in	  Nairobi	  or	  Kathmandu,	  in	  Cebu	  or	  Abuja.	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  came	  about	  thanks	  to	  the	  support	  of	  several	  people.	  Angela	  Oduor	  Lungati,	  
Daudi	  Were	   and	   Sara-­‐Jayne	  Terp	   at	  Ushahidi	   gave	  me	   access	   to	   the	  Uchaguzi	   dataset.	  
Without	  their	  trust	  and	  support,	   this	  project	  could	  not	  have	  been	  done.	  Thanks	  also	  to	  
my	  colleagues	  in	  the	  Standby	  Task	  Force.	  	  
The	  data	  was	  not	  created	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  research,	  and	  to	  extract	  meaning	  from	  the	  
records,	   the	   assistance	   from	   the	   following	   people	   was	   essential:	   The	   inspiring	  
conversations	  with	  Kendra	  Dupuy	  and	  Arne	  Tostensen	  at	  CMI,	  Stephan	  Hamberg	  and	  Jan	  
Skrobanek	  moved	  the	  project	  forward	  and	  improved	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  dataset.	  Tutor	  
and	  advisor	  Maria	  Gabrielsen	  Jumbert	  at	  PRIO	  spent	  hours	  showing	  the	  way	  out	  of	  chaos	  
and	  towards	  some	  structure.	  My	  patient	  wife	  Ingrid	  maybe	  has	  suffered	  the	  most	  from	  a	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1 Introduction	  
Close	  to	  1300	  people	  were	  killed	  and	  more	  than	  half	  a	  million	  were	  displaced	  during	  the	  
violent	   clashes	   before,	   during	   and	   after	   the	   elections	   in	   Kenya	   in	   December	   2007	  
(CarterCenter	  2013:	  17).	  The	  Nairobi	  based	   lawyer	  and	  blogger	  Ory	  Okolloh,	  who	  run	  
the	  blog	  kenyanpundit.com1	  was	  overwhelmed	  by	  messages	  on	  email	  and	  SMS	  regarding	  
the	   violence.	   Kenyapundit	   was	   already	   a	   recognized	   source	   for	   insights	   on	   Kenyan	  
politics,	   human	   rights,	   journalism	   and	   the	   2007	   elections.	   Her	   blog	   soon	   became	   the	  
most	  reliable	  source	  of	  information	  on	  the	  flawed	  elections	  and	  the	  turbulent	  violence.	  
Due	   to	   the	  massive	   flow	   of	   information	   -­‐	  more	   than	   she	   could	   handle	  manually	   -­‐	   she	  
turned	  to	  her	   tech-­‐savvy	   friends	  to	  ask	   for	  assistance.	  During	  a	  week	   in	   January	  2008,	  
they	   created	   an	   online	   platform	   with	   the	   name	   of	   Ushahidi2 	  ("witness")	   to	   which	  
messages	   were	   directed.	   The	   reports	   and	   SMS	   sent	   to	   Ushahidi	   was	   approved	   and	  
verified	   before	   they	   appeared	   on	   the	   interactive	  map.	   It	   created	   an	   awareness	   of	   the	  
situation,	  helped	  civilians	  to	  avoid	  conflict	  areas,	  and	  in	  some	  instances	  provides	  as	  an	  
emergency	  central	  where	  urgent	  situations	  were	  acted	  upon	  (Okolloh	  2009).	  	  
Five	   years	   later	   there	   was	   a	   new	   election	   in	   Kenya.	   By	   this	   time	   the	   technology,	  
workflow	   and	   understanding	   of	   crowdsourced	   mapping	   of	   citizen	   reports	   had	   been	  
tested	  and	  developed	  during	  conflicts,	  disasters	  and	  elections	  (Meier	  2015;	  Norris	  2014;	  
Starbird	   2011).	   A	   customized	   setup	   of	   Ushahidi	   was	   deployed	   for	   the	   2013	   General	  
Elections	  in	  Kenya.	  The	  platform	  and	  the	  project	  had	  the	  name	  "Uchaguzi"	  (Kiswahili	  for	  
"election").	  	  
The	   name	   refers	   to	   an	   instance	   of	   the	   Ushahidi	   platform	   that	  was	   first	   developed	   for	  
monitoring	  the	  2010	  constitutional	  referendum	  (Chan	  2010).	  Later	  on,	  we	  find	  several	  
uses	  both	  of	  the	  name	  "Uchaguzi"	  and	  the	  same	  setup	  under	  different	  names.	  The	  latest	  
was	   the	  "Uzabe"	  project	   to	  monitor	   the	  Nigerian	  presidential	  elections	   in	  march	  2015.	  
“Zabe”	  means	  "election"	  in	  the	  Hausa	  language	  (Babayemi	  2015).	  	  
The	  head	  of	  the	  Uchaguzi	  project,	  Daudi	  Were	  explains	  it:	  The	  main	  difference	  between	  
Ushahidi	  and	  Uchaguzi	  is	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  project	  with	  a	  digital	  setup	  and	  with	  teams	  
to	  be	  prepared	  for	  the	  monitoring	  of	  elections	  (Omenya	  and	  Crandall	  2013).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  blog	  is	  no	  longer	  updated,	  but	  still	  online:	  http://www.kenyanpundit.com/	  
2	  Ushahidi	  is	  now	  a	  company	  offering	  several	  solutions:	  http://www.ushahidi.com/	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Today,	   references	   to	   such	   projects	   even	   appears	   in	   election	   observation	   reports	   from	  
recognized	   institutions	   whether	   they	   are	   performed	   in	   Kenya	   or	   Ukraine	   (EU-­‐EOM	  
2013:	  29;	  OSCE	  2014:	  9).	  
In	   these	   kind	   of	   projects	   there	   is	   a	   diversity	   of	   groups	   engaged.	   The	   reporters	   or	  
observers	   might	   be	   on	   the	   ground	   where	   the	   events	   are	   happening	   or	   they	   might	  
physically	   be	   located	   on	   another	   continent	   connected	   to	   the	   events	   online.	   They	   are	  
sending	   SMS,	   tweeting	   or	   posting	   pictures	   on	   what's	   going	   on.	   They	   are	   real	  
eyewitnesses	  or	  passing	  on	  information	  harvested	  from	  online	  or	  physical	  sources.	  The	  
reporters	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  "the	  crowd".	  	  
At	   the	  collecting	  hub	  of	   the	  project,	   the	  situation	  room,	   there	   is	  a	   team	  organizing	   the	  
information,	  training	  participants	  or	  giving	  feedback	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  addition,	  
there	  is	  a	  trained	  online	  group	  of	  participants	  who	  support	  the	  project	  by	  categorizing,	  
verifying	  or	  geo-­‐locating	  the	  messages	  or	  images.	  This	  group	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  "digital	  
online	  volunteers".	  
My	  participation	  as	  an	  online	  digital	  volunteer	  during	  the	  Uchaguzi	  project	   (and	  many	  
others	   since)	  has	   triggered	   the	  urge	   to	  understand	  what	   is	   going	  on	   in	   these	  projects,	  
what	  characterizes	  the	  content	  of	  the	  information	  gathered,	  and	  whether	  the	  tools	  and	  
methods	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  process	  unfolding	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  
I	  hope	  to	  bring	  forward	  characteristics	  and	  stories	  from	  crowdsourced	  observation	  -­‐	  or	  
citizen	   reporting	  during	  elections	   to	  be	  able	   to	   shed	   light	  on	  new	  sides	  of	  monitoring.	  
There	   might	   be	   new	   stories,	   confirming	   stories	   or	   contradicting	   stories	   in	   the	  
crowdsourced	  narration	  when	  held	  up	  to	  the	  reports	  from	  ordinary	  election	  observation	  
missions.	  	  
When	   including	   ordinary	   citizens	   in	   election	   monitoring	   one	   may	   also	   address	   the	  
question	  whether	   the	  crowd	  are	  able	   to	  pinpoint	  electoral	   fraud	  or	  malpractice.	  Pippa	  
Norris	  is	  the	  director	  of	  the	  "Electoral	  Integrity	  Project",	  a	  collaboration	  between	  several	  
faculties	  at	  Harvard	  University,	  political	  science	  organizations,	  the	  University	  of	  Sydney	  
and	  the	  Australian	  Research	  Council	  (EIP	  2014).	  She	  says	  they	  are.	  "Ordinary	  citizens	  are	  
indeed	   aware	   of	   many	   types	   of	   electoral	   malpractices".	   In	   her	   studies	   of	   public	  
judgements	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  elections	  she	  found	  that	  the	  conclusions	  of	  ordinary	  citizens	  
coincide	  closely	  with	  the	  experts	  assessments	  of	  the	  same	  elections	  (Norris	  2014).	  
A	   small	   group	   of	   international	   election	   observers	   select	   the	   polling	   stations	   to	   cover	  
during	   an	   election	   (Carter	   Center	   2013).	   In	   contrast	   -­‐	   the	   crowd	   is	   "everywhere"	   and	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they	   appear	   in	   large	   numbers.	   They	  might	   represent	   a	   great	   asset	   for	   representative	  
monitoring.	  	  
Sometimes	   the	  possible	  biases	   in	  crowdsourced	  SMS	  projects	  are	  discussed,	   regarding	  
access	  to	  the	  tools	  needed	  to	  participate.	  In	  such	  discussions	  however,	  we	  tend	  to	  forget	  
that	   elections	   themselves	   demand	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   engagement.	   In	   many	   countries,	  
Kenya	   included	   you	   have	   to	   register	   up	   front	   as	   a	   voter	   to	   take	   part	   in	   the	   election	  
(Kelley	  2010;	  KPTJ	  2013;	  Marchant	  2013).	  With	  38	  million	  mobile	  phone	  users	  on	  48	  
million	  people	  (Barkan	  2013),	  and	  according	  to	  Safaricom	  only	  5%	  live	  outside	  mobile	  
coverage	   (GSMA	   2012)	   Kenya	   should	   be	   "connected".	   Adding	   that	   there	   were	   14,3	  
million	  voters	  registered	  for	  the	  elections	  should	  indicate	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  them	  
would	  be	  connected.	  
One	  aim	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  what	  citizen	  reporting	  can	  
do	   to	   increase	  participation,	  debate	   and	  engagement	   in	  political	  processes	   -­‐	   in	   short	   -­‐	  
democratization.	  Domenico	  Tuccinardi	  and	  Franck	  Balme	  think	  that	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  
is	  about	  to	  happen.	  They	  encourage	  a	  shift	  towards	  more	  process-­‐oriented	  observations	  
and	  to	  give	  more	  attention	  to	  citizen	  election	  observation	  groups	  and	  the	  application	  of	  
crowdsourcing	  techniques.	  	  
"By	   combining	   rigor	   and	   objectivity	  with	   the	   ability	   to	   reach	   a	   very	   large	   public	  
through	   several	   stages	   of	   the	   electoral	   cycle,	   these	   platforms	   could	   become	  
extremely	  powerful	  tools	  to	  evaluate	  not	  just	  the	  quality	  of	  elections,	  but	  the	  state	  of	  
democracy	  in	  a	  given	  country	  at	  any	  given	  moment	  in	  time.	  (Tuccinardi	  and	  Balme	  
2013).	  
Maybe	   the	   findings	   in	   this	   study	   also	   can	   add	   to	   the	   body	   of	   knowledge	   on	   how	   to	  
perform	  crowdsourced	  election	  monitoring	  to	  increase	  the	  validity	  and	  viability	  of	  such	  
projects	  and	  strengthen	  the	  confidence	  in	  civic	  participation	  and	  the	  use	  of	  social-­‐	  and	  
digital	  media	  in	  future	  democratization	  projects	  (Sambuli	  et	  al.	  2013b).	  	  
In	   1997	  Thomas	   Carothers	   bluntly	   stated:	   "The	  amateurs	  need	   to	   leave	   the	   field	   to	   the	  
professionals"	   (Carothers	  1997).	  He	  was	   referring	   to	   a	   "crowd"	  of	  more	  or	   less	   skilled	  
international	   observation	   missions	   who	   observed	   the	   1996	   Nicaraguan	   presidential	  
elections.	  Carothers	  promotes	  the	  support	  of	  domestic	  election	  observation	  and	  writes;	  	  
	  
"There	   is	   another,	   equally	   important,	   reason	   for	   the	   neglect	   of	   domestic	  
observation:	  many	   international	  groups	  prefer	   to	   send	  out	   their	  own	  high-­‐profile,	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exciting	   missions	   around	   the	   world	   rather	   than	   engage	   in	   the	   unglamorous	   and	  
painstaking	  work	   of	   helping	   local	   groups	   to	   do	   the	  work	   themselves"	   (Carothers	  
1997:	  27).	  	  
Todays	   monitoring	   landscape	   might	   be	   described	   like	   this:	   Domestic	   observers	   are	  
monitoring	   events	   on	   the	   ground,	   online	   observers	   are	  monitoring	   the	   Internet,	   their	  
combined	  stories	  are	  collected	  and	  organized	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  both	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  
and	  online	  volunteers.	  This	  happens	  during	  crisis	  as	  well	  as	  during	  elections.	  
Several	   studies	   have	   been	   done	   on	   the	   techniques	   and	   process	   of	   crowdsourced	   and	  
volunteer	  election	  observation	  and	  peacekeeping	  efforts	  (Hellström	  and	  Karefelt	  2012;	  
Sambuli	  et	  al.	  2013b;	  Trujillo	  et	  al.	  2014;	  Tuccinardi	  and	  Balme	  2013).	  Far	  less	  is	  written	  
on	  the	  actual	  content,	  which	  stories	  are	  told	  in	  such	  projects.	  	  
Having	   the	   ability	   to	   analyse	   what	   is	   actually	   written	   in	   the	   citizen	   reports,	   this	  
constitute	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   my	   investigation.	   International	   and	   domestic	   election	  
observation	   have	   become	   institutionalized	   with	   recognized	   international	   guidelines	  
(GNDEM	  2012;	  UN	  2005).	  Crowdsourced	  observations	  are	  still	   in	   its	  shaping,	  although	  
there	   exist	   guidelines	   on	   how	   formal	   organization	   should	   collaborate	   with	   online	  
volunteers	  during	  emergencies	  (Capelo,	  Chang,	  and	  Verity	  2013).	  One	  of	  the	  intentions	  
with	  this	  study	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  reporting	  process	  from	  this	  not	  yet	  institutionalized	  
methodology,	   and	   how	   the	   pictures	   drawn	   from	   the	   different	  methods	   complete	   each	  
other	  or	  how	  they	  differ.	  	  
	  
I	  therefore	  ask:	  Does	  the	  Uchaguzi	  project	  give	  a	  relevant	  picture	  of	  the	  process	  on	  the	  
election	  day?	  If	  they	  give	  a	  relevant	  picture,	  what	  are	  main	  similarities	  or	  differences	  in	  
these	   reports	   compared	   to	   traditional	   election	   observation	   reports	   from	   the	   same	  
election?	  And	  what	  were	  the	  shortcomings	  observed,	  and	  what	  could	  possible	  improve-­‐
ments	  to	  this	  be?	  
1.1 Disposition	  
The	   thesis	   consists	   of	   three	   parts.	   The	   first	   contains	   a	   brief	   discussion	   on	   election	  
observation,	   the	  activity	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  ensuring	  free	  and	  fair	  elections	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
promoting	  democracy.	   Since	   its	   start	   in	   the	  1980s,	   election	  observation	  has	  become	  a	  
big	   "industry"	   on	   its	   own.	   And	   discussions	   have	   risen	   on	   the	   value	   of	   its	   numerous	  
missions,	   the	  criteria	  on	  which	  an	  election	   is	   judged	  and	  what	   seems	   to	  be	  a	   constant	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disagreement	   between	   the	   professionals	   on	   acceptable	   performance	   of	   elections.	  
Scholars	   such	   as	   Pippa	   Norris,	   Thomas	   Carothers	   and	   Eric	   Bjornlund	   will	   help	   us	  
understand	  this	  landscape.	  	  
Further,	   the	  first	  part	  contains	  a	  discussion	  of	  citizen	  engagement	  with	  the	  use	  of	  SMS	  
and	  other	  communication	  tools,	  and	  how	  the	  Internet	  and	  social	  media	  have	  opened	  a	  
vast	   landscape	   for	   participation	   independent	   of	   geographical	   location.	   Crowdsourced	  
engagements	   and	   activism	   are	   related	   to	   each	   other	   through	   their	   methods	   and	  
communication	   channels.	   Various	   online	   activities	   performed	   in	  Kenya	   and	   elsewhere	  
during	   important	   events	   share	   some	   common	   concepts.	   Ethan	   Zuckerman,	   Patrick	  
Meier,	   and	   Evgeny	   Morozow	   are	   among	   the	   scholars	   I	   draw	   knowledge	   from.	   This	  
section	   includes	   thoughts	   and	   discussions	   from	   fields	   such	   as	   technology,	   media	   and	  
design.	  
The	   second	   part	   describes	   the	   run	   up	   and	   the	   2013	   election.	   I	   argue	   that	   we	   need	   a	  
backdrop	   on	   what	   else	   was	   going	   on	   before	   and	   during	   the	   elections	   in	   Kenya	   to	  
contextualize	   the	   subject	  of	   study.	  The	  Uchaguzi	  project	  was	  not	  a	   standalone	  project,	  
but	   had	   collaborators	   and	   must	   in	   my	   opinion	   be	   seen	   in	   relation	   to	   other	   civic	  
engagement	   efforts	   during	   the	   run	   up	   and	   through	   the	   elections.	   Quite	   a	   few	   of	   the	  
projects	   enjoyed	   international	   support	   or	   funding.	   Several	   studies	   and	   articles	   are	  
written	   on	   the	   Kenyan	   elections,	   including	   analysis	   of	   the	   social	   media	   landscape.	  
Nanjira	  Sambuli,	  Johan	  Hellström,	  Horacio	  R.	  Trujillo	  and	  Gabrielle	  Bardall	  are	  some	  of	  
my	  sources	  to	  understand	  what	  happened.	  
Finally	   I	   categorize	   and	   analyse	   the	   stories	   told	   through	   the	   crowdsourced	   election-­‐
monitoring	   project	   as	   they	   were	   collected	   on	   the	   Uchaguzi	   platform.	   Final	   election	  
observation	  reports	   from	  Carter	  Center	  and	  the	  domestic	  Elections	  Observation	  Group	  
(ELOG)	  creates	  the	  references	  to	  which	  I	  will	  compare	  the	  relevance	  and	  the	  content	  of	  
the	  Uchaguzi	  stories.	  The	  Carter	  Center	  report	   is	  chosen	  to	  represent	  the	  observations	  
from	  a	  reputed	  international	  election	  observation	  organization,	  and	  the	  ELOG	  report	  is	  
selected	   due	   to	   its	   massive	   coverage	   with	   about	   7000	   observers	   covering	   all	  
constituencies.	  As	  a	  relatively	  new	  form	  of	  election	  monitoring,	  the	  Uchaguzi	  project	  was	  
chosen	  as	  a	  case	  to	  test	  if	  the	  content	  of	  reports	  in	  such	  monitoring	  efforts	  present	  value	  
to	  fill	  in	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  election	  day	  events.	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2 Observer	  assessments	  and	  crowd	  monitoring,	  
theoretical	  reflections	  
After	  the	  cold	  war,	  democracy-­‐assistance	  and	  multi-­‐party	  elections	  were	  seen	  by	  donor-­‐
countries	   as	   a	   condition	   for	   economic	   liberalism,	   and	   financial	   aid	   could	   follow	  
successful	  elections	  (Bordewich,	  Davis-­‐Roberts,	  and	  Carroll	  2006).	  
Election	  monitoring,	  as	  we	  know	  it	  today,	  started	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  with	  ad-­‐hoc	  projects	  
from	   a	   number	   of	   concerned	   individuals	   who	   saw	   the	   need	   of	   observing	   important	  
elections.	   In	   1980,	   through	   an	   election	   that	   played	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   transition	   to	  
independence	   for	   Zimbabwe,	   the	   election	   observation	   "mission"	   consisted	   of	   four	  
activists	  arriving	  in	  the	  capital	   just	  before	  the	  election	  to	  talk	  with	  citizens	  about	  what	  
was	  going	  on	  (Bjornlund	  2004;	  Houser	  1980).	  Ten	  years	  later,	  election	  monitoring	  had	  
become	  a	  widespread,	  high	  profile	  activity.	  	  
Poorly	   prepared	   or	   politically	   biased	   Election	   Observation	   Missions	   was	   rightfully	  
criticized.	  About	  80	  different	  foreign	  observation	  missions	  observed	  the	  1996	  elections	  
in	   Nicaragua.	   The	   number	   of	   observation	   missions	   didn't	   prevent	   technical	   flaws,	   a	  
politicized	   and	   inefficient	   election	   commission	   and	   a	   problematic	   counting	   process	  
(Carothers	  1997;	  McCoy	  and	  Shelley	  1997).	  
2.1 International	  election	  observation	  
Thomas	  Carothers	  also	  discusses	  the	  outcomes	  of	  election	  observations.	  He	  asks	  if	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  simplify	  the	  conclusions	  on	  whether	  an	  election	  was	  "Free	  and	  fair"	  or	  not.	  
He	   points	   to	   problematic	   areas	   of	   international	   election	   observation,	   where	   biased	  
conclusions	  might	  occur	  due	  to	  political	  affiliations	  of	  the	  observing	  group,	  or	  even	  the	  
acceptance	  of	  partially	  flawed	  elections	  of	  sympathy	  with	  the	  country	  (Carothers	  1997).	  	  
Judith	  Kelley	  follows	  up	  on	  Carothers	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Democracy	  in	  2010.	  She	  refers	  to	  
the	   study	   "Data	   on	   International	   Election	   Monitoring"5	  which	   covers	   340	   elections	  
observed	   by	   nearly	   600	   observation	   missions.	   She	   criticizes	   the	   different	   observer	  
missions	   to	   conclude	   differently	   on	   the	   same	   election,	   and	   even	   shows	   that	   one	  
professional	   mission	   might	   contradict	   its	   own	   conclusions.	   The	   OSCE	   report	   on	   the	  
Russian	   elections	   in	   1999	   states	   in	   the	   executive	   summary	   that	   the	   "electoral	   laws	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Data	  on	  International	  Election	  Monitoring	  (DIEM):	  http://sites.duke.edu/kelley/data/	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provides	  a	  healthy	  environment	  for	  fair	  elections",	  while	  the	  content	  of	  the	  report	  points	  
to	  "major	  flaws"	  in	  the	  legislation	  (Kelley	  2010:	  160).	  	  
Khabele	  Matlosa	   ask	   for	   the	   same	   in	   the	  African	   Journal	   of	   Political	   Science.	   I	   am	  not	  
going	   to	   refer	   his	   discussion	   on	   the	   highly	   disputed	   election	   and	   the	   observation	  
missions	  to	  Zimbabwe	  in	  2002	  (Kelley	  2009:	  63;	  Matlosa	  2002:	  138-­‐152).	  But	  he	  states	  
a	   relevant	   demand	   for	   international	   standards,	   not	   only	   to	   evaluate	   the	   quality	   of	   the	  
outcome,	  but	  a	  common	  practice	  on	  the	  deployment	  of	  international	  observation	  itself.	  
Also	   the	   electoral	   processes	   in	   some	  developed	   countries	   are	   disputed.	   In	   France	   and	  
USA	   elections	   are	   not	  monitored	   by	   international	   observation	  missions.	   International	  
observers	  are	  not	  invited.	  Elections	  in	  developing	  countries	  are	  however	  scrutinized	  by	  
the	  international	  community.	  Matlosa	  ask	  if	  this	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  a	  continuation	  of	  old	  times	  
imperialism	  (Matlosa	  2002).	  	  
2.1.1 Standards	  for	  international	  election	  observation	  
Standards	   for	   international	   observations	   arrived	   in	   2005	  with	   the	  UN	   "Declaration	   of	  
Principles	  for	  International	  Election	  Observation	  and	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  International	  
Election	  Observers"	  (UN	  2005).	  But	  the	  principles	  does	  not	  answer	  Matlosa's	  claim	  for	  a	  
common	  practice	  on	  where	  to	  deploy	  these	  missions.	  	  
He	   also	   argues	   that	   observation	   missions	   from	   western	   industrialized	   countries	   to	  
developing	   countries	   "tended	   to	   be	   used	   as	   part	   of	   the	   political	   conditionality	   and	  
leverage	   through	   which	   industrial	   countries	   impose	   their	   hegemony	   over	   developing	  
countries	  and	   thereby	  undermine	   their	  already	  enfeebled	  national	   sovereignty"	   (Matlosa	  
2002).	  His	  concern	  is	  shared	  from	  a	  slightly	  different	  angle	  by	  Judith	  Kelley,	  who	  finds	  it	  
peculiar	   that	   EU	   tend	   to	   observe	   elections	   in	   countries	   with	   which	   they	   either	   have	  
political	  relations	  or	  support	  with	  aid	  (Kelley	  2010:	  169).	  
And	   Carothers	   finally	   raises	   concern	   about	   the	   community	   of	   observer	   organisation's	  
lack	  of	  interest	  in	  supporting	  domestic	  election	  monitors.	  "Domestic	  election	  monitors,	  if	  
properly	  organized	  and	  prepared,	  have	  important	  advantages	  over	  foreign	  observers.	  They	  
can	   much	   more	   easily	   turn	   out	   in	   very	   large	   numbers,	   usually	   in	   the	   thousands."	  	  
(Carothers	  1997).	  During	  the	  Kenyan	  elections	  in	  2013	  -­‐	  they	  did.	  
Today	  there	  is	  a	  shift	  towards	  monitoring	  numerous	  aspects	  of	  governance,	  not	  only	  the	  
elections	   themselves.	   	   "Interventions	  range	   from	  monitoring	  and	  capacity-­‐building	   ...	  on	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one	   hand	   and	   attempting	   to	   improve	   legal	   regulations,	   strengthening	   accountability	  
mechanisms,	  and	  applying	  international	  pressures	  on	  the	  other	  hand"	  (Norris	  2014)	  
As	   large	   groups	   of	   citizens	   now	   have	   a	   possibility	   to	   raise	   their	   voice,	   we	   might	   see	  
another	   turn	   in	   the	   evolution	   of	   election	   observation.	   In	   her	   list	   of	   policy	   options	   for	  
strengthening	  electoral	  integrity,	  Pippa	  Norris	  includes	  technology,	  domestic	  NGOs	  and	  
social	   media	   (Norris	   2014:	   201).	   Those	   are	   the	   elements	   with	   which	   I'll	   attempt	   to	  
contextualize	  the	  Uchaguzi	  project.	  
2.2 Domestic	  election	  observation	  
In	  2012,	  the	  "Declaration	  of	  Global	  Principles	  for	  Non-­‐Partisan	  Election	  Observation	  and	  
Monitoring	   by	   Citizen	   Organizations	   and	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   for	   Non-­‐Partisan	   Citizen	  
Election	   Observers	   and	   Monitors"	   were	   endorsed	   by	   over	   160	   nonpartisan	   election	  
monitoring	  organizations	  in	  more	  than	  75	  countries	  on	  five	  continents	  (GNDEM	  2012).	  
The	   guidelines	  was	  worked	  out	   by	   the	  Global	  Network	  of	  Domestic	   Election	  Monitors	  
(GNDEM),	  where	  also	  the	  ELOG	  from	  Kenya	  took	  part.	  	  
The	   declaration	   recognize	   civil	   society,	   engaging	   millions	   of	   citizens	   to	   participate	   in	  
public	  affairs,	  and	  acknowledge	  monitoring	  of	  elections	  by	  such	  civic	  bodies	  as	  a	  	  
"specialized	   form	   of	   human	   rights	   defending	   that	   focuses	   on	   civil	   and	   political	  
rights,	   which	   are	   central	   to	   achieving	   genuine	   elections,	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	  
democratic	  governance".	  The	  declaration	  further	  note	  that	  "non-­‐partisan	  election	  
observation	   and	   monitoring	   organizations	   can	   contribute	   significantly	   to	  
improving	  the	  democratic	  quality	  of	  legal	  frameworks	  for	  elections,	  the	  conduct	  of	  
election	  processes	  and	  broader	  democratic	  development"	  (GNDEM	  2012:	  3).	  	  
	  
With	   the	   aim	   of	   supporting	   a	   process-­‐oriented	   approach	   to	   election	   monitoring	   and	  
violence	  prevention	  and	  by	  supporting	  citizen	  groups	  in	  their	  aim	  for	  accountability,	  the	  
declaration,	  and	  its	  acceptance	  also	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  marks	  a	  shift.	  The	  potential	  
in	  citizen	  observation,	  their	  use	  of	  new	  digital	  tools	  and	  crowdsourcing	  techniques	  was	  
finally	  recognized	  by	  the	  democracy	  assisting	  community	  (Tuccinardi	  and	  Balme	  2013).	  
The	  field	  is	  no	  longer	  left	  only	  for	  "the	  professionals"	  as	  Carothers	  wished	  in	  1997.	  But	  -­‐	  
this	   time	   it	   is	  not	   international	  amateurs	   that	   is	  promoted,	  but	  as	  he	  also	  wished	   for	   -­‐	  
domestic	   monitoring	   groups.	   The	   declaration	   is	   aimed	   at	   assisting	   in	   the	  
professionalization	  of	  such	  groups.	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Tuccinardi	  and	  Balme	  calls	  it	  a	  "crowdsourcing	  revolution"	  stating	  that	  
"Citizen	   election	   observation	   activities	   have	   led	   the	   developments	   in	   the	   entire	  
election	  observation	   sector	  and	   the	  methodology	   they	  developed	  has	   evolved	  over	  
25	   years:	   experiences	   like	   the	   ones	   of	   NAMFREL	   of	   the	   Philippines	   in	   1986	   and	  
Transparencia	   Peru	   in	   2000,	   have	   been	   instrumental	   and	   inspirational	   for	   the	  
design	   and	   subsequent	   evolution	   of	   international	   election	   observation	   efforts.	  
(Tuccinardi	  and	  Balme	  2013)	  
2.3 Revolutions	  and	  people	  power	  
What	  was	  it	  with	  NAMFREL?	  Under	  the	  regime	  of	  Ferdinand	  Marcos	  in	  the	  Philippines	  
one	   of	   the	   first	   citizen	   election	   observation	   organizations	   emerged.	   The	   National	  
Citizens’	  Movement	   for	   Free	  Elections	   (NAMFREL)	  with	  more	   than	  250	  000	  members	  
played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  "People	  Power	  Revolution"	  in	  February	  1986.	  	  
The	   February	   7	   elections	   was	   considered	   "not	   free	   and	   fair"	   by	   the	   International	  
Observer	  Delegation	  who	  reported	  the	  voting	  to	  be	  flawed	  with	  bribing,	  double	  voting,	  
fraudulent	   voter	   registration	   and	   falsified	   counts.	   Despite	   this,	   they	   stated	   that	   "the	  
election	  succeeded	  in	  providing	  a	  vehicle	  through	  which	  the	  national	  will	  of	  the	  Philippines	  
was	  ultimately	  expressed"	  (Atwood	  and	  Schuette	  1986).	  The	  count	  they	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  
observation	  report,	  showed	  a	  winning	  president	  Ferdinand	  Marcos	  over	  the	  contestant,	  
Corazon	  Aquino.	  	  
Meanwhile,	   29	   computer	   technicians	   from	   the	   official	   Commission	   on	   Elections	  
(COMELEC)	   walked	   out	   in	   protest	   of	   the	   deliberate	   flawed	   results	   of	   the	   elections	  
(DuVall	   and	   Ackerman	   2001)	   and	   NAMFREL	   published	   their	   Parallel	   Vote	   Tabulation	  
(PVT)	   showing	   that	   	   Corazon	   Aquino	   was	   the	   actual	   winner.	   The	   statement	   of	   the	  
Archbishop	  of	  Cebu,	  Ricardo	  Vidal	  reading:	  "Now	  is	  the	  time	  to	  speak	  up.	  Now	  is	  the	  time	  
to	  repair	  the	  wrong.	  The	  wrong	  was	  systematically	  organized.	  So	  must	  its	  correction	  be".	  
His	  	  message	  was	  aired	  by	  the	  local	  station	  Radio	  Veritas	  and	  followed	  up	  by	  millions	  of	  
people	  who	  gathered	  in	  Epifanio	  de	  los	  Santos	  Avenue	  (EDSA)	  in	  Metro	  Manila.	  "	  (Vidal	  
1986).	  During	  three	  days	  -­‐	  22	  -­‐	  25	  February,	  the	  two	  million	  people	  joined	  what	  came	  to	  
be	   called	   the	   "People	   Power	   Revolution",	   ending	  with	   Ferdinand	  Marcos	   boarding	   an	  
American	   helicopter	   from	   his	   presidential	   palace,	   departing	   for	   a	   final	   destination	   in	  
Hawaii.	   By	   the	   time	   of	   the	   uprising,	   the	   International	   Observer	   Delegation	  was	   safely	  
back	  home	  (Atwood	  and	  Schuette	  1986).	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NAMFRELs	  500	  000	  volunteers	  and	  the	  organizations	  exposure	  of	  "fraud	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  Marcos	  government	  contributed	  significantly	   to	   the	  ouster	  of	   the	  regime",	   states	   the	  
final	  election	  report	  (Bordewich,	  Davis-­‐Roberts,	  and	  Carroll	  2006).	  
The	  above	  story	  is	  not	  included	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  demonstrating	  a	  successful	  overthrow	  
of	   a	   regime	   -­‐	  which	   it	   also	  was	   -­‐	   but	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   power	   of	   civil	   organizations	  
doing	  systematic	  election	  monitoring	  and	  tallying	  and	  collaboration	  with	  each	  other.	  	  
2.3.1 The	  machine	  that	  sees	  it	  all	  
In	  a	  charming	  talk	  at	  TED.com6	  in	  2007,	  the	  former	  editor	  of	  Wire	  magazine,	  Kevin	  Kelly	  
talks	  about	  the	  first	  5000	  days	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web.	  He	  claims	  that	  the	  web	  itself	  is	  
the	  largest	  and	  longest	  running	  "machine"	  that	  mankind	  ever	  created.	  This	  "machine"	  is	  
growing	  at	  an	  enormous	  rate	  every	  day.	  All	  our	   laptops,	   cameras,	  phones	  and	  gadgets	  
with	   a	   sliver	   of	   built	   in	   connectivity	   are	   the	   "eyes	   and	   ears"	   of	   this	   machine.	   All	   the	  
screens	  in	  the	  world	  are	  "windows"	  into	  this	  huge	  pile	  of	  information.	  	  
He	  predicts	   our	   total	   dependency	   of	   the	  machine,	   "The	  One"	   as	   he	   names	   it.	   	  We	  will	  
depend	   on	   it	   much	   in	   the	   same	   way	   our	   society	   have	   become	   totally	   dependent	   of	  
another	  technology	  invented	  long	  ago,	  which	  is	  language	  and	  writing.	  We	  can't	  imagine	  
our	  world	  running	  without	  it.	  The	  machine	  is	  hungry	  for	  ever	  more	  information,	  and	  we	  
gladly	   feed	   it	   (Kelly	  2007).	  This	  machine	   is	  one	  of	   the	   foundations	   for	  online	  activism,	  
surveillance	  or	  sous-­‐veillance.	  Without	  it	  there	  would	  be	  no	  digital	  crowdsourcing.	  	  
2.3.2 Politics	  of	  technology	  
Research	   fellow	   Gregory	   Asmolov	   at	   the	   London	   School	   of	   Economics	   and	   Political	  
Science	  discusses	  the	  political	  aspects	  of	  crowdsourcing	  tools	  in	  his	  text	  "Crowdsourcing	  
as	  an	  Activity	  System:	  Online	  Platforms	  as	  Mediating	  Artifacts"	  (2014).	  He	  suggests	  that	  
the	  term	  "Crowdsourcing"	  embeds	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  collecting	  information,	  
reporting	   and	   eventual	   actions.	   And	   further	   -­‐	   he	   underlines	   that	   no	   ICT	   systems	   are	  
unaffected	   by	   politics:	   "...ICT,	   and	   in	   particular	   crowdsourcing,	   and	   the	   architecture	   of	  
online	  platforms	  can	  be	  conceptualized	  as	   forms	  of	  “governance	  of	  crowds”	  that	   through	  
their	  structure	  suggest	  “the	  possible	  field	  of	  action	  of	  others.”	  (Asmolov	  2014)	  
Similar	   governance	   can	  be	   seen	   in	  other	  kinds	  of	   social	  media.	  When	  you	   create	   your	  
Facebook	  account,	  you	  are	  encouraged	  to	  enter	  information	  about	  your	  real	  life	  contacts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  TED	  is	  a	  platform	  for	  spreading	  ideas	  and	  trigger	  conversation:	  http://www.ted.com/	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-­‐	  where	  you	  went	  to	  school,	  where	  you	  studied	  and	  where	  you	  work.	  Facebook	  suggest	  
you	  should	  bond	  with	  the	  likes	  of	  yourself.	  	  
During	   his	   keynote	   at	   ICT4Peace	   conference	   in	   2014	  media	   scholar	   Ethan	  Zuckerman	  
warns	  on	  the	  effect	  such	  platforms	  may	  have.	  "Technology	  is	  never	  a	  neutral	  player	  in	  this	  
space.	  When	  you	  make	  decisions	  on	  how	  people	  are	  going	   to	  act	  online,	   you	  are	  making	  
political	  decisions,"	   he	   says	   (Zuckerman	   2014).	   He	   use	   the	   sociologist	   Robert	  Mertons	  
study	  on	  "homophily"	   love	  of	   the	  same	   -­‐	  about	  social	   forces	  affecting	   the	   formation	  of	  
friendship.	   Several	   researches	   show	   that	   we	   tend	   to	   flock	   together	   with	   others	  
assumingly	   like	   ourselves	   (Zuckerman	   2013:	   69-­‐73).	   There	   might	   be	   structures	   that	  
tries	   to	   interfere	  with	  such	   tendencies,	   for	  example	  a	  university	  dorm	  room	  organizer	  
who	  might	  try	  to	  mix	  groups	  with	  different	  backgrounds	  on	  the	  same	  floor.	  	  In	  contrast	  -­‐	  
Facebook	   is	   a	   social	   platform	   that	   encourages	   homophily.	  When	   you	   sign	   up,	   you	   are	  
invited	  to	  connect	  with	  the	  likes	  of	  yourself.	  	  This	  is	  the	  political	  aspect	  of	  the	  software	  
which	  Zuckerman	  comments:	  "Facebook	  is	  the	  only	  business	  that	  I	  know	  of	  that	  has	  made	  
homophily	  its	  business	  model"	  (Zuckerman	  2014).	  	  
He	  points	  to	  Myanmar	  to	  underpin	  his	  argument.	  Where	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  have	  had	  
20	  years	  to	  get	  used	  to	  the	  Internet,	  Myanmar	  citizens	  came	  online	  in	  large	  numbers	  in	  
2012.	   And	   there	  was	   Facebook.	   It	   shaped	   an	   online	  world	   quite	   different	   from	   other	  
cyberspaces,	  where	  businesses,	  interest	  organizations	  or	  political	  movements	  turned	  to	  
Facebook	  for	  their	  online	  activity.	  And	  -­‐	  as	  Zuckerman	  puts	  it	  -­‐	  "homophily	  leads	  to	  echo-­‐
chambers,	   which	   leads	   to	   extreme	   positions.	   Technology	   by	   itself	   does	   not	   bring	   people	  
together.	  It	  may	  do	  the	  opposite"	  (Zuckerman	  2013).	  
There	  are	  two	  connections	  from	  this	  reasoning	  to	  the	  Kenyan	  elections.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  
90	  %	   of	   hate-­‐speech	   messages	   harvested	   by	   the	   Umati	   project	   (see	   chapter	   3)	   were	  
found	  on	  Facebook.	  Secondly	  -­‐	  one	  may	  ask	  which	  political	  structures	  were	  embedded	  in	  
the	  Uchaguzi	  platform	  that	  contributed	  to	  shape	  the	  information	  harvested.	  	  
Farid	  Shirazi	  et	  al	  claim	  that	  "there	  is	  a	  very	  high	  correlation	  between	  ICT	  expansion	  and	  
democratic	   freedoms".	   Their	   study	   covered	  133	   countries	   and	   their	   development	   from	  
the	  birth	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web	  in	  1995	  through	  2003.	  The	  relation	  between	  high	  ICT	  
expansion	   during	   the	   time	   period	   and	   high	   democracy	   performance	   he	   claims	   are	  
closely	   connected.	   	   When	   individuals	   have	   the	   possibility	   to	   share	   knowledge,	  
participate	  in	  dialogue	  and	  get	  access	  to	  information,	  they	  do.	  ICT	  infrastructure	  has	  in	  
general	   a	   positive	   impact	   on	   democracy	   and	   freedom	   of	   expression.	   But	   the	   same	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technology	  also	  opens	  channels	  for	  radical	  groups,	  religious	  fundamentalists,	  and	  their	  
exchange	   of	   dangerous	   speech	   and	   threats.	   Governments	   reactions	   to	   un-­‐wanted	  
communication	  by	  filtering	  and	  censorship	  has	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  political	  rights	  and	  
liberties,	  and	  will	  therefore	  also	  reduce	  the	  country's	  performance	  on	  a	  democracy	  scale	  
(Shirazi,	  Ngwenyama,	  and	  Morawczynski	  2010).	  
2.4 Crowdsourcing	  and	  its	  applications	  in	  civic	  engagement	  
Jeff	  Howe	  coined	  the	  term	  "crowdsourcing"	  nearly	  ten	  years	  ago	  in	  an	  article	   in	  Wired	  
(Howe	   2006).	   The	   term	   describes	   a	   contemporary	   alternative	   to	   "outsourcing"	   -­‐	  
harvesting	   information	   or	   services	   from	   a	   crowd.	   In	   his	   later	   book,	   he	   points	   to	   the	  
research	   of	   Scott	   E.	   Page	   who	   tested	   the	   ability	   for	   problem	   solving	   among	   different	  
groups	  of	  people.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  a	  group	  of	  people	  with	  a	  diverse	  skillset	  (the	  crowd)	  
outperforms	  a	  group	  of	  experts	  in	  problem	  solving.	  This	  eventually	  formed	  the	  theorem	  
"Diversity	  Trumps	  Ability"	  (Howe	  2009).	  Since	  then	  ever	  new	  aspects	  of	  engaging	  "the	  
crowd"	  in	  scientific	  work,	  monitoring,	  political	  or	  humanitarian	  projects	  have	  evolved.	  	  
Some	  of	  these	  aspects	  are	  seen	  in	  the	  online	  volunteer	  crowd	  supporting	  the	  teams	  on	  
the	   ground.	  With	   a	   spread	   of	   skillsets,	   their	   combined	   knowledge	   may	   outperform	   a	  
small	   group	   of	   experts.	   Daren	   Brabham	   confirm	   this	   in	   his	   description	   of	   what	  
crowdsourcing	   is	   and	   is	   not:	   ..."when	   the	   conditions	   are	   right,	   groups	   of	   people	   can	  
outperform	  individual	  experts,	  outsiders	  can	  bring	  fresh	  insights	  to	  internal	  problems,	  and	  
geographically	  dispersed	  people	  can	  work	  together"...	  (Brabham	  2013).	  	  
Already	   in	   2002,	   during	   the	   annual	   conference	   of	   the	   American	   Political	   Science	  
Association,	  Pippa	  Norris	  presented	  a	  study	  on	  how	  political	   tools	  were	  changing.	  She	  
stated	   that	   the	   increasing	   level	   of	   human	   capital	   and	   social	   modernisation	   lead	   to	   a	  
situation	  where	   educated	   citizens	   have	  more	   options	   for	   participation	   in	   society	   than	  
their	  parents.	  Through	  different	  tools	  and	  via	  "...	  new	  social	  movements,	  Internet	  activism	  
and	  transnational	  policy	  networks"	  the	  younger	  generation	  are	  less	  willing	  to	  direct	  their	  
engagement	   through	   traditional	   channels	   as	   political	   parties	   and	   churches	   (Norris	  
2002).	  Not	  until	  two	  years	  later,	  in	  February	  2004,	  Mark	  Zuckerberg	  launched	  Facebook.	  
One	  of	   the	   research	   areas	  of	   the	  Electoral	   Integrity	  Project	   is	   "Crowdsourced	  Election	  
Monitoring",	   a	   methodology	   for	   citizens	   to	   monitor	   and	   to	   organize	   the	   information	  
collected	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  elections.	  Their	  description	  of	  three	  different	  kinds	  of	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crowdsourcing	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  Uchaguzi	  project,	  and	  are	  referred	  below	  (Grömping	  
2014).	  	  
2.4.1 Risks	  in	  online	  engagement	  
Evgeny	   Morozov	   warns	   on	   the	   belief	   that	   connectivity	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   share	  
information	   will	   liberate	   the	   oppressed	   and	   set	   us	   free.	   Named	   a	   "cyber	   sceptic"	   he	  
raises	  his	  voice	  at	  western	  Internet	  utopians	  as	  hopelessly	  naive	  and	  out	  of	  sync	  with	  the	  
situations	   on	   the	   ground.	   Propaganda,	   censorship	   and	   surveillance	   by	   (authoritarian)	  
governments	  are	  easily	  enabled	  by	  a	   "free"	  net	  and	   the	  willingness	  of	  citizens	   to	  raise	  
their	  voices.	  The	  more	  connections	  between	  activists	  a	  government	  can	  identify,	  and	  the	  
more	  trust	  users	  have	  in	  blogs	  and	  social	  networks,	  the	  easier	  it	  is	  to	  disguise	  carefully	  
designed	   government	   messages	   and	   boost	   the	   propaganda	   apparatus.	   In	   particular,	  
Morozow	   is	   warning	   of	   the	   belief	   that	   large	   social	  media	   campaigns	  will	   lead	   to	   real	  
change.	   Covering	   the	   field	   of	   mass	   movements	   with	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   an	   informed	  
sceptic,	  he	  still	  encourages	  political	  activists	  to	  master	  these	  media.	  "That	  they	  may	  not	  
know	  how	  to	  do	  this	  is	  a	  poor	  excuse	  for	  not	  getting	  engaged"	  (Morozov	  2011).	  	  
During	  the	  attack	  on	  the	  Westgate	  shopping	  centre	  in	  Nairobi	  in	  2013,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
attackers,	   the	   hostages	   and	   the	   general	   public	   all	   were	   active	   on	   Twitter	   not	   only	  
established	   this	  medium	   as	   a	  major	   source	   of	   information,	   but	   also	   illustrated	   to	   the	  
extreme	  the	  risks	  involved.	  People	  trapped	  inside	  the	  building	  or	  eager	  journalists	  were	  
posting	   images	   identifying	  where	  people	  were	  hiding7,	  not	  reflecting	  over	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	   terrorists	   were	   following	   the	   same	   channels	   (Card,	   Mackinnon,	   and	   Meier	   2013;	  
Carpeev	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Ishengoma	  2013).	  This	  example	   is	  extreme,	  but	  may	  illustrate	  the	  
importance	  of	  knowledge	  on	  how	  the	  tools	  work.	  
2.4.2 Attributes	  of	  crowdsourcing	  	  
Common	  attributes	   for	   a	   variety	  of	   crowdsourcing	  projects	   are	   "the	  crowd,	  the	  task	  at	  
hand,	   the	   recompense	   obtained,	   the	   crowdsourcer	   or	   initiator	   of	   the	   crowdsourcing	  
activity,	  what	  is	  obtained	  by	  them	  following	  the	  crowdsourcing	  process,	  the	  type	  of	  process,	  
the	   call	   to	   participate,	   and	   the	   medium"	   (Estellés-­‐Arolas	   and	   González-­‐Ladrón-­‐de-­‐
Fuevara	  2012).	  Arolas	  and	  Fuevara	  describe	  overarching	  attributes,	  not	  characteristics	  
of	  the	  project	  as	  such.	  Maja	  Bott	  and	  Gregor	  Young	  add	  success	  criteria	  to	  the	  equation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See	  example	  of	  images	  circulating	  at:	  https://goo.gl/zUCT8f	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in	  their	  article	  in	  PRAXIS.	  Core	  elements	  as	  infrastructure,	  vision	  for	  the	  project,	  human	  
capital,	   linkages	   and	   trust	   are	   key	   to	  make	   the	   project	  work.	   So	   is	   governance	   of	   the	  
project	  itself.	  "Decentralization	  of	  authority,	  thus	  minimizing	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  problem;	  
centralization	   of	   information	   via	   one	   platform	   and	   interoperability	   of	   interfaces	   and	  
applications	  with	  this	  platform"	  (Bott	  and	  Young	  2012)	  are	  examples	  of	  such	  governance.	  	  
In	   their	   report	   for	   the	  World	  Bank	   two	   years	   later,	   they	   study	   applications	   of	   crowd-­‐
sourcing	  projects	  for	  governance	  in	  fragile	  state	  contexts.	  The	  ability	  for	  crowdsourced	  
monitoring	   projects	   to	   "localize,	   visualize,	   and	   publish	   complex,	   aggregate	   data	   on	   a	  
multilayer	  map"	   in	   near	   real	   time,	   "empowers	   citizens	   and	   beneficiaries	   of	   government	  
and	  donor	  services	  to	  provide	  feedback".	  The	  projects	  can	  deliver	  an	  immediate	  situation	  
awareness,	   an	   aspect	   of	   crowdsourced	   monitoring	   that	   might	   be	   one	   of	   the	   main	  
differences	  to	  traditional	  observation	  processes	  (Bott,	  Gigler,	  and	  Young	  2014).	  	  
A	  crowdsourced	  election	  monitoring	  projects	  can	  engage	  large	  groups	  of	  citizens	  on	  the	  
ground	  as	  observers.	  These	  observers	  typically	  inform	  a	  central	  hub	  via	  SMS	  about	  the	  
incidents	  and	  their	   locations.	  This	   information	  is	  then	  posted	  on	  interactive	  maps.	  The	  
near	  real	  time	  reporting	  using	  social	  media	  or	  SMS	  in	  combination	  with	  platforms	  such	  
as	   the	   Ushahidi,	   have	   "created	  a	  new	  horizon	  of	  possibilities	   for	  monitoring,	  harnessing	  
election	   violence	   by	   documenting	   it	   in	   real	   time,	   and	   creating	   new	   access	   channels	   for	  
citizens	   to	   hold	   their	   governments	   accountable",	   as	   Gabrielle	   Bardall	   notes	   (Bardall	  
2010).	  
The	  above	  sounds	  nice,	  but	  crowdsourced	  projects	  are	  vulnerable	  both	  for	  false	  reports	  
or	  for	  revealing	  information	  that	  should	  not	  reach	  the	  public.	  George	  Chamales	  therefore	  
suggests	  best	  practise	  to	  include	  guidance	  "to	  identify	  sensitive	  types	  of	  information	  that	  
should	   not	   be	   disclosed	   and	   ways	   to	   detect	   and	   respond	   to	   inaccurate	   or	   fabricated	  
information"	  (Chamales	  2013).	  
The	   landscape	   and	   scope	   of	   crowdsourced	   projects	   is	   vast.	   To	   relate	   the	   Uchaguzi	  
project	  to	  the	  set	  of	  definitions	  and	  characteristics	  of	  crowdsourcing,	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  "The	  
Electoral	   Integrity	   Project"8	  and	   the	   definitions	   they	   use	   to	   separate	   variations	   of	  
crowdsourcing	  (Grömping	  2014).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  Electoral	  Integrity	  project:	  https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/home	  	  
	   21	  
2.4.3 Listening	  or	  actively	  asking	  
Imagine	   you	   enter	   a	   town	   on	   the	   day	   of	   an	   important	   event.	   The	   market	   square	   is	  
crowded,	  people	  are	  chatting	  about	  what	  is	  going	  on.	  If	  you	  collected	  all	  what	  was	  said	  
on	   the	   market	   square	   and	   filtered	   out	   the	   nonsense,	   it	   resembles	   what	   happens	   in	  
passive	   crowdsourcing.	   If	   you	   instead	   started	   asking	   people	   what	   happened,	   it	  
resembles	  active	  crowdsourcing.	  Both	  methods	  are	  frequently	  used.	  	  
"Passive"	   crowdsourcing	   usually	   describes	   various	  methods	   of	   passively	   listening	   and	  
harvesting	   information	   from	  media	   channels	   or	   social	  media	   as	   Facebook	   or	   Twitter.	  
During	  particular	  events,	   there	  would	  be	  created	  keywords	  or	  hashtags9	  used	  to	  relate	  
the	  message	  to	  the	  event	  (Grömping	  2014).	  	  
To	  properly	  monitor	  the	  large	  amount	  of	   information	  shared	  on	  social	  media,	  machine	  
learning	   techniques	   are	   used	   to	   be	   able	   to	   filter	   out	   the	   noise	   and	   extract	   valuable	  
information	   from	  of	  messages	   -­‐	  or	   to	   find	   the	  needle	   in	   the	  haystack,	  as	  Patrick	  Meier	  
likes	   to	   describe	   it	   (Cobb	   et	   al.	   2014;	   Imran	   et	   al.	   2014;	   Starbird,	   Muzny,	   and	   Palen	  
2012).	  	  
"Open"	   crowdsourcing	   is	   characterized	   by	   the	   ability	   of	   any	   citizen	   equipped	   with	   a	  
mobile	  phone	  or	  Internet	  connection	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  given	  project.	  The	  term	  "Active"	  
is	   used	   when	   the	   crowd	   is	   encouraged	   to	   do	   so,	   either	   through	   traditional	   media,	  
posters,	   pamphlets	   or	   social	  media.	   There	   are	   numerous	   experiences	   on	   how	   reports	  
from	  the	  crowd,	  organized	  in	  a	  proper	  manner,	  can	  alert	  or	  inform	  the	  general	  public	  on	  
events	   as	   they	   are	   unfolding.	   If	   participation	   in	   political	   processes	   also	   attracts	   those	  
who	  normally	  do	  not	  participate	  "this	  is	  something	  that	  will	  affect	  political	  equality	  in	  a	  
positive	  direction"	  (Hellström	  and	  Karefelt	  2012).	  
In	   certain	   events,	   the	   large	   amount	   of	   messages	   sent	   can	   be	   directed	   by	   adding	  
particular	   tags	   to	   the	  message.	  Thus	   the	  open	  crowdsourcing	  becomes	  "guided"	   in	   the	  
sense	  that	   the	  crowd	  is	  given	  recommendations	  on	  how	  to	  classify	  their	  messages.	  UN	  
OCHA	   has	   a	   project	   going	   to	   further	   elaborate	   the	   possibilities	   of	   guiding	   tweets	   to	  
increase	  the	  usefulness	  of	  microblogging10	  during	  crisis	  (Moore	  and	  Verity	  2014).	  
"Bounded"	  crowdsourcing	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  registered	  and	  usually	  trained	  "crowd"	  
of	  informants	  feed	  the	  information	  or	  collaborate	  on	  a	  given	  project.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  See	  the	  appendix	  for	  a	  list	  of	  hashtags	  used	  for	  the	  Uchaguzi	  project.	  
10 	  Microblogging:	   Posting	   messages	   with	   severe	   space	   or	   size	   restraints,	   http://www.merriam-­‐
webster.com/dictionary/microblogging	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Cristophe	  Billen,	  an	  analyst	  at	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court,	  develops	  a	  project	  called	  
"Peoples	   Intelligence".	   It	   seeks	   to	   develop	   crowdsourcing	   information	   during	   crisis	   or	  
tense	   situations	   a	   step	   further,	   using	   a	   digital	   talk-­‐back	   function	   to	   ask	  witnesses	   for	  
details	  and	  more	   information	   through	  automated	  SMS.	  The	  project	   is	   in	   its	  developing	  
phase,	  granted	  a	  seed	   fund	  from	  USAID	   in	  2014.	  "Peoples	   Intelligence"	  provides	  a	   tool	  
for	   verification	   of	   reports	   received	   by	   witnesses,	   with	   the	   ability	   to	   request	   more	  
information	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  incident	  is	  not	  fully	  reported	  (Billen	  2013,	  2014).	  	  
2.4.4 Online	  volunteers	  	  
Wikipedia	  could	  not	  have	  been	  created	  without	  them,	  Open	  Street	  Map	  wouldn't	  be	  the	  
major	  open-­‐source	  map	  of	  the	  world	  without	  the	  group	  of	  engaged	  citizens	  described	  as	  
online	   volunteers.	   In	   some	   contexts	   they	   may	   be	   described	   as	   the	   "Volunteer	   and	  
Technical	   Communities"	   (V&TC).	   These	   are	   organized	   groups	   of	   online	   volunteers	  
(Waldman,	  Verity,	  and	  Roberts	  2013).	  	  
The	  United	  Nations	  started	  using	  online	  volunteers	  15	  years	  ago	   in	  collaboration	  with	  
Cisco	  systems.	  With	   todays	  450	  000	  registered	  volunteers	   their	  database	  represents	  a	  
massive	  workforce	  for	  online	  humanitarian-­‐	  and	  development	  purposes	  (UN	  Volunteers	  
2015).	  Close	   to	  3	  million	  online	  volunteers	  were	   searching	   for	   flight	  MH370	   in	  March	  
2014	   through	   the	   Tomnod11	  platform	   (Fishwick	   2014).	   At	   the	   time	   of	   writing	   the	  
Tomnod	  volunteers	  does	  damage	  assessment	  from	  satellite	  images	  over	  Nepal.	  
Online	   volunteers	   may	   be	   more	   or	   less	   trained,	   and	   are	   characterized	   by	   their	  
engagement	  and	  skills	  rather	  than	  profession,	  age,	   location	  or	   income.	  They	  and	  count	  
dozens	   or	   millions	   depending	   on	   the	   event.	   (Cobb	   et	   al.	   2014;	   Shanley	   et	   al.	   2013).	  
During	   the	   Uchaguzi	   project	   more	   than	   200	   trained	   online	   volunteers	   engaged	   in	  
translating,	   verifying,	   and	   geo-­‐locating	   the	   reports	   on	   the	   elections	   (Omenya	   and	  
Crandall	  2013).	  	  
The	  Ushahidi	  mapping	  platforms,	  which	  is	  free	  to	  use,	  has	  been	  deployed	  in	  a	  number	  of	  
monitoring	   projects,	   whether	   it	   has	   been	   election-­‐monitoring,	   crisis	   mapping	   of	  
wildfires,	  earthquakes,	  floods	  or	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  In	  addition	  to	  be	  a	  major	  tool	  for	  
collecting	  information,	  the	  platform	  and	  its	  creators	  at	  iHub	  Nairobi	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  core	  
for	  a	  global	  online	  community	   investigating	   the	  perils	  and	  possibilities	  of	  open	  source	  
tools	  for	  crowdsourced	  mapping	  projects	  (Bardall	  2010).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Tomnod	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  satellite	  company	  DigitalGlobe:	  http://www.tomnod.com/	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The	   crowdmap	   platform	   is	   simply	   a	   database	   enabled	   for	   collecting	   information	   via	  
mobile	   apps,	   SMS	   or	   the	   web.	   The	   user	   sets	   up	   a	   structure	   for	   categorizing	   the	  
information,	  and	  adds	  a	  geographical	  location	  to	  each	  report.	  It	  then	  appears	  as	  a	  located	  
dot	  on	  an	  interactive	  map.	  Where	  OpenStreetMap	  (OSM	  2015)	  is	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  crowd	  to	  
join	  drawing	  the	  roads,	  buildings	  or	  market	  squares,	  the	  Ushahidi	  tool	  allows	  the	  crowd	  
to	  populate	  such	  maps	  with	  textual	  descriptions,	  images	  or	  videos	  of	  events.	  
The	  use	  of	  Ushahidi	  to	  map	  the	  earthquake	  in	  Haiti	  in	  2010,	  gave	  a	  boost	  to	  this	  type	  of	  
crisis	   mapping	   where	   online	   volunteers	   were	   translating,	   categorizing	   and	   mapping	  
reports	  from	  the	  affected	  population	  to	  create	  an	  as	  close	  to	  realtime	  as	  possible	  -­‐	  map	  
over	   the	   situation.	   This	  mapping	   exercise	   led	   to	   a	   new	   term,	   "Digital	   Humanitarians"	  
(Bailard	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Bott,	  Gigler,	  and	  Young	  2014;	  Meier	  2015).	  	  
The	   loosely	   connected	   individuals	   have	   later	   organized	   themselves	   in	   more	   or	   less	  
specialized	  entities	  and	  are	   today	  counted	  upon	  during	  major	  disasters.	  Organizations	  
such	  as	  Red	  Cross,	  the	  World	  Bank,	  UN	  OCHA	  or	  MSF	  are	  frequently	  using	  their	  services	  
(ICRC	  2013;	  Karlsrud	  2014;	  OCHA	  2013).	  
2.4.5 Mobile	  phones	  for	  governance	  
For	  more	  than	  a	  decade,	  Johan	  Hellström	  has	  studied	  how	  mobile	  phones	  can	  be	  used	  as	  
a	  tool	  for	  good	  governance.	  He	  refers	  to	  DFiDs	  three	  main	  concepts	  for	  good	  governance:	  
"Capability	  of	  governments	  to	  get	  things	  done,	  how	  they	  respond	  to	  the	  needs	  and	  rights	  of	  
their	   citizens,	   and	   how,	   in	   turn,	   people	   can	   hold	   their	   governments	   to	   account"	   (DFID	  
2006).:	   Hellström	   is	   not	   over-­‐optimistic	   about	   how	   East-­‐African	   governments	   are	  
enabling	  mobile	  technologies	  for	  good	  governance.	  Maja	  Bott	  describes	  the	  reluctance	  of	  
the	  Kenyan	  government	  to	  enable	  the	  citizen	  engagement	  platform	  Huduma12	  created	  to	  
enable	   dialogue	   between	   the	   government	   and	   the	   public.	   The	   platform	   is	   still	   under	  
construction	   (Bott	   and	   Young	   2012:	   28).	   But	   Hellström	   acknowledges	   how	  
communication	  between	  citizens	  has	  changed	  with	  the	  spread	  of	  mobile	  communication	  
tools.	  "Technology	  does	  not	  empower	  anyone,	  citizens	  empower	  themselves.	  And	  with	  right	  
and	  better	  tools,	  this	  will	  become	  easier"	  (Hellström	  2011).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Huduma:	  Swahili	  for	  "Service".	  See	  http://www.hudumakenya.go.ke/	  -­‐	  Portal	  is	  coming	  "soon".	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2.4.6 Lowering	  the	  language	  barriers	  
During	   the	   presidential	   elections	   in	   Ukraine	   in	   2014,	   OSCE/ODIHR	   noticed	   the	  
contribution	   of	   the	   volunteer	   organization	   OPORA,	   and	   their	   use	   of	   citizen	   reporting	  
with	   2500	   volunteers	   throughout	   the	   country	   and	   their	   online	   mapping	   project	  
(opora.org	  2014;	  OSCE	  2014).	  The	  OPORA	  platform	  is	  no	  longer	  online.	  
With	   translation	   activated	   on	   your	   web-­‐browser,	   the	   reports	   and	   the	   project	   was	  
readable	  even	  for	  us	  who	  don't	  understand	  Ukrainian.	  This	  simple	  feature	  increase	  the	  
potential	  audience	  for	  such	  projects	  -­‐	  enabled	  by	  machine	  translation	  technology	  in	  the	  
tools	  we	  use.	  And	  -­‐	  the	  content	  is	  understandable	  outside	  your	  language	  domain.	  From	  
understanding	  nothing,	  machine	  translation	  let	  you	  understand	  a	  lot.	  	  
2.4.7 Examples	  of	  crowdsourcing	  projects	  	  
The	  below	   table	   shows	  different	   types	   of	   crowdsourced	  projects,	   describing	   the	   tasks	  
performed	  by	  the	  crowd	  and	  characteristics	  of	  these	  projects.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  comprehensive	  
list,	  but	  might	  give	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  such	  projects	  in	  some	  relevant	  settings.	  
Type	   Crowd	  task	   Example	   Motive	   Characteristics	  
Documentation	  	   Creating	  videos	   Witness.org	   Making	  grassroots	  
heard	  
Dedicated	  channel	  	  
Edited	  videos	  
Trust	  
Advocacy	   Sign	  petitions	   Avaaz/SumOfUs	   Influence	   "Clicktivism"	  
Crisis	  alerts,	  
information	  
Tweeting	   Phillipines	  Gov.,	  
OCHA	  
Information	   Organized	  hashtags	  to	  
direct	  tweets	  





Solve	  large	  tasks	   Classifying	  images,	  
tagging	  objects	  
Crisismapping	   Adding	  
information	  to	  a	  
map	  
Standby	  Task	  Force,	  
KLL	  
Creating	  overview	  
of	  a	  situation	  





directly	  to	  a	  
project	  
Environmentalist-­‐,	  
human	  rights	  	  
Documenting	  
particular	  events	  
Civilians	  dedicated	  to	  a	  
particular	  happening	  in	  
time	  
Self	  organizing	   Inform	  each	  other	   Self	  organizing	  
through	  Facebook	  	  
Stay	  informed,	  
share	  tasks	  
Closed	  or	  open	  
exchange	  of	  
information	  
Mapping	   Draw	  map	  details	  
from	  satellite	  
images	  
OSM,	  Wikimapia	   Create	  detailed	  
maps	  of	  unmapped	  
areas	  
Span	  from	  local	  
interest	  to	  global	  










and	  fair	  elections	  
Mixture	  of	  bounded	  
and	  open	  
crowdsourcing	  
Table	  1:	  Examples	  of	  different	  uses	  of	  crowdsourcing	  and	  crowdwork.	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2.4.8 Citizen	  reporting	  in	  other	  elections	  	  
In	  some	  recent	  elections	   in	  sub-­‐Sahara	  countries,	   the	  voices	  of	   the	  crowd,	   through	  the	  
engagement	   in	   domestic	   election	   observation	   and	   with	   the	   use	   of	   ICT	   based	  
communication	  tools,	  are	  becoming	  visible	  and	  more	  organized	  as	  participants	  in	  what	  
might	   be	   describes	   as	   a	   hybrid	   between	   domestic	   and	   international	   observation	  
"missions".	  The	  observers	  are	  on	  the	  ground,	  covering	  far	  more	  polling	  stations	  than	  any	  
international	  mission,	  reporting	  directly	  to	  an	  online	  platform.	  The	  international	  online	  
volunteers	  assist	  the	  project	  from	  their	  offices,	  homes	  or	  universities	  worldwide.	  
Although	  crowdsourcing	  projects	  are	  going	  on	  during	  elections	  on	  all	  continents,	   I	  will	  
refer	  to	  a	  couple	  of	  projects	  below.	  
At	  the	  2012	  International	  Conference	  on	  Information	  and	  Communication	  Technologies	  
and	  Development	  (ICTD)	  in	  Atlanta,	  USA	  Johan	  Hellström	  and	  Anna	  Karefelt	  presented	  a	  
study	  on	  the	  use	  of	  SMS	  during	  the	  Uganda	  general	  elections	  in	  2011.	  A	  domestic	  non-­‐
governmental	   organization,	   the	   DEMGroup	   set	   up	   two	   platforms	   for	   SMS	   enabled	  
election	  monitoring.	   One	  was	   an	   open	   platform,	   inviting	   the	   general	   public	   to	   submit	  
their	   observations,	   the	   other	  was	   a	   bounded	   crowdsourcing	   platform	   deploying	   6000	  
observers	  to	  report	  from	  the	  elections.	  Hellström	  and	  Karefelt	  surveyed	  the	  experiences	  
of	  the	  participating	  and	  not-­‐participating	  citizens	  on	  their	  experience	  with	  the	  reporting	  
possibilities	   and	   tools.	   They	   found	   that	   such	   platforms	   indeed	   create	   a	   channel	   for	  
citizens	  who	  don't	  know	  where	  else	  to	  report	  their	  observations	  or	  where	  to	  turn	  to	  for	  
help	  during	   the	  elections.	  They	  also	   found	   that	   the	  main	  obstacle	   for	  not	  participating	  
was	  either	  that	  the	  public	  did	  not	  know	  about	  the	  service,	  their	  fear	  of	  personal	  security	  
or	  the	  perception	  that	  their	  reports	  would	  be	  of	  no	  use.	  	  
They	   noticed	   that	   "Using	   mobile	   phones	   for	   participation	   seem	   to	   attract	   groups	   of	  
citizens	  not	  participating	  in	  other	  arenas,	  which	  suggest	  that	  this	  channel	  is	  contributing	  
positively	  to	  political	  equality."	  (Hellström	  and	  Karefelt	  2012)	  
2.4.9 Reclaim	  Naija	  
Bailard	   and	   Livingston	   have	   investigated	   the	   actual	   datasets	   gathered	   during	   the	  
crowdsourced	  monitoring	  of	  the	  2011	  Nigerian	  Elections,	  ReclaimNaija13.	  Reports	  from	  
citizens	   during	   the	   elections	   for	   the	  National	  Assembly,	   the	  Presidential	   elections	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  ReclaimNaija	  was	  also	  running	  for	  the	  2015	  elections	  in	  Nigeria:	  http://www.reclaimnaija.net/	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the	  Governor	  elections	  added	  up	  to	  27	  000	  crowdsourced	  reports.	  The	  elections	  for	  the	  
Nigerian	  National	  Assembly	  were	  to	  take	  place	  on	  April	  2.	  2011,	  but	  was	  delayed	  due	  to	  
polling	   stations	  not	  being	  prepared,	   lacking	  material	   for	   the	  votes.	  The	  elections	  were	  
postponed	   by	   a	   week.	   Bailard	   and	   Livingston	   partly	   credit	   the	   crowdsourced	  
information	   for	   the	   extra	   time	   given	   to	   Independent	   National	   Electoral	   Commission	  
(INEC)	  to	  prepare	  the	  elections	  (Bailard	  and	  Livingston	  2014).	  
Further	  they	  claim	  to	  have	  found	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  crowdsourced	  reports	  and	  
the	   ability	   for	   voters	   to	   successfully	   cast	   their	   vote.	   Their	   point	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	  
crowdsourced	   information	   increased	   number	   of	   votes	   cast	   because	   of	   increased	  
motivation	   but	   "Rather,	   our	   point	   is	   that	   motivated	   voters	   were	   presented	   with	   an	  
opportunity	   to	   successfully	   realize	   their	   ambition	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   election	   owing	   to	  
the	   repairs	   made	   to	   the	   voting	   process."	   (Bailard	   and	   Livingston	   2014:	   359)	   The	  
crowdsourced	   reports	   provided	   information	   to	   election	   officials	   to	   better	   support	   the	  
elections,	  resulting	  in	  more	  successful	  votes.	  They	  state	  that	  "crowdsourced	  information	  
can,	   indeed,	   improve	   transparency	   and	   possibly	   even	   electoral	   integrity"	   and	   that	   "the	  
reduced	   communication	   costs	   provided	   by	   digital	   networks	   have	   altered	   the	   toolset	   of	  
governance	  and	  citizenship	  in	  potentially	  profound	  ways"	  (Bailard	  and	  Livingston	  2014).	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3 Civil	  society	  projects	  in	  the	  2013	  Kenya	  Elections	  
In	   2010,	   Kenyans	   cast	   their	   votes	   in	   the	   national	   referendum	   to	   confirm	   their	   new	  
constitution.	  The	  new	   legislative	   framework	  contained	  several	   reforms	   that	  supported	  
the	  possibilities	  for	  civic	  engagement	  as	  well	  as	  changes	  in	  power	  structure	  for	  following	  
elections.	  Some	  important	  changes	  were:	  
• The	   constitution	   removes	   the	   power	   of	   the	   president	   to	   appoint	   key	   public	  
officials	  including	  the	  electoral	  commission.	  	  
• The	   new	   commission	   is	   a	   body	   independent	   from	   the	   presidency	   and	   has	  
operational	  autonomy	  of	  the	  election	  management.	  
• The	  creation	  of	  47	   counties	  with	  an	  elected	  governor	   created	  as	  a	  new	   level	  of	  
political	  power.	  The	  elected	  governors	  constitute	  the	  Senate,	  the	  Upper	  House.	  
• Candidates	  running	  for	  president	  need	  50%	  plus	  one	  to	  win	  rather	  than	  plurality.	  
The	  elected	  president	  also	  have	  to	  gain	  more	  than	  25%	  of	  the	  votes	  in	  24	  of	  the	  
47	  counties	  to	  secure	  support	  from	  different	  communities	  	  
(Carter	  Center	  2013:	  20-­‐24)	  
	  
Other	  proposals	  never	  passed	   the	  parliament,	   such	  as	   a	  demand	   for	   the	   candidates	   to	  
declare	  their	  wealth	  or	  the	  regulation	  of	  campaign	  financing.	  And	  finally,	  Kalenjins	  and	  
the	   Kikuyus	   -­‐	   the	   once	   bitter	   enemies	   in	   the	   2007/08	   elections	   was	   now	   teamed	   up	  
behind	  the	  same	  presidential	  candidate	  (Carter	  Center	  2013;	  CrisisGroup	  2013).	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  an	  expanded	  media	  landscape,	  where	  voters	  were	  allowed	  to	  question	  
their	   candidates	   in	   public	   (BBC	   2013),	   set	   the	   stage	   for	   several	   civic	   engagement	  
projects.	   But	   happiness	   on	   the	  new	  media	   freedom	  didn't	   last.	   In	   contradiction	   to	   the	  
press	  freedom	  secured	  in	  the	  new	  constitution,	  a	  new	  bill	  was	  passed	  in	  parliament	  in	  
October	  2013	  that	  again	  would	  reduce	  the	  press	  freedom	  in	  Kenya	  (RSF	  2013).	  
One	   month	   ahead	   of	   the	   elections,	   Human	   Rights	  Watch	   warned	   that	   the	   underlying	  
reasons	  for	  the	  violence	  in	  2007	  still	  was	  present	  and	  alive,	  and	  that	  the	  tension	  in	  parts	  
of	   the	   country	   even	   had	   escalated	   (HRW	   2013).	   The	   global	   angst	   for	   new	   waves	   of	  
violence	  in	  Kenya	  evoked	  a	  large	  media	  attention	  on	  the	  preparations	  and	  the	  elections.	  
Traces	  of	  what	  was	  expected	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  prepared	  categories	  for	  the	  reports	  
on	   the	   Uchaguzi	   platform.	   Luckily,	   not	   too	   many	   reports	   were	   filed	   to	   populate	   the	  
gravest	  categories	  of	  violence	  (Leson	  2013c).	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3.1 Securing	  peaceful	  elections	  
To	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  outbursts,	  the	  country	  had	  never	  seen	  such	  electoral	  preparations	  
with	   the	   peace	   projects,	   voter	   education	   and	   civic	   engagement	   as	   during	   the	  months	  
ahead	   of	   the	   elections.	   This	   is	   the	   landscape	   in	   which	   the	   crowdsourced	   monitoring	  
project	  was	   launched.	  All	   the	  peace	  efforts	  mentioned	  above	  has	   to	  be	  seen	   in	  context	  
with	   the	   Uchaguzi	   project.	   The	   "tone"	   was	   set	   -­‐	   even	   with	   the	   risk	   of	   suppressing	  
important	  issues	  to	  keep	  the	  peace.	  
3.1.1 Training	  voters	  and	  observers	  
With	  the	  new	  political	  and	  media	  landscape	  and	  with	  a	  massive	  international	  support	  to	  
prevent	   a	   new	   violent	   turnout	   of	   elections,	   volunteer	   organizations	   and	  NGOs	   started	  
planning	   for	   the	   events	   to	   come	   in	   2013.	   Partners	   and	   sources	   for	   finance	   were	  
identified,	  and	  the	  Constitution	  and	  Reform	  Education	  Consortium	  (CRECO)	  planned	  for	  
voter	   education	   and	   training	   of	   observers.	   International	   organizations	   such	   as	   Dutch	  
HIVOS,	  Canadian	  CIDA,	  USAID,	   the	  British	  DFID	  and	  the	  Kenyan	  Independent	  Electoral	  
and	  Boundaries	  Commission	  (IEBC)	  supported	  the	  various	  voter	  education	  and	  electoral	  
staff	  education	  projects.	  The	  Constitution	  &	  Reform	  Education	  Consortium	  (CRECO)	  -­‐	  an	  
umbrella	   organization	   for	   more	   than	   20	   civil	   sector	   organizations	   was	   one	   of	   the	  
important	   drivers	   of	   voter	   education	   as	   well	   as	   training	   observers.	   (EU-­‐EOM	   2013;	  
Hivos	  2013;	  KHRC	  2014;	  US	  DoS	  2013).	  "Although	  voter	  education	  was	  carried	  out	  in	  all	  
the	  constituencies,	  it	  was	  of	  varying	  and	  uneven	  quality	  and	  quantity"	  ELOG	  notes	  in	  their	  
report	  (ELOG	  2013).	  
Where	  CRECO	  focused	  on	  voters,	   the	  Elections	  Observation	  Group	  (ELOG)	  coordinated	  
stakeholder	   awareness	   projects	   and	   long	   term	   observation,	   and	   later	   on,	   election	   day	  
monitoring	  as	  well	  as	  Parallel	  Vote	  Tabulation.	  	  
ELOG	  deployed	   the	   largest	   group	   of	   observers	   during	   the	   elections,	   and	   their	   partner	  
organization	  CRECO	  contributed	  to	  this	  group.	  The	  latter	  collaborated	  with	  the	  Uchaguzi	  
project,	  feeding	  the	  platform	  with	  their	  observations	  (Omenya	  2013).	  	  
3.2 The	  (social)	  media	  landscape	  
The	  use	  of	  ICT	  in	  the	  preparation	  for	  the	  elections	  did	  not	  pass	  without	  notice.	  Trujillo	  et	  
al	  points	  to	  the	  fear	  of	  contagious	  violence	  to	  spread,	  and	  how	  creative	  use	  of	   ICT	  and	  
innovative	  strategies	  were	  employed	  to	  prevent	  it	  before	  the	  2013	  elections	  (Trujillo	  et	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al.	   2014).	   In	   Kenya	   there	   were	   38	   million	   mobile	   phone	   users	   of	   a	   population	   of	   48	  
million	  in	  2013.	  Every	  grown	  up	  -­‐	  rich	  and	  poor	  -­‐	  have	  one,	  and	  except	  some	  of	  the	  less	  
populated	  areas	  in	  the	  north,	  there	  is	  mobile	  coverage	  in	  most	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  
M-­‐pesa	   mobile	   banking	   system	   have	   included	   new	   groups	   in	   the	   official	   economy	  
(Barkan	  2013).	  	  	  
3.2.1 Peace	  campaigns	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  in	  cyberspace	  
One	   other	   group	   involved	   in	   civic	   education	   that	   played	   a	   role	   in	   promoting	   peaceful	  
elections	  was	   Sisi	   ni	   Amani	   Kenya	   ("We	   are	   Peace	   Kenya").	   In	   collaboration	  with	   the	  
global	   community	   PopTech	   (PopTech	   2015)	   Sisi	   ni	   Amani	   arranged	   community	  
meetings	  as	  well	  as	  SMS-­‐based	  civic	  education	  and	  promotion	  of	  peace	  (Corlazzoli	  2014;	  
Sisi	  ni	  Amani	  2013).	  
PeaceTXT	  Kenya	  campaigned	  to	  "prevent,	  reduce	  or	  stop	  election-­‐related	  violence"	  using	  
SMS	   to	   transmit	   peace-­‐messages	   to	   their	   subscribers	   (Gettleman	   2013;	   Kalan	   2013;	  
Meier	  2013b;	  Trujillo	  et	  al.	  2014).	  	  
To	   prevent	   media	   from	   spreading	   hate	   speech,	   guidelines	   were	   developed	   by	   the	  
National	  Cohesion	  and	  Integration	  Commission.	  Media	  was	  encouraged	  to	  do	  "peaceful	  
reporting".	   Monitors	   were	   deployed	   to	   watch	   and	   listen	   to	   see	   that	   media	   did	   not	  
contribute	  to	  escalation	  of	  hate	  or	  violence	  (Marchant	  2013).	  
FInally,	   the	   advertising	   company	   Flashcast	   Kenya,	   used	   its	   text	   displays	   on	   buses	   in	  
Nairobi	   and	   encouraged	   their	   passengers	   to	   post	   peace-­‐messages	   via	   SMS.	   The	   texts	  
displayed	   on	   screens	   on	   the	   buses	   and	  was	   also	   published	   via	   the	   company's	   Twitter	  
feed,	  on	  their	  Facebook	  page	  and	  on	  the	  FlashCast	  Peace	  Feed	  website	  (Marchant	  2013).	  
3.2.2 Kenya	  speaks	  
For	   the	   first	   time	   in	   history	  Kenyans	   experienced	   an	   open	  media-­‐debate	   between	   the	  
contestants	   in	  the	  elections.	  A	  project	  staged	  by	  BBC	  -­‐	  Sema	  Kenya	  ("Kenya	  Speaks")	   -­‐	  
invited	   citizens	   to	   appear	   in	   panel	   debates	   and	   were	   encouraged	   and	   allowed	   to	  
question	  their	  leaders	  face	  to	  face.	  The	  weekly	  program	  series	  ran	  from	  October	  2012	  to	  
the	  end	  of	  March	  2013,	  following	  a	  straight	  forward	  concept	  of	  broadcasted	  public	  panel	  
debates	  among	  the	  candidates	  staged	  both	  in	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  
voters	  were	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	  direct	   dialogue	  with	   their	   candidates	   on	   live	  TV.	  The	  
project	  was	  run	  by	  BBC	  Media	  Action	  TV	  and	  funded	  by	  DFID	  (BBC	  2013).	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3.2.3 Scanning	  social	  media	  for	  dangerous	  speech	  
The	  Umati	   ("crowd")	  project,	   supported	  by	   Internews,	  PACT,	   and	  Chemonics/KTI	  was	  
set	   up	   to	   scan	   social	   media	   for	   hateful	   expressions.	   The	   team	   surveying	   the	   Internet	  
worked	  in	  five	  Kenyan	  languages,	  Swahili	  and	  English.	  With	  over	  2	  million	  active	  Kenyan	  
Facebook	  users	   in	  April	  2013	   the	   space	  of	   expression	  was	   significant.	  The	  aim	  was	   to	  
"create	   a	   window"	   of	   insight	   to	   the	   state	   of	   Kenyan	   society.	   Sanctions	   and	   laws	   to	  
prosecute	   hate-­‐speech	   that	   generates	   violent	   action	   is	   not	   yet	   in	   place,	   and	   the	  
monitoring	  is	  not	   in	   itself	  a	  complete	  solution,	  but	  surely	  a	  method	  to	  raise	  awareness	  
on	   the	   phenomenon.	   The	   Umati	   project	   facilitated	   the	   possibility	   of	   response	   and	  
commenting	   through	   the	   project	   and	   developed	   methods	   to	   identify,	   collect	   and	  
categorise	  such	  expressions	  (Sambuli,	  Morara,	  and	  Mahihu	  2013;	  Wrong	  2013).	  	  
They	   followed	   Susan	   Beneschs	   definition	   of	   hate	   speech	   -­‐	   speech	   that	   encourages	  
violence	  against	  a	  particular	  group.	  She	  documents	   that	   inflammatory	  speech	   tends	   to	  
rise	  before	  outbreaks	  of	  mass	  violence,	   and	   that	  monitoring	   such	   speech	  may	   form	   "a	  
basis	  for	  efforts	  to	  prevent	  such	  violence"	  (Benesch	  2012).	  	  
Interestingly,	  the	  Umati	  monitoring	  found	  that	  90	  %	  of	  hate-­‐speech	  before	  the	  elections	  
was	  retrieved	  from	  Facebook.	  Ethan	  Zuckerman	  reports	  a	  similar	  situation	  on	  Facebook	  
in	   Myanmar	   -­‐	   where	   the	   Muslim	   Rohingya	   minority	   are	   harassed	   and	   persecuted.	  
Facebook	  is	  not	  in	  its	  roots	  an	  open	  social	  media	  platform	  where	  your	  expressions	  run	  a	  
higher	  risk	  of	  being	  contradicted	  (Zuckerman	  2014)	  such	  as	  on	  Twitter.	  
3.2.4 Online	  polling	  station	  locator	  
As	  other	  multinational	  giants,	  Google	  joined	  the	  party	  by	  launching	  their	  Kenya	  Elections	  
Hub	   -­‐	   a	   portal	   meant	   for	   journalists,	   candidates	   or	   voters	   to	   find	   news,	   links	   and	   a	  
Google-­‐map	  to	  find	  your	  polling	  station.	  Kenya	  was	  the	  third	  sub-­‐Sahara	  country	  where	  
this	   initiative	   had	   been	   launched,	   after	   Senegal	   and	   Gambia.	  With	   14	  million	   internet	  
users,	  mostly	  accessing	  the	  internet	  with	  smartphones,	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  voters	  
turned	  to	  the	  net	  to	  stay	  informed	  (CapitalFM	  2013;	  Mayers	  2013).	  According	  to	  Google	  
Zeitgeist,	  "IEBC"	  ranked	  as	  a	  top	  search	  word	  for	  Google	  searches	  from	  Kenya	  in	  2012,	  
beating	  both	  "Facebook"	  and	  "Whitney	  Houston"	  (Google	  2012;	  Okolloh	  2013)	  
	  
Globally,	   according	   to	   Tuccinardi	   and	   Balme,	   election-­‐day	   activities	   have	   become	  
increasingly	  "cleaner".	  Groups	  who	  are	  seeking	  to	  manipulate	  the	  election	  results	  chose	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to	  aim	  their	   fraud	  in	  other	  areas	  such	  as	  media	  manipulation,	  political	  party	  financing,	  
voter	  registration	  or	  boundary	  delimitations	  (Tuccinardi	  and	  Balme	  2013).	  
Despite	   this,	   the	   violence	   before,	   during	   and	   after	   the	   2007/2008	   elections	   in	   Kenya	  
were	   fresh	   in	   mind	   before	   the	   2013	   elections.	   This	   makes	   a	   good	   reason	   for	   all	   the	  
efforts	   done	   to	   prevent	   it	   happen	   again.	   The	   Facebook	   platform	   "I	   am	   Kenyan",	   the	  
Umati	  project	  "I	  have	  no	  Tribe"	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Peacetxt	  effort	  are	  all	  signs	  of	  how	  projects	  
were	  aimed	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  violence	  and	  keep	  the	  elections	  peaceful	  (Trujillo	  et	  al.	  
2014).	  
3.2.5 ICT	  for	  managing	  the	  Kenyan	  Elections	  
The	  2013	  Kenyan	  elections	  also	   turned	  out	   to	  become	   the	  most	  expensive	  ever	   in	   the	  
nations	  history.	  The	   IEBC	   introduced	   technology	   to	  match	  a	  21st	   century	  approach	   to	  
elections.	   The	   Biometric	   Voter	   Registration	   system	   (BVR)	   would	   ensure	   a	   foolproof	  
computerized	  national	  register	  of	  voters.	  The	  Electronic	  Voter-­‐Identification	  Devices	  or	  
EVIDs,	  33,100	  were	  eventually	  purchased	  by	  the	  IEBC,	  one	  for	  each	  polling	  station,	  was	  
to	  ensure	  recognition	  of	  voters.	  Thirdly,	  the	  system	  of	  SMS	  transfer	  of	  results	  to	  a	  central	  
server	   with	   realtime	   publishing	   of	   intermediate	   tallying	   should	   prevent	   fraud	   during	  
transmission	  of	  votes	  (Barkan	  2013;	  Carter	  Center	  2013).	  	  
Joel	  Barkan,	  in	  his	  article	  in	  Journal	  of	  Democracy,	  launches	  serious	  critics	  to	  the	  choices	  
done	  by	  the	  IEBC	  in	  their	  selection	  of	  technology,	  their	  procurement	  process	  and	  their	  
delay	   to	   make	   crucial	   decisions.	   This	   led	   to	   a	   shortened	   period	   of	   time	   for	   voter	  
registration	  and	  a	  fragile	  setup	  on	  election	  day	  (Barkan	  2013).	  	  
The	  purchase	  was	  done	  to	  late,	  so	  was	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  equipment,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  
backup	  power	  contributed	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  about	  40%	  of	  the	  advanced	  systems.	  One	  of	  
the	  main	   reason	   for	   complaints	  on	  a	   slow	  voting	  processes	  was	   connected	   to	   that	   the	  
IEBC	  manning	  the	  polling	  stations	  had	  to	  turn	  to	  paper	  based	  voter	  registers	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  continue	  the	  voting	  process	  (Barkan	  2013;	  Carter	  Center	  2013;	  ELOG	  2013).	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3.3 The	  Uchaguzi	  methodology	  
Uchaguzi	   is	  not	  only	   a	   technology	  platform,	  but	   also	   a	   set	  up	   to	  handle	   crowdsourced	  
election	   monitoring.	   It	   was	   first	   created	   for	   the	   2010	   referendum	   for	   the	   new	  
constitution	   (Chan	   2010)	   and	   renewed	   for	   the	   2013	   elections.	   According	   to	   the	  
organizers,	  the	  platform	  "seeks	  to	  leverage	  on	  existing	  activities"	  on	  election	  observation	  
(Omenya	  2013).	  The	  umbrella	  organization	  Elections	  Observer	  Group	  (ELOG)	  therefore	  
became	   an	   important	   partner.	   The	   setup	   enabled	   rapid	   publication	   of	   reports	   in	   a	  
systematic	   way.	   Secondly,	   the	   team	   in	   the	   situation	   room	   could	   alert	   authorities	   or	  
organizations	  to	  react	  on	  urgent	  issues,	  and	  thirdly	  -­‐	   it	  worked	  as	  a	  channel	  to	  give	  an	  
outlet	  to	  the	  voice	  of	  citizens.	  	  
Below	   is	   a	   screen	   dump	   showing	   the	   Uchaguzi	   platform	   as	   it	   appeared	   during	   the	  
elections.	  Each	  circle	  represent	  the	  reports	  from	  a	  given	  location,	  zooming	  in	  on	  the	  map	  
let	  the	  viewer	  identify	  what	  was	  communicated	  from	  a	  given	  place.	  
	  
	  
Map	  1:	  Dots	  on	  the	  map	  showing	  number	  of	  reports	  from	  each	  location.	  Categories	  used	  are	  selectable	  to	  the	  
right.	  (Screenshot	  from	  njathika.blogspot.com)	  
	  
The	  main	  target	  group	  for	  the	  Uchaguzi	  project	  were	  ordinary	  citizens.	  Through	  posters,	  
flyers	  and	  broadcast	  the	  general	  public	  were	  encouraged	  to	  report	  on	  the	  election	  as	  it	  
proceeded	  (Omenya	  and	  Crandall	  2013).	  	  
Their	   official	   partner,	   CRECO	   deployed	   2000	   observers	   during	   the	   elections.	   Another	  
important	  partner	  in	  the	  project	  was	  Peace	  and	  Development	  Network	  Trust	  (PeaceNet),	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an	  umbrella	  organisation	  for	  several	  Civic	  Society	  Organisations	  (CSO)	  concerned	  with	  
peace	  building,	  promotion	  of	  justice	  and	  conflict	  transformation.	  
3.4 The	  Uchaguzi	  workflow	  
Three	  major	  sources	  of	  information	  were	  deployed	  during	  the	  data	  collection:	  
First	  were	  the	  trained	  group	  of	  observers.	  These	  volunteers	  were	  equipped	  with	  a	  cell-­‐
phone	  and	  a	  predefined	  list	  of	  issues	  to	  report.	  The	  phone	  numbers	  of	  the	  observers	  was	  
registered	   on	   the	   Uchaguzi	   platform	   on	   forehand	   together	   with	   the	   location	   of	   the	  
observer.	  The	  four	  digit	  toll	  free	  number	  "3002"	  was	  set	  up	  for	  reporting	  to	  the	  platform.	  
The	  predefined	  lists	  of	  issues	  to	  report	  on	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Code	  Cards.	  The	  cards	  
contained	  51	  chosen	  issues,	  each	  of	  them	  identified	  with	  a	  number.	  By	  sending	  an	  SMS	  
to	  "3002"	  containing	  the	  given	  number	  from	  the	  Code	  Card,	  the	  report	  was	  registered	  on	  
the	  Uchaguzi	  platform	  and	  converted	  to	  plain	  text.	  Since	  the	  names,	  phone-­‐numbers	  and	  
location	   of	   the	   observers	   already	   was	   registered	   in	   the	   system	   these	   reports	   were	  
automatically	  geolocated	  (Leson	  2013b).	  	  
	   	   04.03.2013,	  5:49,	  Mathioya	  District	  Headquarters,	  Kiriani,	  Boxes	  Inspection:	  Polling	  station	  
0520	  inspecting	  the	  boxes	  (Uchaguzi	  ID	  782)	  
	  
Before	   the	   elections	   2500	   on-­‐the-­‐ground	   volunteers	   from	   different	   youth	   groups	   and	  
umbrella	  organizations	  like	  CRECO,	  Mercy	  Corps,	  CHF,	  USAID,	  and	  CUEA	  were	  trained	  as	  
observers.	  Some	  were	  trained	  by	  their	  organization,	  others	  went	  through	  online	  training	  
arranged	  by	  the	  Uchaguzi	  team.	  
The	   reports	   from	   these	   observers	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   "Trusted	   reports"	   in	   the	   dataset	  
exported	   from	   the	  Uchaguzi	   platform.	   Further	   description	   of	   the	   list	   of	   issues	   follows	  
below.	  
The	   "Trusted	   Election	   Monitor	   Cards"	   (Code	   Cards)	   acted	   as	   a	   reporting	   guide	   for	  
trusted	   observers.	   They	   were	   registered	   on	   the	   Uchaguzi	   platform	   on	   forehand	   with	  
their	   location	  on	  constituency	   level,	  and	   their	  phone-­‐number.	  By	  sending	  an	  SMS	  with	  
the	   number	   corresponding	   to	   the	   issue	   on	   the	   Code	   Cards,	   their	   message	   was	  
automatically	   converted	   to	   readable	   text	   on	   the	   Uchaguzi	   platform.	   If	   they	   needed	   to	  
report	  on	  other	   issues,	   their	  SMS	  would	  contain	  normal	  text.	   If	   the	  phone	  number	  and	  
name	  was	  not	   registered	  and	   the	  observer	   still	  used	   the	  Code	  Cards,	   the	  number	   sent	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simply	  appeared	  in	  the	  message	  body	  of	  the	  report.	  The	  Uchaguzi	  wiki14	  shows	  the	  list	  of	  
codes	   and	   report	   categories	   used	   for	   the	   Uchaguzi	   platform	   (Leson	   2013b,	   2013c).	  
These	  are	  listed	  in	  table	  4.	  
In	   the	  same	  Wiki	   the	  Uchaguzi	  Categories	  are	  explained,	   listed	   in	   (Table	  4,	   column	  B),	  
while	   the	   Carter	   Center	   categories	   are	   picked	   from	   their	   checklists	   used	   during	   the	  
observation	   (p121-­‐123)	   (Carter	   Center	   2013).	   The	   ELOG	   categories	   are	   derived	   from	  
their	  election	  observation	  report	  (ELOG	  2013).	  
Secondly	  -­‐	  observers	  referred	  to	  as	  "the	  crowd"	  was	  ordinary	  citizens	  with	  no	  previous	  
training.	  They	  were	  encouraged	  to	  report	  on	  the	  elections	  with	  an	  SMS	  to	  "3002".	  The	  
team	  at	  the	  Uchaguzi	  situation	  room	  had	  the	  option	  to	  message	  back	  and	  ask	  for	  details	  
on	  such	  SMS	  reports.	  This	  has	  evidently	  been	  done	  several	  times.	  	  
Applications	  for	  iOS	  or	  Android,	  email	  or	  the	  form	  on	  the	  Uchaguzi	  platform	  represented	  
alternatives	  to	  sending	  SMS.	  Others	  reported	  through	  twitter	  using	  tags	  like	  @Uchaguzi	  
and	   #Uchaguzi.	   Tweets	   containing	   these	   tags	   were	   monitored	   by	   the	   crew	   in	   the	  
Uchaguzi	  situation	  room.	  A	  complete	  list	  of	  hashtags	  used	  during	  the	  elections	  is	  found	  
in	  the	  appendix	  (Leson	  2013a;	  Omenya	  2013).	  	  
3.4.1 Working	  groups	  and	  teams	  
To	   better	   understand	   the	   structure	   and	   division	   of	   labour	   behind	   the	   crowdsourced	  
Uchaguzi	   project	   we	   need	   to	   describe	   the	   practical	   organization	   of	   the	   event.	   In	  
collaboration	  with	  a	  core	  group	  in	  Nairobi	  consisting	  of	  less	  than	  twenty	  individuals	  and	  
a	  handful	   of	   online	  participants,	   two	  major	   groups	  were	   engaged:	  Domestic	   groups	   in	  
Kenya	  and	  digitally	  connected	  individuals	  and	  worldwide	  groups.	  	  
The	  domestic	  working	  groups	  preparing	  the	  project	  consisted	  of	  teams	  responsible	  for	  
various	   aspects	   of	   the	   preparation.	   Teams	   were	   organized	   to	   test	   the	   platform	   and	  
proposed	   digital	   security	   measures,	   to	   work	   with	   media	   strategy	   and	   managing	  
outreach,	   workflow	   process,	   and	   documentation.	   The	   language	   team	   translated	   the	  
platform	  setup	  to	  Swahili,	  others	  developed	  strategies	  for	  the	  use	  of	  social	  media	  during	  
the	  project	  period.	  Finally,	  the	  Research	  and	  Analysis	  team	  were	  to	  observe	  the	  process	  
and	  draw	  lessons	  from	  the	  project	  (Leson	  2013a).	  	  
The	   final	   report	   on	   the	   Uchaguzi	   project,	   compiled	   and	   written	   by	   Rhoda	   Omenya	  
describes	  a	  project	  with	  high	  ambitions	  and	  serious	  partners.	  Her	  report	  reveals	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Uchaguzi	  wiki:	  https://wiki.ushahidi.com/display/WIKI/Uchaguzi+-­‐+Kenyan+Elections+2013	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Uchaguzi	   project	   would	   have	   been	   "strengthened	   with	   explicit	   strategies	   guiding	   the	  
various	  areas	  of	  the	  deployment	  and	  communicated	  well	  to	  all	  partners"	   (Omenya	  2013:	  
7).	  She	  also	  addresses	  the	  question	  whether	  these	  kind	  of	  projects	  should	  be	  based	  on	  
"one	  of"	  events	  or	  if	  there	  should	  be	  a	  long	  term	  strategy	  for	  the	  entire	  election	  cycle.	  
3.4.2 Digital	  teams	  
The	   structure	   of	   the	   digital	   teams	   was	   inspired	   by	   the	   setup	   used	   by	   the	   volunteer	  
organisation	   Standby	   Task	   Force15.	   Their	   structure	   had	   proven	   effective	   for	   handling	  
large	  crowdsourced	  project	  during	  crisis,	  since	  its	  foundation	  after	  the	  Haiti	  Earthquake	  
in	  2010	  (Meier	  2015;	  Milner	  2014).	  Depending	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  operation,	  the	  digital	  
teams	   are	   given	   specialized	   tasks	   and	   responsibilities.	   For	   the	  Uchaguzi	   project,	   eight	  
teams	  were	  deployed	  and	  trained	  on	  forehand.	  
The	  Media	  Monitoring	   team	   was	   in	   charge	   of	   monitoring	   citizen	   reports	   via	   different	  
social	  media	  streams	  like	  Twitter,	  Facebook,	  blogs	  or	  online	  media.	  	  
04.03.2013,	  07:24,	  Market	  Street,	  Nairobi,	  Kenya:	  @<Name>	  A	  woman	  has	  just	  delivered	  here	  at	  Muthurwa	  
polling	  station.	  Its	  a	  baby	  girl	  #Choice2013	  pic.twitter.com/zGKsao21Ch	  
	  
The	   above	   report,	   picked	   up	   from	   Twitter	   was	   of	   course	   re-­‐tweeted	   several	   times.	  
Entering	  the	  Uchaguzi	  platform,	  it	  was	  categorized	  "Everything	  Fine"	  
The	  Translation	  Team	   translated	   reports	   from	   local	   languages	   to	   English.	   Below	   is	   an	  
example	   of	   translation	   of	   a	   message	   that	   hardly	   would	   have	   been	   registered	   by	  
traditional	  election	  observation.	  The	  message	  was	  categorized	  "Other".	  
04.03.2013,	  14:36,	  KERWA	  PRI.SCH,	  KIKUYU,	  KIAMBU:	  "Wee	  ̨t̨kia	  kana_rege,	  twana	  nt̨	  _ragwatanio	  g	  _k	  _	  
Kerwa_Kikuyu,	  ng̨uo	  m	  _tumia	  atwarwo	  mbere,	  twatua	  twana	  onatuo	  tuhakwo	  karangi	  
Believe	  it	  or	  not!	  Women	  are	  borrowing	  babies	  from	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  taken	  forward	  in	  the	  queue,	  we	  have	  
agreed	  that	  even	  babies	  be	  applied	  the	  ink	  on	  their	  finger	  too.	  <Name>	  (Uchaguzi	  ID	  1614)	  
	  
The	  SMS-­‐team	  handled	  all	  incoming	  messages	  including	  extraction	  of	  the	  location	  of	  the	  
incident.	  This	  one	  was	  categorized	  as	  "Voting	  issues".	  
04.03.2013,	  15:34,	  CHANGAMWE,	  	  MOMBASA:	  Sisi	  waislamu	  ni	  dhambi	  kuingia	  kanisani	  na	  hatuezi	  kuingia	  
kwa	  sababu	  ya	  kupipa	  kura(mwisho	  wa	  lami	  mshomoroni	  opposite	  mshomoroni	  mosque	  	  
It	  is	  a	  sin	  for	  us	  Muslims	  to	  enter	  churches	  and	  we	  will	  not	  enter	  to	  vote	  (Uchaguzi	  ID	  1670)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Standby	   Task	   Force	   is	   a	   digital	   organization	   specializing	   in	   crisis	   mapping	   during	   emergencies.	   See:	  
http://blog.standbytaskforce.com/our-­‐model/what-­‐we-­‐do/	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Geolocation	  team	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  all	  reports	  also	  from	  the	  SMS	  and	  Media	  Monitoring	  
teams	  to	  ensure	   the	  reports	  were	  mapped	  to	   the	  correct	   location.	   Important	   tools	   like	  
OpenStreetMap	  and	  Google	  Maps,	  combined	  with	  online	  lists	  of	  polling	  stations	  help	  the	  
process	  of	   adding	  Latitude	   and	  Longitude	   coordinates	   to	   the	   reports.	  All	   reports	  have	  
these	   coordinates	   and	   are	   key	   to	   creating	   the	   maps	   seen	   later	   on.	   For	   the	   reason	   of	  
readability,	  I	  have	  removed	  the	  coordinates	  when	  quoting	  elsewhere.	  Category	  "Other".	  
04.03.2013,	  7:26,	  Industrial	  Area,	  MAKADARA,	  NAIROBI,	  1.3054988,	  36.8631167:	  Please	  do	  something	  about	  
Employers	  in	  industrial	  area	  nairobi	  who	  told	  their	  employees	  to	  go	  to	  work	  today	  This	  robbing	  them	  of	  their	  
democratic	  right	  to	  vote	  (Uchaguzi	  ID	  966)	  
	  
Verification	  team	  ensured	  that	  feedback	  and	  response	  was	  given	  for	  critical	  and	  urgent	  
reports.	  This	  team	  was	  also	  doing	  triangulation	  and	  verification	  of	  reports.	  The	  example	  
below	  would	  be	  classified	  "urgent"	  and	  trigger	  a	  team	  member	  to	  alarm	  the	  police.	  
02.03.2013,	  19:24,	  Nyali,	  Nakumatt	  Likoni,	  Nyerere	  Avenue,	  MOMBASA:	  Send	  some	  police	  officers	  at	  kenol	  
near	  Nakumat	  nyali,	  guptas'	  planet	  Bamburi,	  chelsea	  internet	  ciber	  cafe,	  someone	  has	  been	  stubbed	  
(Uchaguzi	  ID	  239)	  
	  
The	  Reports	  team	  was	  responsible	  for	  approving	  reports	  for	  online	  publishing	  as	  well	  as	  
ensuring	  that	  the	  reports	  were	  given	  the	  correct	  categorization.	  
The	   Analysis	   and	   Research	   team	   was	   in	   charge	   of	   analysing	   the	   information	   (sense	  
making).	   They	   provided	   situation-­‐room	   reports	   that	   also	   was	   shared	   with	   partners,	  
citizens	  and	  the	  media.	  	  
Finally,	  the	  Tech	  Team	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  maintaining	  the	  platform	  during	  the	  activation,	  
solving	  any	  technical	  problems	  that	  might	  occur	  (Leson	  2013a;	  Sambuli	  et	  al.	  2013a)	  
Online	   teams	   were	   basically	   manned	   by	   volunteers,	   most	   of	   them	   coming	   from	  
organisations	   connected	   to	   the	  Digital	  Humanitarian	  Network16.	   Training	   for	   both	   the	  
local	   and	   online	   teams	  was	   arranged,	   and	  mandatory	   for	   participants.	   Approximately	  
240	  online	  volunteers	  from	  19	  countries	  were	  trained	  and	  taken	  through	  all	  workflows	  
to	   get	   them	   generally	   acquainted.	   They	   would	   then	   break	   into	   groups	   to	   further	   go	  
through	  their	  chosen	  workflow	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  instructions	  on	  wiki	  pages	  and	  with	  
the	   assistance	   of	   co-­‐leads.	   These	   co-­‐leads	   consisted	   of	   experienced	   online	   volunteers.	  
(Omenya	  2013).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Digital	   Humanitarian	   Network	   consist	   of	   various	   online,	   volunteer	   organisations	   and	   their	   active	  
partners.	  See	  http://digitalhumanitarians.com/about	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In	  this	  deployment	  as	   in	  many	  others,	  Skype	  is	  used	  as	  the	  communication	  tool	  within	  
teams	   and	   across	   the	  whole	   operation.	   A	   setup	   of	   Skype-­‐chats	   for	   each	   team	   and	   for	  
coordinating	  purposes	  have	  almost	  become	  a	  standard	  procedure	  for	  such	  operations.	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4 Preparing	  the	  dataset	  for	  comparison	  
The	  dataset	   I	   received	   for	   this	   study	  we	   so-­‐called	   "Approved	   reports".	   They	  had	  been	  
accepted	  by	  the	  Uchaguzi	  team	  for	  online	  publishing.	  Spam,	  false	  information	  or	  reports	  
impossible	  to	  locate	  would	  not	  be	  published.	  	  	  
After	  removing	  a	  number	  of	  double	  postings	  in	  the	  dataset,	  it	  now	  contains	  2333	  records	  
-­‐	  or	  reports	  from	  individual	  observers.	  Their	  observations	  are	  from	  the	  polling	  stations	  
and	  market	  squares	  in	  Kenya,	  or	  from	  social	  media	  and	  local	  news	  websites.	  There	  are	  
stories	  about	  life	  and	  death,	  about	  fraud	  and	  intimidation,	  but	  also	  about	  a	  surprisingly	  
peaceful	   yet	   slow-­‐paced	   election	   process	   that	   engaged	   more	   than	   80	   percent	   of	   the	  
registered	  voters.	  	  
As	   a	   comparison	   of	   relevance	   of	   the	  Uchaguzi	   dataset,	   I	   use	   the	   final	   report	   from	   the	  
international	  election	  observation	  mission	  of	   the	  Carter	  Center	   in	  addition	   to	   the	   final	  
report	   from	   the	   domestic	   Election	   Observation	   Group	   ELOG.	   As	   a	   recognized	  
international	   observation	   group	   with	   extensive	   experience,	   the	   Carter	   Center	   report	  
should	  represent	  a	  benchmark	  of	  international	  standards.	  The	  Center	  also	  give	  credit	  to	  
the	  ELOG	  report	  stating:	  "Not	  only	  did	  ELOG’s	  efforts	  inspire	  confidence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
Center	   about	   the	   capacities	   of	   citizen	   observers	   but	   their	   findings	   also	   provided	   an	  
important	   register	   against	   which	   we	   could	   check	   the	   quality	   of	   our	   own	   observations"	  
(Carter	  Center	  2013:	  76).	  Both	  EU	  and	  the	  African	  Union	  had	  their	  teams	  on	  the	  ground	  
as	  well	  as	  several	  other	  national	  and	  international	  observation	  groups.	  	  
4.1 Cleaning	  and	  refining	  the	  dataset	  
Although	  the	  reports	  I	  received	  should	  not	  contain	  personal	  information,	  some	  of	  them	  
still	   contained	   some	   names.	   They	   have	   been	   anonymized,	   and	   occasional	   instances	   of	  
phone	   numbers	   are	   removed.	   The	   csv	   file	   contained	   2993	   records	   as	   I	   received	   it.	  
Duplicate	   reports	   and	   reports	  missing	   a	   location	   haves	   been	   removed.	   Further	   I	   have	  
entered	  full	  text	  descriptions	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  report	  only	  contained	  a	  code	  referring	  
to	   the	  Code	  Card.	  Messages	   in	  Swahili	  not	   translated	  by	   the	   teams	  are	   translated	  with	  
Google	  Translator	  to	  be	  able	  to	  verify	  the	  category	  given	  to	  the	  report.	  If	  the	  meaning	  of	  
the	  report	  was	  still	  unclear,	  it	  has	  been	  removed.	  	  	  
The	  dataset	  contained	  the	  following:	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Report	  ID	  -­‐	  a	  unique	  ID	  number,	  which	  is	  also	  used	  for	  reference	  to	  individual	  reports	  in	  
this	  text.	  
Incident	  Date	  -­‐	  Date	  and	  timestamp	  of	  the	  message	  
Incident	  Title	  -­‐	  The	  header	  of	  the	  message	  
Location	  -­‐	  A	  location	  name	  given	  either	  by	  the	  system	  or	  by	  the	  geo-­‐location	  team	  
Description	   -­‐	  The	  message	  body.	  If	  the	  reporter	  sent	  a	  two	  digit	  code,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  
description	  from	  the	  Code	  Card.	  
Category	  -­‐	  the	  category/sub	  category	  are	  the	  ones	  set	  up	  on	  the	  Uchaguzi	  platform,	  and	  
assigned	  by	  the	  categorization	  team.	  
Lat.	  -­‐	  Latitude	  
Long.	  -­‐	  Longitude	  
Approved	  -­‐	  reports	  approved	  by	  the	  team	  in	  Nairobi	  
Verified	  -­‐	  the	  incident	  is	  verified/not	  verified	  by	  other	  sources.	  
I	  have	  added	  County,	  Constituency	  and	  Polling	  Station	  as	  well	  as	  a	  new	  set	  of	  codes	  and	  
categories	   to	   improve	   the	   information	  value.	  A	  number	  of	   reports	  contain	   information	  
on	  the	  polling	  station	  from	  where	  the	  observation	  is	  done	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  station	  ID	  
in	  the	  IEBC	  register.	  The	  official	  name	  of	  the	  station	  is	  then	  entered	  in	  the	  dataset.	  	  
To	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  the	  dataset	  is	  of	  an	  acceptable	  standard	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
this	  analysis.	  It	  is	  not	  to	  be	  published,	  but	  a	  pdf	  export	  has	  been	  sent	  to	  the	  censors.	  
4.1.1 Refining	  locations	  of	  the	  reports	  
To	  be	   able	   to	   show	   the	   geographical	   distribution	  of	   reports	   in	   the	  Uchaguzi	   dataset,	   I	  
needed	  to	  add	  polling	  station	  name,	  constituency	  and	  county	  information	  to	  the	  records.	  
Two	  datasets	  have	  been	  used	  for	  this	  purpose.	  One	  is	  the	  IEBC	  list	  of	  voter-­‐registration	  
sites	  containing	  about	  15	  000	  names,	  coded	  with	  an	  ID	  number.	  This	  number	  was	  used	  
by	   several	   observers	   to	   identify	   their	   location	   (IEBC	   2012).	   The	   other	   is	   a	   database	  
extracted	   from	   the	   IEBC	   Polling	   Station	   Locator17.	   Mikel	   Maron	   from	   OpenStreetMap	  
extracted	   about	   25	   000	   geolocated	   polling	   stations	   and	   shared	   it	   on	   GitHub18.	   I	   have	  
used	  this	  dataset	  uploaded	  to	  a	  Google	  Sheet	  as	  verification	  of	  the	  names	  and	  locations	  
mentioned	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset	  and	  thus	  being	  able	  to	  identify	  the	  number	  of	  polling	  
17	  IEBC	  polling	  station	  locator:	  http://vote.iebc.or.ke/	  
18	  Mikel	  Maron	  on	  GitHub:	  https://github.com/mikelmaron/kenya-­‐election-­‐data	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stations	   mentioned	   in	   the	   reports.	   Shapefiles	   from	   his	   dataset	   is	   also	   used	   to	   show	  
constituency	  and	  county	  borders	  where	  this	  is	  used	  on	  maps.	  
There	  were	   in	   total	   33	   100	   polling	   stations	   operating	   during	   the	   elections,	   but	   some	  
8000	  have	  not	  been	   registered	   in	   the	  database	   I	   used.	   Some	  of	   the	   explanation	  of	   the	  
difference	   is	   that	   the	   IEBC	   at	   certain	   polling	   stations	   created	   different	   "streams"	   to	  
separate	  large	  groups	  of	  voters	  in	  manageable	  queues	  (Carter	  Center	  2013).	  	  
Below	   is	   an	   example	   of	   how	   a	   report	   is	   refined.	   Original	   report	   is	   located	   to	   the	  
constituency,	  but	  the	  text	  contains	  ID	  number	  of	  the	  pollingstation.	  The	  station	  is	  found,	  
and	   added	   to	   the	  message,	   giving	   it	   a	  more	   precise	   location.	   The	   text	   "Incident-­‐NO9",	  
meaning	  BVR	  kits	  did	  not	  work,	  indicate	  that	  the	  observer	  used	  the	  Code	  Cards.	  
04.03.2013,	  6:58	  Kipkelion,	  Kenya,	  ID	  kit	  not	  working,	  "Kipkelion-­‐East,constituence-­‐CODE,NO188polling-­‐
station,code-­‐038incident-­‐NO9	  Kits	  in	  Chepseyon	  ward	  in	  Kipsigori	  polling	  station	  were	  not	  working."	  
(Uchaguzi	  ID	  924)	  
	  
04.03.2013,	  6:58,	  CHEPSEON	  COMPLEX	  PRIMARY	  SCHOOL	   KIPKELION	  EAST,	  KERICHO,	  Rift	  Valley,	  ID	  kit	  
not	  working:	  "Kipkelion-­‐East,constituence-­‐CODE,NO188polling-­‐station,code-­‐038incident-­‐NO9	  Kits	  in	  
Chepseyon	  ward	  in	  Kipsigori	  polling	  station	  were	  not	  working."	  (Uchaguzi	  ID	  924)	  
	  
Finally,	  both	  GoogleMaps19	  and	  OpenStreetMap20	  (OSM)	  have	  had	  a	  project	  running	  on	  
locating	  primary	  schools	  in	  Kenya.	  As	  most	  polling	  stations	  were	  found	  in	  schools,	  this	  
information	   has	   been	   of	   great	   help	   to	   determine	   the	   precise	   location	   from	  where	   the	  
reports	   came.	   In	   its	   original	   set	   up,	   locations	  were	   determined	   down	   to	   constituency	  
level.	  Where	  possible,	  I	  have	  refined	  this	  down	  to	  polling	  station	  level.	  
In	   some	   villages	   and	   towns,	   the	   demarcation	   between	   two	   or	   more	   constituencies	  
follows	  a	  street	  or	  a	  river.	  In	  these	  cases	  it	  has	  been	  of	  great	  value	  to	  be	  able	  to	  locate	  the	  
reports	   to	  building	   level.	  As	   it	   turned	  out	   -­‐	   the	  constituency	   to	  which	   the	  report	  came	  
from	   therefore	   shifted.	   All	   reports	   from	   cities	   and	   towns	   are	   in	   the	   present	   dataset	  
located	  to	  ward-­‐level.	  Quite	  a	  few	  of	  the	  "automated"	  reports	  are	  located	  to	  constituency	  
level.	   It	   might	   therefore	   happen	   that	   there	   are	   reports	   from	   one	   constituency	   telling	  
stories	   from	  different	  polling	  stations	  without	   it	  being	  possible	   to	   find	  out	   from	  which	  
stations	  it	  arrived.	  The	  geographical	  information	  is	  used	  for	  positioning	  the	  reports	  on	  a	  
map,	  as	  seen	  later	  on.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Google	  Maps:	  https://www.google.no	  
20	  Open	  Street	  Map:	  http://www.openstreetmap.org	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4.1.2 Comparison	  of	  structure	  in	  the	  reports	  
The	  Carter	  Center	  and	  ELOG	  reports	  follows	  templates	  covering	  all	  sides	  of	  the	  electoral	  
process	   from	   Kenya’s	   electoral	   institutions	   and	   the	   framework	   for	   the	   elections,	   via	  
political	   parties	   -­‐	   their	   financing	   and	   campaigning	   to	   how	   post-­‐election	   disputes	   are	  
solved.	  Only	  a	  fraction	  of	  this	   is	  covered	  by	  the	  Uchaguzi	  reports.	  They	  cover	  five	  days	  
starting	  two	  days	  before	  the	  elections.	  
The	  Carter	  Center	  address	  the	  following	  themes:	  
The	  legal	  framework:	  The	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  are	  not	  addressing	  the	  legal	  framework	  as	  
such,	  only	  the	  violations	  of	  it	  during	  election	  day.	  
The	   Electoral	   System	   and	   Boundary	   Delimitation:	   None	   of	   the	   boundaries	   are	  
commented	  in	  our	  dataset.	  	  
Election	   Management:	   Reports	   concerning	   the	   Biometric	   Voter	   Registration	   (BVR)	  
system,	   (or	   EVID	   system)	   or	   design	   of	   polling	   stations	   are	   connected	   to	   electoral	  
management,	  but	  are	  commented	  on	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  performance	  during	  election	  day.	  
The	   Media:	   Only	   two	   reports	   are	   concerned	   with	   how	   media	   operated	   during	   the	  
elections.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  -­‐	  the	  Carter	  Center	  does	  not	  comment	  on	  the	  widespread	  use	  
of	  social	  media	  as	  a	  channel	  during	  the	  electoral	  process.	  
Candidacy	   and	   Campaigning:	   The	   Uchaguzi	   reports	   covers	   (illegal)	   election	   day	  
campaigning	  as	  well	  as	  a	  relatively	  widespread	  practice	  of	  vote	  buying.	  
Voter	  Education:	  Comments	  on	  assistance	  for	   illiterate	  voters	  and	  some	  lack	  of	  clarity	  
on	  voter	  information	  are	  found	  in	  the	  dataset,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  cover	  voter	  education	  as	  
such.	  
Voter	  Registration:	  The	  Uchaguzi	  data	  does	  not	  cover	  the	  process	  of	  registration,	  but	  
contain	  several	  reports	  on	  voters	  who	  can't	  find	  their	  name	  in	  the	  register.	  
Voting	  Operations:	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  reports	  are	  directly	  commenting	  on	  the	  voting	  
operation.	  In	  addition,	  they	  describe	  the	  general	  situation	  in	  various	  locations	  regarding	  
threats,	  bribes	  or	  peaceful	  voting	  conditions.	  
Vote	   Counting:	  Not	   very	  many	   reports	   are	   connected	   to	   the	   counting	  process	   (26),	   a	  
few	  more	  are	  providing	  citizen	  provisional	  results	  (96).	  
Electoral	  Dispute	  Resolution:	  The	  Uchaguzi	  project	  did	  not	  cover	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  
electoral	  period.	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4.1.3 Comparison	  on	  Coverage	  
Carter	  Center	  observers	  visited	  a	  total	  of	  265	  polling	  stations	  in	  34	  counties	  (p.	  92).	  	  
There	  are	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  from	  more	  than	  500	  identified	  polling	  stations	  in	  addition	  to	  
records	   referring	   to	   constituencies.	   Uchaguzi	   covers	   46	   counties,	   missing	   only	   the	  
scarcely	  populated	   Isiolo	  County.	  The	  dataset	   further	   contain	   reports	   from	  234	  of	   the	  
290	  constituencies.	  Table	  2	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  observers	  from	  the	  Carter	  Center,	  
ELOG	  and	  CRECO.	  The	  latter	  group	  was	  reporting	  to	  the	  Uchaguzi	  platform.	  	  
	  
	   IEBC	  totals	   Carter	  Center	   ELOG	   Uchaguzi	  /	  CRECO	  
Counties	   47	   34	   47	   46*	  	  
Constituencies	   290	   N/A	   290	   234**	  
Polling	  stations	   33	  100	  ***	   265	   952	   500	  +	  
Observers	   9000	  +****	   52	   7000+	   ~2500	  
Table	  2:	  Number	  of	  Counties,	  constituencies,	  polling	  stations	  and	  observers	  deployed	  on	  election	  day.	  	  
*	  9	  counties	  are	  represented	  by	  less	  than	  10	  reports.	  	  
**	  26	  constituencies	  are	  represented	  with	  only	  one	  report.	  	  
***	  Carter	  Center	  operates	  with	  a	  number	  of	  32	  400	  polling	  stations.	  	  
****	  More	  than	  50	  domestic	  organizations	  were	  accredited	  by	  the	  IEBC	  to	  observe	  the	  elections.	  
4.1.4 Categorizing	  the	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  
The	  table	  below	  shows	  how	  new	  categories	  are	  created	  and	  some	  are	  split	  in	  sub-­‐groups	  
to	   extract	   meaningful	   charts	   and	   tables.	   I	   argue	   that	   Chart	   2	   (below)	   reveals	   more	  
meaning	   than	   if	   the	   subjects	   were	   categorized	   according	   to	   the	   setup	   in	   the	   Carter	  
Center	  report	  as	  shown	  in	  Chart	  1.	  	  
The	  separation	  and	  creation	  of	  new	  "categories"	  are	  also	  connected	  to	  the	  material	  itself.	  
As	   seen	   in	   the	   large	   Table	   4	   -­‐	   both	   the	   crowd	   and	   the	   trained	   observers	   reported	   on	  
issues	  not	  foreseen	  in	  the	  pre-­‐defined	  list	  of	  issues	  and	  on	  the	  Code	  Cards.	  
	  
Theme	   covered	   by	   Carter	  
Center	  short	  term	  observer	  
teams	  
Thesis	  categorization	   Examples	  of	  content	  
Security	   01	  Peace	   Peace	  initiatives	  and	  messages	  
01	  Tension	   Rumours,	   dangerous	   speech,	   mobilization	   towards	  
violence,	  etc.	  
01	  Violence	   Violent	  &	  Physical	  attack,	  armed	  clashes,	  robbery	  etc.	  
Administration	  /	  
Management	  
02	  Adm.	  issues	   Numbering	   of	   poll	   stations,	   design	   compromising	  
secrecy,	  absence	  of	  IEBC	  staff,	  closing,	  etc.	  
02	  Tech	  issues	   ID	   kit	   not	   working,	   power	   cuts,	   computer	   problems,	  
etc.	  
Opening	   03	  Opening	   Late	   opening,	  missing	  materials,	   no	   security	   present,	  
etc.	  
Polling	   04	  Fraud	   Bribing,	  buying	  of	  ID	  cards,	  ballot	  box	  stuffing,	  etc.	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04	  Malpractice	   Unusual	   voter	   assistance,	   campaigning,	   intimidation,	  
etc.	  
04	  Slow	  process	   Complaints	  on	  a	  slow	  process	  
04	  Voting	  issues	   Voters	  name	  missing,	  voters	  turned	  away	  
Counting	  and	  results	   05	  Citizen	  results	   Citizen	  reporting	  results	  of	  counts	  
05	  Count	  Issues	   Issues	  connected	  to	  counting	  
05	  Results	  Issues	   Issues	  connected	  to	  results	  and	  announcements	  
Other	  issues	   06	  Other	   ID	  cards	  lost,	  queue	  sneaking,	  questions,	  etc.	  
Table	  3:.Sub-­‐categorisation	  and	  grouping	  of	  the	  messages	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset.	  
	  
The	   Code	   Card	   used	   by	   the	   trusted	   observers	   was	   to	   simplify	   and	   systematize	   the	  
reporting.	  The	   issues	   listed	  on	   these	  cards	  are	  shown	   in	  column	  A	  of	  Table	  4,	  and	  are	  
numbered	   1-­‐51.	   But	   in	   the	   dataset	   there	   were	   reports	   covering	   particular	   issues	   not	  
listed	  as	  issues	  in	  the	  setup	  of	  the	  reporting	  system,	  like	  complaints	  on	  a	  slow	  process	  or	  
technical	  failures	  during	  the	  voting.	  (Table	  4,	  row	  52-­‐53).	  In	  addition,	  derived	  from	  the	  
setup	  on	   the	  Uchaguzi	  platform	   there	  are	   issues	  on	  violence,	  peace-­‐efforts	   and	   citizen	  
results	  (Table	  4,	  row	  54-­‐59),	  neither	  listed	  on	  the	  code	  cards.	  These	  are	  added.	  
Column	  B-­‐D	   shows	   the	   categories	   for	   each	   issue	   used	   by	   the	   Uchaguzi	   platform,	   the	  
Carter	   Center	   and	   the	   ELOG	   observation	   report.	   To	   be	   able	   to	   derive	   meaningful	  
diagrams	  of	  the	  different	  categories,	  we	  have	  created	  a	  modified	  set	  of	  categories	  shown	  
in	  column	  E.	  They	  basically	  follow	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  others,	  so	  that	  security,	  administrative	  
setup,	  opening	  procedure,	  polling,	  counting	  and	  results	  are	  separated.	  	  
The	   Code	   Cards	   did	   not	   contain	   descriptions	   of	   violence	   other	   than	   "	   51.	   Sexual	   and	  
Gender	   Based	   Violence"	   of	   which	   there	   was	   one	   report.	   The	   same	   goes	   for	   "Peace"	   -­‐	  
although	   the	   crowd	   and	   observers	   were	   encourage	   through	   media	   to	   report	   on	   this	  
(Omenya	  2013:	  29).	  In	  sum	  -­‐	  the	  above	  separations	  of	  the	  main	  categories	  are	  done	  to	  
visualize	  more	  detail	  what	  was	  messaged	  by	  the	  crowd.	  	  
"Closing	   procedures"	   is	   usually	   included	   in	   the	   reports	   by	   observer	   groups.	   Only	   two	  
statements	  cover	  this	  on	  the	  Code	  Cards.	  One	  is	  included	  in	  the	  "Adm	  issues"	  and	  has	  to	  
do	   with	   closing	   before	   schedule	   (issue	   27),	   the	   other	   is	   connected	   to	   violence	   and	  
included	  in	  that	  category	  (issue	  45).	  	  
Column	  F	  shows	  the	  number	  of	  reports	  in	  which	  the	  issues	  are	  mentioned.	  These	  figures	  
can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  indicator	  on	  what	  the	  observers	  and	  the	  crowd	  found	  as	  the	  most	  
important	   cases	   to	   report.	   Issues	   with	   more	   than	   75	   reports	   are	   highlighted	   yellow.	  
Issues	   generating	   50-­‐74	   reports	   are	   marked	   light	   green.	   Issues	   with	   few	   reports	   are	  
greyed	  out.	  All	  reports	  are	  however	  included	  in	  Chart	  1	  and	  2	  on	  the	  following	  pages.	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4.1.5 Issues	  and	  categorization	  in	  three	  reports	  
The	  first	  51	  rows	  of	  table	  4	  shows	  the	  Codes	  and	  corresponding	  statements	  (1–51)	  used	  
by	   the	   trusted	   observers	   during	   the	   elections.	   The	   blue	   rows	   (52–53)	   are	   statements	  
extracted	   from	  the	  collection	  of	   reports.	  The	  red	  rows	  (54–59)	  are	  extracted	   from	  the	  
Uchaguzi	  sub-­‐categories.	  	  
Columns	  B-­‐D	  shows	  how	  different	  observer	  groups	  categorize	  the	  issues.	  Column	  E	  are	  
the	  categories	  used	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  and	  finally	  -­‐	  column	  F	  shows	  number	  
of	  reports	  for	  each	  issue.	  	  
A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	  












1. Polling	  Station	  Not	  Opened	  On	  Time	   Polling	  St	  Admin	   03	  Opening	   01	  Opening	  &	  
set	  up	  
03	  Opening	   150	  
2. Polling	  Station	  Not	  Numbered	  Properly	   Polling	  St	  Admin	   03	  Opening	   01	  Opening	  &	  
set	  up	  
02	  Adm	  issues	   54	  
3. Absence	  Of	  IEBC	  Officials/Staff	  At	  Polling	  
Station	  Opening	  
Staffing	  Issues	   03	  Opening	   01	  Opening	  &	  
set	  up	  
02	  Adm	  issues	   28	  
4. Design	  Of	  Polling	  Station	  Compromising	  
Secrecy	  Of	  Ballot	  
Polling	  St	  Admin	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   02	  Adm	  issues	   32	  
5. Missing/Inadequate	  Voting	  Materials	   Polling	  St	  Admin	   03	  Opening	   01	  Opening	  &	  
set	  up	  
03	  Opening	   46	  
6. No	  Presence	  Of	  Security	  At	  Polling	  Station	   Staffing	  Issues	   03	  Opening	   01	  Opening	  &	  
set	  up	  
03	  Opening	   22	  
7. Ballot	  Boxes	  Not	  Sealed	  At	  Start	  Of	  Voting	  
Process	  





8. Observers/Media	  Blocked	  From	  Entering	  
Polling	  Station	  
Staffing	  Issues	   03	  Opening	   01	  Opening	  &	  
set	  up	  
03	  Opening	   25	  
9. Identification	  Kit	  Not	  Working	   Polling	  St	  Admin	   04	  Polling	   01	  Opening	  &	  
set	  up	  
02	  Tech	  issues	   310	  
10. Polling	  Station	  Not	  Adequately	  Lit	   Polling	  St	  Admin	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   02	  Tech	  issues	   44	  
11. Register	  of	  Voters	  missing	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   02	  Adm	  issues	   18	  
12. Eligible	  Voters	  Turned	  Away	  /Not	  Allowed	  
to	  Vote	  
Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  Voting	  
issues	  
14	  
13. Voters	  Names	  Missing	  From	  Voter	  
Register	  
Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  Voting	  
issues	  
225	  
14. Voters	  Issued	  With	  Invalid	  Ballot	  Papers	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  Voting	  
issues	  
1	  
15. Voter	  Importation	  i.e.	  Voters	  Brought	  
from	  Elsewhere	  
Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  Fraud	   6	  
16. Voter	  Impersonation	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  
Malpractice	  
3	  
17. Voter	  Intimidation	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  
Malpractice	  
26	  
18. Purchasing	  Of	  Voters	  Cards	  Outside	  
Polling	  Centre/Station	  
Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   04	  Violence	   04	  Fraud	   8	  
19. Bribing	  Of	  Voters	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   04	  Violence	   04	  Fraud	   99	  
20. Voters	  Voting	  More	  Than	  Once	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  Fraud	   2	  
21. Illiterate	  Voters	  Not	  Assisted	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  
Malpractice	  
21	  
22. Unusually	  Many	  Assisted	  Voters	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  
Malpractice	  
60	  
23. Voter	  Assister	  Not	  Taking	  Oath	  Of	  Secrecy	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  
Malpractice	  
37	  
24. Ineligible	  Voters	  Allowed	  To	  Vote	   Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  
Malpractice	  
4	  
25. Campaigns/Propaganda	  Ongoing	  Outside	  
Polling	  Station	  
Voting	  Issues	   04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  
Malpractice	  
59	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A	   B	   C	   D	   E	   F	  












26. Polling	  Officials	  (security/IEBC	  staff)	  
Behaving	  Unprofessionally	  (see	  40.)	  
Polling	  St.	  
Admin	  
04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  
Malpractice	  
38	  
27. Polling	  Station	  Closed	  Before	  Time	   Polling	  St.	  
Admin	  
05	  Closing	   03	  Closing	   02	  Adm	  Issues	   14	  
28. Sealed	  Ballot	  Box	  Tampered	  With	   Polling	  St.	  
Admin	  
04	  Polling	   03	  Closing	   04	  Fraud	   6	  
29. Non-­‐Voting	  Materials	  Placed	  In	  Ballot	  Box	   Polling	  St.	  
Admin	  
04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  Fraud	   5	  




05	  Closing	   03	  Closing	   05	  Count	  
Issues	  
3	  




06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Count	  
Issues	  
6	  




06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Count	  
Issues	  
2	  




06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Count	  
Issues	  
3	  




06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Count	  
Issues	  
5	  




06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Count	  
Issues	  
3	  
36. Agents	  Failure	  To	  Sign	  Final	  Results	  Form	   Counting	  &	  
Results	  
06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Results	  
Issues	  
1	  
37. Agents	  Decline	  To	  Sign	  Tally	  Sheet	  &	  Decline	  
To	  Give	  Reason	  
Counting	  &	  
Results	  
06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Results	  
Issues	  
0	  
38. Error	  Or	  Omission	  In	  Computing	  Or	  
Completing	  Tally	  Sheets	  
Counting	  &	  
Results	  
06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Results	  
Issues	  
16	  




06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Count	  
Issues	  
5	  
40. IEBC	  Officials	  Not	  Acting	  In	  Accordance	  To	  
Set	  Rules	  (see	  26)	  
Staffing	  Issues	   06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   04	  
Malpractice	  
45	  




06	  Counting	   03	  Counting	   05	  Results	  
issues	  
8	  




07	  Tabulation	  &	  
Results	  
03	  Counting	   05	  Results	  
issues	  
6	  
43. Failure	  To	  Announce	  Provisional	  Result/Final	  
Results	  By	  IEBC	  official	  
Counting	  &	  
Results	  
07	  Tabulation	  &	  
Results	  
03	  Counting	   05	  Results	  
issues	  
7	  




07	  Tabulation	  &	  
Results	  
03	  Counting	   05	  Results	  
issues	  
2	  
45. Polling	  Station	  Closed	  Due	  To	  Violence	   Polling	  St.	  
Admin	  
01	  Security	   03	  Closing	   05	  Results	  
issues	  
3	  
46. Occurrence	  Of	  Violence	  After	  
Announcement	  Of	  Final	  Results	  
Counting	  &	  
Results	  
01	  Security	   04	  Violence	   01	  Violence	   4	  
47. No	  Transport	  To	  Deliver	  Ballot	  Boxes	   Counting	  &	  
Results	  
02	  Management	   03	  Counting	   02	  Adm	  issues	   2	  




07	  Tabulation	  &	  
Results	  
03	  Counting	   05	  Count	  
Issues	  
2	  




07	  Tabulation	  &	  
Results	  
03	  Counting	   05	  Results	  
issues	  
0	  
50. Media	  Biased	  In	  Reporting	  Election	  
Coverage	  
Other	   08	  Campaigning	   05	  Other	   04	  
Malpractice	  
2	  
51. Sexual	  and	  Gender	  Based	  Violence	   Security	  Issues	   01	  Security	   04	  VIolence	   01	  Violence	   1	  
ISSUES	  NOT	  ON	  THE	  CODE	  CARDS:	   	   	   	   	   	  
52. Slow	  election	  process	  (Derived	  from	  reports)	   Polling	  St.	  
Admin	  
04	  Polling	   02	  Voting	   04	  Slow	  
process	  
109	  
53. ICT/electricity	  failure	  (Derived	  from	  reports)	   Polling	  St.	  
Admin	  
02	  Management	   02	  Voting	   02	  Tech	  issues	   38	  




07	  Tabulation	  &	  
Results	  
03	  PVT	   05	  Citizen	  
results	  
97	  
55. Peace	  Initiatives	  (Derived	  from	  Uchaguzi	  
categories)	  
Positive	  Events	   01	  Security	   05	  Other	   01	  Peace	   39	  
56. Everything	  Fine	  (Derived	  from	  Uchaguzi	  
categories)	  
Positive	  Events	   01	  Security	   05	  Other	   01	  Peace	   343	  
57. Tension	  (Derived	  from	  reports)	   Security	  Issues	   01	  Security	   04	  Violence	   01	  Tension	   87	  
58. Violence	  (Derived	  from	  reports)	   Security	  Issues	   01	  Security	   04	  Violence	   01	  Violence	   80	  
59. Other	  issues	  (Derived	  from	  reports)	   Other	   02	  Other	   05	  Other	   06	  Other	   32	  
	   	   	   	   Total	   2	  333	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Table	  4:	  (previous	  page)	  shows	  the	  codes	  and	  number	  of	  reports	  received	  and	  how	  they	  are	  categorised.	  
	  
4.2 Negative	  statements	  or	  open	  ended	  questions	  
The	  Uchaguzi	  setup	  was	  prepared	  for	  rapid	  reporting	  of	  issues.	  Equipped	  with	  the	  Code	  
Card	  you	  would	  send	  "9"	  to	  3002	  to	  tell	  that	  the	  Identification	  kit	  was	  not	  working.	  If	  it	  
was	  working,	  you	  had	  the	  option	  to	  write	  a	  full	  text	  message	  saying	  so.	  No	  observers	  did	  
that.	  
The	  Carter	  Center	  check	  lists	  (See	  appendix)	  contains	  open	  ended	  questions	  like:	  
Carter	  Center	  Checklist	  (Opening)	   Uchaguzi	  Code	  Cards	  
Issue	   Answer	  option	   Issue	   Answer	  option	  
19	  Were	  all	  the	  poll	  
workers	  present	  at	  
Polling	  Station?	  
Yes/No	   3.	  Absence	  Of	  IEBC	  
Officials/Staff	  At	  Polling	  
Station	  Opening	  
Confirm	  statement	  (or	  no	  
information	  /	  free	  SMS)	  
42	  How	  would	  you	  
evaluate	  the	  Polling	  
Station	  staff's	  
performance?	  	  	  
a.	  Very	  Good	  b.	  Good	  c.	  
Poor	  d.	  Very	  Poor	  





Confirm	  statement	  (or	  no	  
information	  /	  free	  SMS)	  
Table	  4a:	  Examples	  on	  how	  issues	  are	  formulated	  in	  the	  Carter	  Center	  checklist	  and	  the	  Uchaguzi	  Code	  Cards	  
	  
The	   examples	   in	   table	   4a	   show	   the	   difference	   in	   how	   issues	   are	   formulated	   in	   Carter	  
Center	   Checklist	   and	   on	   the	   Uchaguzi	   Code	   Cards.	   The	   Carter	   Center	   encourage	  
observers	  to	  report	  both	  good	  and	  bad	  performance,	  while	  the	  Uchaguzi	  Code	  Card	  only	  
ask	  for	  information	  on	  poor	  performance	  or	  malfunctioning	  systems.	  This	  is	  a	  systemic	  
difference	  between	  the	  two	  lists	  of	  issues.	  The	  Uchaguzi	  setup	  thus	  shapes	  the	  viewpoint	  
of	   the	   observer	   to	   look	   for	   things	   going	  wrong	   rather	   than	   reporting	   on	   things	   going	  
well.	   	   Statements	   created	   on	   forehand	   had	   an	   advantage.	   Coded	   messages	   were	  
programmable.	  The	  platform	  converted	  a	  number	  to	  a	  meaningful	  message.	  	  
Adding	   a	   letter	   to	   the	   coded	   messages	   would	   have	   given	   the	   possibility	   to	   use	   open	  
questions	  on	  the	  Code	  Cards.	  Send	  "3Y"	  (3	  Yes)	   if	   the	  staff	  was	  present,	   "3N"	  (3	  No)	   if	  
not.	  For	  graded	  evaluations,	   the	  same	   logic	  could	  have	  been	  used:	  "26a"	   for	  very	  good	  
performance	  of	  the	  staff	  ranging	  to	  "26d"	  for	  very	  poor	  performance.	  The	  programming	  
of	   the	  Uchaguzi	  platform	  would	  not	  be	  more	   complicated,	   and	   the	  dataset	  might	  have	  
delivered	  richer	  information	  in	  that	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  performance	  would	  have	  
been	   recorded.	  Also	   the	  observers	  would	  be	   less	  directed	   to	  only	   looking	   for	  negative	  
performance.	  Despite	  this	  -­‐	  there	  are	  large	  numbers	  of	  reports	  on	  peaceful	  elections	  and	  
good	  performance	  -­‐	  they	  were	  just	  not	  asked	  for	  on	  the	  Code	  Cards.	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4.2.1 Multiple	  bits	  of	  information	  in	  one	  report	  
Categorizing	   the	   reports	   sent	   according	   to	   the	  Code	  Cards	  was	  mostly	   unproblematic.	  
One	   message	   contained	   one	   issue.	   Some	   of	   the	   observers	   however,	   sent	   messages	  
containing	   several	   codes	  or	  describing	  different	   incidents	  within	   the	   same	  SMS.	  David	  
Weinbergers	   has	   written	   about	   theories	   of	   categorization	   of	   physical	   and	   digital	  
information.	   In	   his	   book	   "Everything	   is	   Miscellaneous"	   he	   advocates	   to	   reduce	   the	  
contagious	  urge	  to	  box	  information	  in	  single	  categories	  as	  we	  would	  do	  in	  the	  physical	  
world	   and	   promotes	   the	   use	   of	   tags	   as	   we	   do	   in	   the	   world	   of	   digital	   information	  
(Weinberger	   2008).	   The	   extract	   of	   the	   message	   below	   can	   be	   categorized	   in	   two	  
categories	   -­‐	   "Peace"	   and	   "Slow	   process"	   and	   is	   one	   of	   many	   reports	   containing	  
information	  covering	  multiple	  categories	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset.	  I	  have	  to	  some	  extent	  
re-­‐coded	  messages	  and	  given	  them	  more	  than	  one	  "tag"	  where	  appropriate.	  
04.03.2013,	  20:08,	  LONDIANI	  TOWNSHIP	  PRIMARY	  SCHOOL,	  KIPKELION	  EAST,	  KERICHO,	  Londiani	  township	  
pri	  sch	  the	  area	  peaceful	  thous	  line	  still	  long	  exercise	  moving	  slowly	  with	  about	  500	  people,having	  not	  
casted	  their	  votes	  Kericho	  county,	  londiani	  town	  not	  bad,	  town	  is	  calm	  (Extract	  from	  Uchaguzi	  report	  2068)	  
	  
4.3 Categorization	  to	  reveal	  information	  
By	   using	   the	   Carter	   Center	   categories,	   there	   are	   three	   themes	   standing	   out	   -­‐	   Security	  
(23,6%),	  Opening	  process	  (14,6%)	  and	  Voting	  (48,6%).	  The	  following	  chart	  show	  counts	  
of	   reports	   within	   each	   category.	   As	   mentioned	   above	   -­‐	   we	   claim	   that	   the	   number	   of	  
reports	  on	  each	  issue	  can	  indicate	  how	  the	  observers	  perceived	  the	  elections.	  What	  was	  
the	   most	   important	   for	   them	   to	   report?	   By	   using	   a	   different	   categorization	   we	   get	   a	  
different	  picture	  of	  the	  answers.	  
In	  the	  second	  diagram,	  we	  have	  used	  the	  categories	  listed	  in	  column	  E	  in	  the	  table	  above.	  
We	   have	   also	   introduced	   a	   differentiation	   on	   some	   of	   the	   traditional	   categorizations	  
used	  in	  observation	  reports.	  
Chart	  1	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  reports	   if	  we	  categorize	  the	  reports	  according	  to	  the	  
setup	  in	  the	  Carter	  Center	  report.	  About	  half	  the	  reports	  are	  concerning	  the	  polling	  itself,	  
two	  other	  significant	  themes	  being	  security	  and	  opening	  procedures.	  Limited	  amount	  of	  
meaning	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  this	  visualisation.	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4.3.1 Reports	  sorted	  with	  Carter	  Center	  categories	  
The	  diagram	  below	  shows	  number	  of	  reports	  in	  each	  category	  when	  sorted	  according	  to	  
the	  Carter	  Center	  clustering	  of	  themes.	  The	  main	  three	  groups	  are	  connected	  to	  security,	  
opening	  procedures	  and	  polling	  issues.	  Tabulation	  and	  results	  are	  under-­‐reported.	  The	  
diagram	  is	  created	  from	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset	  categorized	  as	  shown	  in	  table	  4,	  column	  C	  
(Carter	  Center	  category).	  The	  diagram	  shows	  that	  the	  crowd	  and	  the	  trusted	  reporters	  
were	  concerned	  on	  security	  issues,	  opening	  issues	  and	  the	  polling	  itself,	  but	  reveals	  no	  
detailed	  picture	  of	  what	  concerned	  the	  voters.	  
	  
Chart	  1:	  2333	  reports	  sorted	  in	  accordance	  with	  Carter	  Center	  categories	  
	  
If	  we	  alter	  the	  categories	  assigned	  to	  the	  reports,	  the	  distribution	  changes,	  and	  I	  argue	  
that	  the	  information	  level	  increases.	  It	  also	  shows	  issues	  the	  crowd	  reported	  which	  was	  
not	   asked	   for	   on	   the	   Code	   Cards.	   Chart	   2	   shows	   the	   distribution	   of	   reports	   when	  
categorized	  as	  listed	  in	  Table	  3	  and	  4.	  
4.3.2 Reports	  sorted	  with	  modified	  categories	  
When	   re-­‐allocating	   reports	   to	   a	   sub-­‐divided	   set	   of	   categories,	   a	  more	   detailed	   picture	  
emerge	   on	   the	   issues	   found	   most	   important	   by	   the	   crowd	   during	   election	   day.	   Both	  
technical	  problems	  and	  administrative	  issues	  were	  commented.	  	  
Chart	   2	   shows	   that	   the	   category	   connected	   to	   security	   shows	   in	   fact	   contained	  more	  
messages	   related	   to	   peace	   (16,3%)	   and	   very	   few	   report	   about	   violence	   (3,2%).	   The	  
category	  "malpractice"	  describes	  misbehaviour	  of	  staff,	  voters	  and	  agents,	  that	  affected	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the	   voting	   process,	   while	   "fraud"	   includes	   bribing.	   The	   diagram	   is	   created	   from	   the	  
Uchaguzi	  dataset	  categorized	  as	  shown	  in	  table	  4,	  column	  E	  "Thesis	  Categories".	  
	  
	  
Chart	  2:	  Reorganizing	  the	  reports	  in	  new	  categories	  reveal	  a	  more	  detailed	  picture	  of	  what	  was	  reported.	  
	  
Chart	  2:	  The	  single	   largest	  group	  of	  messages	  reported	  about	  peaceful	  elections	  (343).	  
The	   category	  was	   listed	   on	   the	  Uchaguzi	   platform	   as	   "Everything	   fine"	   and	   contained	  
testimonies	  on	  the	  absence	  of	  violence	  and	  large	  numbers	  of	  voters	  lining	  up	  in	  patience	  
to	  vote.	  	  In	  some	  areas	  the	  situation	  was	  tenser,	  where	  observers	  reported	  on	  rumours,	  
threats	  or	  disturbances.	  Chapter	  6.12	  presents	  a	  closer	  look	  on	  these	  messages.	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  24,2%	  of	  the	  reports	  shown	  in	  Chart	  2	  are	  on	  issues	  not	  listed	  on	  
the	   Code	   Cards	   -­‐	   Peace	   reports	   (16,3%),	   Violence	   (3,2%)	   and	   Slow	   (voting)	   process	  
(4,7%).	  	  
The	   three	   categories	  Peace	   (16,3%),	  Tech	   issues	   (16,9%)	   covering	   the	  malfunctioning	  
BVR	   and	   EVID	   systems,	   and	   Voting	   issues	   (15,7%)	   covering	  missing	   names	   from	   the	  
register	  adds	  up	   to	  almost	  half	  of	   the	   total	  number	  of	   reports.	  Simply	  put	   -­‐	   the	  crowd	  
reported	   on	   easy	   to	   spot	   issues.	   Their	   perception	   on	   safety	   or	   insecurity,	   injustice	   as	  
fraud	   or	   malpractice	   or	   technical	   obstacles	   preventing	   them	   from	   a	   calm	   arrival,	  
understanding	  what	  to	  do,	  vote	  and	  then	  leave.	  Issues	  on	  technicalities	  connected	  to	  the	  
formal	  procedures	  inside	  the	  polling	  station	  are	  far	  less	  reported.	  	  
Reports	  from	  trusted	  observers	  using	  the	  Code	  Cards	  are	  easy	  to	  categorise.	  Each	  report	  
contained	   one	   piece	   of	   information.	   The	   Uchaguzi	   dataset	   show	   that	   the	   volunteers	  
categorizing	  report	  have	  struggled	  with	  some	  of	  the	  more	  descriptive	  reports	  containing	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information	   that	   fitted	   several	   categories.	   Although	   there	   was	   a	   possibility	   to	   tag	   a	  
report	   for	  more	   than	  one	   category,	   this	  was	  not	  done	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   and	   therefore	  
reduces	  the	  precision	  in	  the	  above	  chart.	  	  
But	  in	  the	  following	  diagrams	  are	  showing	  single	  issues,	  not	  categories.	  Here	  the	  reports	  
containing	  free	  descriptions	  are	  tagged	  relevant	  to	  the	  content.	  Below	  is	  one	  example:	  
"04.03.2013,	  13:28,	  SOUTH	  C,	  LANGATA,	  NAIROBI,	  So	  Far	  So	  Good	  South	  C:	  Everyone	  is	  so	  far	  so	  good	  around	  
south	  c	  waiting	  in	  queues	  to	  cast	  their	  vote.	  Everything	  has	  been	  good	  and	  well	  organized.	  Though	  there	  have	  
been	  some	  long	  queues	  but	  everyone	  is	  calm."	  (#1660)	  
This	  report	  is	  tagged	  under	  "Peace",	  "Voting	  OK"	  and	  "Slow	  process".	  There	  are	  not	  too	  
many	  reports	   in	   the	  dataset	   covering	  more	   topics,	  but	   since	   they	  exist,	   this	  method	  of	  
categorization	  has	  been	  used	  when	  creating	  charts	  describing	  single	  issues.	  
5 Analysing	  the	  content	  
I	  have	  chosen	  a	  few	  issues	  from	  the	  dataset	  for	  further	  analysis.	  The	  higher	  number	  of	  
reports	  received	  concerning	  a	  particular	  issue	  the	  easier	  it	  is	  to	  use	  the	  data.	  Below	  the	  
chosen	  issues	  are	  discussed.	  
The	   reports	   in	   the	   dataset	   are	   from	   two	   major	   groups	   of	   observers.	   To	   check	   if	   the	   
trained	   reporters	   and	   the	   crowd	   talked	   about	   the	   same	   issues	   they	   are	   separated	   in	  
Table	  5.	  	  
The	  comparison	  shows	  that	  Trusted	  reporters	   filed	  more	  reports	  on	   issues	  mentioned	  
on	   the	   Code	   Cards	   than	   the	   crowd.	   Their	   reports	   outnumber	   the	   crowd	   on	   
administrative	   and	   technical	   issues,	   malpractice	   and	   voting	   issues.	   But	   on	   issues	   not	  
listed	  on	  the	  cards	  the	  crowd	  reported	  more	  frequently.	  	  
This	  confirm	  that	  observers	  who	  are	  guided	  to	  report	  on	  specific	  issues	  are	  likely	  to	  do	  
so,	  where	  as	  the	  crowd	  -­‐	  who	  had	  no	  guidance,	  report	  on	  situations	  that	  are	  important	  to	  
them	   or	   situations	   they	   are	   encouraged	   to	   talk	   about	   from	   other	   sources.	   During	   the	   
elections,	  radio-­‐stations	  were	  inviting	  people	  to	  report	  to	  the	  "3002"	  short-­‐code	  during	  
the	  day.	  It	  is	  not	  known	  if	  particular	  subjects	  were	  promoted	  in	  these	  broadcasts,	  but	  it	  
is	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  peace-­‐messages	  could	  be	  one	  such	  category	  given	  the	  high	  focus	  
peaceful	  elections	  was	  given	  in	  in	  various	  channels.	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Table	  5	  also	  list	  reports	  retrieved	  from	  social	  media	  or	  websites,	  simply	  to	  get	  an	  idea	  of	  
the	   numbers	   retrieved	   from	   such	  media.	   As	   the	   table	   shows	   -­‐	   very	   few	   reports	   from	  
social	  media	  was	  included	  in	  the	  mapping	  project.	  
The	   Code	   Cards	   contained	   only	   one	   issue	   connected	   to	   violence,	   "Sexual	   and	   Gender	  
Based	  Violence"	  -­‐	  to	  which	  there	  were	  no	  reports.	  	  
	  


















































































1 Trusted reports 1 12 
 




40 3 995 
2 The Crowd 352 104 67 120 119 66 83 88 89 96 21 27 1232 
3 Twitter 21 4 4 5 14 2 7 10 2 1 1 2 73 
4 Web/media 7 3 4 
   
4 11 2 
  
2 33 
SUM 381 123 75 342 395 135 214 109 366 97 62 34 2333 
Table	  5:	  Comparison	  on	  number	  of	  reports	  within	  each	  category	  depending	  on	  the	  source	  of	  the	  reports	  
	  
To	  further	  test	   if	   the	  reports	   from	  the	  two	  reporting	  groups	  correspond,	   I	  have	  picked	  
two	  single	  subjects	  and	  compared	  them	  in	  the	  below	  charts.	  	  
As	  the	  Carter	  Center	  and	  ELOG	  reports	  also	  comment,	  some	  polling	  stations	  did	  not	  open	  
on	   time.	   "Carter	   Center	   observers	   reported	   that	   75	   percent	   of	   polling	   station	   openings	  
occurred	  by	  6:30	  a.m."	   (Carter	   Center	   2013:	   103)	   and	   a	   total	   of	   6,4%	   of	   the	   Uchaguzi	  
reports	   comment	   on	   late	   opening.	   The	   diagram	   below	   show	   a	   similar	   picture	   as	   the	  
Carter	  Center,	  where	  the	  far	  most	  reports	  on	  late	  opening	  was	  sent	  before	  7	  a.m.	  Also	  it	  
shows	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  trained	  observers	  and	  the	  crowd.	  A	  polling	  station	  not	  
open	  when	  you	  expect	  it	  to	  be	  is	  easy	  for	  anyone	  to	  observe.	  	  
Kenya	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  (KHRC)	  blame	  the	  non	  functioning	  BVR	  kits	  to	  be	  the	  
main	   reason	   for	   late	   starts,	   in	   some	   locations	   creating	   frustrations	   among	  voters	  who	  
queued	  at	  early	  hours	  to	  vote,	  an	  thereby	  led	  to	  tension	  and	  unrest	  (KHRC	  2014).	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Chart	  3:	  The	  blue	  line	  shows	  reports	  from	  trusted	  reporters,	  the	  red	  line	  is	  from	  "the	  crowd".	  81	  %	  of	  the	  reports	  
concerning	  opening	  were	  sent	  before	  9am.	  (Uchaguzi	  data)	  
	  
The	  timeline	  is	  used	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  relevance	  for	  the	  reports	  on	  late	  opening	  of	  the	  
polling	   stations.	  Chart	  3	   shows	  a	  very	   similar	  pattern	  between	   the	   two	  groups,	  only	  a	  
handful	   of	   reports	   on	   this	   issue	   after	   9	   am	   in	   the	   morning	   indicates	   both	   that	   the	  
absolute	  majority	  of	  polling	  stations	  were	  up	  and	  running	  by	  that	   time,	  and	  that	   there	  
are	  no	  practical	  difference	  in	  the	  reports	  from	  the	  two	  groups.	  
The	  Biometric	   Voter	  Registration	   system	  was	   exposed	   to	  major	   criticism	  both	   before,	  
during	  and	  after	  the	  election.	  The	  two	  groups	  of	  reporters	  seem	  to	  agree	  that	  the	  system	  
was	  not	  functioning	  as	  shown	  in	  Chart	  4.	  The	  small	  rise	  in	  number	  of	  reports	  after	  12	  am	  
might	  even	  indicate	  the	  time	  when	  batteries	  started	  to	  run	  out	  on	  the	  equipment.	  	  
The	  above	   indicates	   that	  both	  groups	  of	  reporters	  were	   in	   tune	  with	  each	  other,	  and	   I	  
therefore	  combine	  all	  the	  responses	  in	  the	  following	  charts	  and	  maps.	  	  
The	  Carter	  Center	  found	  that	  "In	  41	  percent	  of	  polling	  stations	  visited	  by	  Center	  observers	  
these	  electronic	  devices	  were	  not	  operating."	  (Carter	  Center	  2013:	  99)	  
	  
	  
Chart	   4:	   The	   increase	   of	   reports	   around	   lunch	   may	   indicate	   situations	   where	   the	   kits	   was	   working	   in	   the	  
morning,	  but	  then	  ran	  out	  of	  power.	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5.1.1 Timeline	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  polling	  day	  events	  
Using	   a	   timeline	   to	   reflect	   events	   unfolding	   is	   one	   characteristic	   of	   crowdsourced	  
information.	   The	   timestamp	   of	   the	   messages	   are	   automatically	   recorded,	   and	   can	  
therefore	  create	  a	  time-­‐oriented	  view	  of	  what	  goes	  on.	  In	  some	  situations,	  the	  timestamp	  
can	  also	  contribute	  to	  verification	  of	  the	  report.	  
To	   test	   if	   the	   timeline	   generate	   meaning	   to	   the	   report,	   I	   have	   picked	   a	   "random"	  
selection	  of	  issues	  and	  presented	  them	  in	  Chart	  5.	  Reports	  on	  fraud,	  peace	  messages	  and	  
citizen	   results	   are	   very	   different	   in	   nature.	   Logically	   there	   should	   be	   no	   reports	   on	  
results	  before	  late	  in	  the	  day,	  and	  one	  could	  expect	  the	  others	  to	  be	  reported	  in	  a	  more	  
stable	  flow.	  	  
The	  most	  surprising	  curve	  shows	  the	  peace	  messages	  coming	  in	  bulks,	  creating	  peaks	  at	  
certain	  hours.	  Maybe	  the	  sudden	  jump	  in	  the	  curve	  is	  an	  outlier.	  But	  it	  could	  also	  be	  that	  
radio-­‐jingles	  or	  other	  broadcasts	  encouraged	  the	  voters	  to	  send	  peace	  messages	  to	  the	  
Uchaguzi	  platform.	  The	  curve	  showing	  citizen	  results	  stays	  flat	  until	  5pm	  when	  it	  slowly	  
rises	  peaking	  at	  11	  pm.	  If	   the	  chart	  had	  included	  the	  day	  after	  the	  elections,	  we	  would	  
have	  seen	  citizen	  result	  coming	  in	  all	  through	  the	  night	  and	  into	  the	  next	  day.	  
Voters	   reporting	  on	   fraudulent	  behaviour,	   register	   this	   throughout	   the	  election	  day.	   It	  
might	   also	   be	   that	   these	   types	   of	   issues	   were	   not	   reported	   the	   moment	   they	   were	  
observed,	  but	   later	  on.	  Fraud	  and	  malpractice	   is	  discussed	   in	  more	  detail	   further	   later	  
on.	  
	  
Chart	  5:	  Selected	  issues	  reported	  during	  election	  day.	  Toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  citizen	  results	  start	  to	  come	  in,	  
while	  reports	  on	  fraud	  follows	  the	  opening	  hours	  of	  the	  polling	  stations.	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5.1.2 Handling	  large	  volumes	  of	  reports	  	  
The	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  reports	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset,	  came	  during	  election	  day.	  The	  
rapid	   increase	   in	   reporting	   early	   in	   the	   morning	   put	   a	   strain	   on	   the	   teams	   in	   the	  
situation	   room	   in	  Nairobi	   as	  well	   as	   on	   the	   online	   volunteers.	   The	   capacity	   to	   rapidly	  
process	   large	   volumes	   of	   reports	   was	   an	   issue	   noted	   in	   the	   evaluation	   report	   of	   the	  
project,	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	   limitation	  for	  projects	  where	  manual	  filtering	  is	  a	  part	  of	  
the	  workflow	  before	  publication	  of	  such	  reports	  (Omenya	  2013).	  	  
The	   lack	   of	   capacity	   to	   manually	   handle	   large	   numbers	   of	   reports	   is	   also	   one	   major	  
argument	   for	   using	   artificial	   intelligence	   tools	   to	   help	   separate	   noise	   from	   valuable	  
information.	  An	  online	  crowd	  would	  then	  through	  a	  simple	  interface	  be	  able	  to	  put	  the	  
information	   in	   its	   correct	   category.	   Patrick	   Meier	   and	   his	   team	   at	   QCRI	   are	  
experimenting	   with	   such	   tools	   in	   the	   project	   Artificial	   Intelligence	   for	   Monitoring	  
Elections	  (AIME)	  (Meier	  2011,	  2013a).	  
	  
Chart	  6	  shows	  the	  flow	  of	  reports	  on	  election	  day	  and	  the	  rapid	  rise	  of	  reports	  early	  in	  the	  mornng.	  
	  
5.2 Comparing	  issues	  on	  check-­‐lists	  
ELOG	   deployed	   two	   supervisors	   in	   each	   constituency	   and	   selected	   976	   observers	   to	  
perform	  Parallel	  Vote	  Tabulation	  (PVT)	   in	  nationally	  representative	  samples	  of	  polling	  
streams.	  The	  PVT	  was	  performed	  in	  all	  constituencies.	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ELOG	  had	  a	  high	  rate	  of	   response	   from	  the	  national	   sample	   (97.5%).	  This	  means	   they	  
received	  data	  from	  -­‐	  and	  the	  data	  passed	  quality	  control	  checks	  for	  -­‐	  952	  polling	  streams	  
out	  of	  the	  976	  total	  polling	  streams	  in	  their	  chosen	  sample	  (ELOG	  2013:	  59).	  
The	  Uchaguzi	  project	  was	  not	  organized	   the	  same	  way,	  and	  therefore	   the	  results	   from	  
the	  two	  groups	  are	  not	  directly	  comparable.	  	  
SMS	  reporters	  will	  typically	  focus	  on	  particular	  issues	  they	  discover	  rather	  than	  sending	  
in	  reports	  covering	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  election.	  A	  direct	  comparison	  of	  the	  content	  from	  
the	   two	   kinds	   of	   observations	   does	   not	  make	   sense.	   But	   high	   numbers	   of	   reports	   on	  
particular	  subjects	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  importance,	  and	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  
key	  findings	  in	  observation	  reports	  might	  be	  possible.	  	  
The	  ELOG	  findings	  can	  be	  presented	  with	  percentages	  of	  polling	  streams	  visited,	  as	  the	  
Carter	  Center	  does,	   the	  Uchaguzi	   reports	   can	  only	  be	  presented	  as	   report	   counts.	  The	  
total	  number	  of	  polling	  streams	  covered	  by	  the	  Uchaguzi	  observers,	  by	  ordinary	  voters	  
and	  social	  media	  is	  not	  listed.	  But	  -­‐	  all	  the	  reports	  from	  the	  Uchaguzi	  observers	  have	  a	  
location,	  although	  not	  always	  down	  to	  polling	  station	  level.	  	  
Of	  the	  2333	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  943	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  522	  polling	  stations	  identified	  in	  
the	  dataset,	  while	  1451	  are	  located	  to	  a	  ward,	  village	  or	  constituency.	  In	  the	  table	  below,	  
we	  have	  listed	  the	  number	  of	  reports	  covering	  similar	  issues	  as	  the	  ELOG	  reports.	  	  
If	   the	  number	  of	  reports	  on	  one	   issue	   is	  high,	   it	   is	  an	   indication	   that	  several	  reporters	  
have	  noticed	  the	  same	  issue	  at	  different	  stations.	  The	  top	  three	  -­‐	  late	  opening,	  problems	  
with	   the	   identification	   kits	   and	   voters	   not	   finding	   their	   name	   in	   the	   register	   are	  
significant.	  	  
Different	  ways	  of	  formulating	  issues	  in	  the	  three	  observation	  reports,	  also	  challenges	  a	  
direct	   comparison.	   That	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   ELOGs	   conclusion	   on	   election	   day	  
monitoring:	   "Better	   synergy	   amongst	   domestic	   observers	   in	   the	   deployment	   and	  
standardization	   of	   observation	   tools	   is	   desirable	   in	   future	   election	   observation	   efforts"	  
ELOG	  2013:	  61)	  
Where	   ELOG	  mostly	   use	   a	   positive	   statement,	   the	   Uchaguzi	   dataset	   contains	   negative	  
statements.	   Some	   comparable	   information	   is	   however	   possible	   to	   discuss.	   This	   is	  
covered	  below	  each	  of	  the	  following	  tables.	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All	   three	   reports	   states	  a	  high	  number	  of	  polling	   stations	  opening	   too	   late.	  As	  Chart	  2	  
earlier	  on	  shows,	  6,4%	  of	  the	  total	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  complain	  about	  late	  opening.	  
Chart	  3	  where	  we	  compare	  the	  comments	  from	  trusted	  reporters	  and	  the	  crowd	  show	  
first	  that	  the	  two	  groups	  of	  observers	  report	  the	  same	  thing,	  secondly	  that	  the	  number	  of	  
reports	  decline	  after	  9	  am,	  indicating	  that	  by	  far	  the	  most	  stations	  were	  up	  and	  running	  
by	  that	  time.	  	  
	  
ELOG	   Uchaguzi	  
5.2:	  Opening	  and	  set	  up	  
Critical	  Indicators	  	  
%	  of	  all	  
polling	  
streams	  (%)	  	  
Uchaguzi	  Code	  cards/reports	   N	  reports	  
Polling	  streams	  opened	  on	  time	  
(6.15am)	  	  
59.7	  	   01	  Polling	  station	  not	  opened	  on	  time	   147	  	  
Polling	  streams	  had	  security	  
personnel	  present	  	  
99.6	   06	  No	  presence	  of	  security	  at	  polling	  
station	  
23	  
Ballot	  boxes	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  
empty	  before	  being	  sealed	  	  
95.6	   07	  Ballot	  boxes	  not	  sealed	  at	  start	  of	  
voting	  process	  
8	  
Polling	  streams	  had	  strategic	  items	  
for	  voting	  	  
99.4	  	   05	  Missing/	  Inadequate	  voting	  
materials	  
49	  
Polling	  stream	  did	  not	  have	  an	  
electronic	  poll	  book	  or	  the	  poll	  book	  
failed	  to	  function	  	  
8.0	  	   09	  Identification	  kit	  not	  working	  
	  
315	  
Table	  6:	  Source:	  ELOG	  2013	  PVT	  observation	  Data,	  Table	  5.2,	  National	  Sample	  (	  ELOG	  2013:	  59-­‐60)	  	  	  
	  
ELOG	  reports	  on	  security,	  sealed	  boxes	  and	  presence	  of	  strategic	  material,	  are	  positive.	  	  
It	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  the	  low	  numbers	  of	  reports	  from	  the	  Uchaguzi	  observers.	  
This	   is	   connected	   to	   the	   logical	   problem	  with	  negative	   statements	   on	   the	  Code	  Cards.	  
The	   Uchaguzi	   observers	   were	   not	   given	   a	   predefined	   alternative	   than	   reporting	  
malfunction,	   A	   low	   number	   of	   reports	   therefore	  might	   indicate	   that	   the	   issue	  was	   all	  
fine,	  or	  that	  the	  issues	  was	  overseen.	  	  
5.2.2 Comparing	  Voting	  day	  issues	  
Table	   7	   covers	   incidents	   on	   election	   day.	   Both	   Carter	   Center,	   ELOG	   and	   Uchaguzi	  
recorded	  that	  the	  identification	  kits	  in	  many	  poll	  stations	  did	  not	  work.	  The	  Code	  Cards	  
contained	  an	  additional	  question	  on	  the	  names	  missing	  from	  the	  register	  (13).	  It	  is	  not	  
clear	  if	  the	  missing	  names	  were	  connected	  to	  the	  machines	  not	  working,	  or	  a	  faulty	  pre-­‐
election	  registration	  process.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  -­‐	  unusually	  many	  assisted	  voters	  may	  be	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fraudulent	   or	   it	   might	   be	   that	   the	   election	   was	   complicated.	   Voters	   had	   to	   cast	   six	  
different	  votes	  in	  each	  their	  box.	  
04.03.2013,	  12:44,	  MSAMBWENI,	  KWALE:	  Ballot	  confusing,	  unable	  to	  cast	  vote	  "HELO	  BARAKA	  
NIMESHINDWA	  KUPIGAKURA	  JUYALAMA	  YAWAGOMBEZI	  SIELEWI	  AFADHALI	  WANGE	  WEKA	  JINA	  HAU	  
PICHA	  YA	  MGOMBEYAJI	  NI	  <Name>	  
Hello	  Baraka.	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  cast	  my	  vote	  because	  the	  party	  symbols	  were	  confusing.	  They	  should	  have	  only	  
put	  the	  photo	  or	  name	  of	  the	  aspirant.	  <Name>	  (Uchaguzi	  ID	  2096)	  
Combined	  with	   reports	   on	   varying	   quality	   of	   the	   voter	   education	   processes	   (Omenya	  
and	  Crandall	  2013),	  it	  might	  not	  be	  surprizing	  that	  the	  voters	  needed	  assistance.	  
	  
ELOG	   Uchaguzi	  
5.3	  Access	  and	  actual	  voting	  	   %	  of	  all	  
polling	  
streams	  	  
Uchaguzi	  Code	  cards/reports	   N	  reports	  
Electronic	  poll	  book	  failed	  at	  some	  point	  
during	  voting	  	  
55.1	  	   53	  ICT/Electricity	  failure,	  	  
09	  Identification	  kit	  not	  working	  
38	  	  
315	  
Many	  voters	  within	  the	  stream	  (i.e.,	  25	  or	  
more)	  received	  assistance	  when	  voting	  	  
54.0	  	   22	  Unusually	  many	  assisted	  voters	   60	  
People	  whose	  details	  were	  not	  on	  voters’	  
register	  not	  permitted	  to	  vote	  (as	  
prescribed	  by	  law)	  	  
84.8	  	   12	  Eligible	  Voters	  Turned	  Away	  /Not	  





N/A	   	   13	  Voter's	  names	  missing	  from	  voter	  
register	  
227	  
People	  whose	  details	  were	  not	  on	  voters’	  
register	  were	  permitted	  to	  vote	  	  
15.2	  	   24	  Ineligible	  voters	  allowed	  to	  vote	   4	  
Secrecy	  of	  the	  vote	  was	  violated	  during	  
voting	  	  
17.6	   23	  Voter	  assister	  not	  taking	  oath	  of	  
secrecy	  
04	  Design	  of	  polling	  station	  





Voters’	  fingers	  were	  marked	  with	  ink	  	   99.9	  	   NA	   	  
Some	  people	  not	  permitted	  to	  vote	  	   46.4	  	   12	  Eligible	  voters	  turned	  away	  /not	  
allowed	  to	  vote	  
14	  
Voters	  names	  were	  properly	  marked	  or	  
crossed	  out	  once	  their	  details	  were	  
confirmed	  in	  the	  voters	  register.	  	  
99.4	  	   NA	   	  
Ballot	  papers	  were	  properly	  stamped	  with	  
the	  IEBC	  official	  stamp	  before	  being	  
issued.	  	  
99.5	   14	  Voters	  issued	  with	  invalid	  ballot	  
papers	  
1	  
Polling	  streams	  still	  voting	  at	  7.30	  p.m.	  	   6.9	  	   27	  Polling	  Station	  Closed	  Before	  Time	   14	  
Table	  7:	  Source:	  ELOG	  2013	  PVT	  observation	  Data,	  Table	  5.3,	  National	  Sample	  (ELOG	  2013:	  60)	  	  	  
	  
All	  three	  reports	  comment	  on	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  BVR	  and	  the	  electronic	  poll	  book.	  Where	  
ELOG	  ask	   if	   those	  who	  didn't	   find	   their	  name	  were	  allowed	   to	  vote	   anyway,	  Uchaguzi	  
filed	  reports	  of	  those	  who	  wasn't	  in	  the	  register.	  Only	  4	  reports	  says	  that	  illegible	  voter	  
were	  allowed	  to	  vote,	  and	  14	  reports	  says	  that	  elegible	  voters	  were	  turned	  away.	  When	  
the	  ID-­‐machines	  failed	  and	  the	  IEBC	  had	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  paper-­‐based	  register,	  combined	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with	   numerous	   reports	   stating	   that	   people	   didn't	   find	   their	   name	  must	   logically	   have	  
slowed	  down	  the	  process.	  Chart	  7	  therefore	  contains	  these	  three	  issues.	  
	  	  
	  
Chart	   7:	   Uchaguzi	   reports	   on	   failing	   Biometric	   Voter	   Register	   (BVR),	   missing	   names	   from	   the	   register	   and	  
complaint	  of	  a	  slow	  voting	  process.	  
	  
The	  Carter	  Center	   report	   suggest	   that	   too	  many	  voters	  were	  assigned	   to	   some	  polling	  
station	  contributing	  to	  a	  slow	  process.	  When	  the	  identification	  kits	  failed,	  and	  one	  had	  to	  
return	   to	   the	   paper-­‐based	   register,	   it	   moved	   even	   slower.	   If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   then	   it	  
logically	  should	  occur	  in	  urban	  areas	  with	  a	  dense	  population	  and	  large	  groups	  of	  voters	  
registered	  to	  each	  polling	  station.	  Map	  2	  indicates	  that	  this	  indeed	  was	  the	  case.	  
	  
	  
Map	  2:	  14,8	  %	  of	  all	  reports	  from	  Nairobi	  County	  were	  complaints	  about	  slow	  voting	  process.	  The	  purple	  dots	  
show	  geographical	  distribution	  of	  complaints,	  blue	  dots	  are	  reports	  on	  other	  issues.	  In	  rural	  areas	  there	  are	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Purple	   dots	   showing	   complaints	   on	   a	   slow	   process	   are	   concentrated	   in	   the	   capital	  
Nairobi,	  where	   as	   in	   the	   countryside	   around,	   there	   are	   hardly	   any	   complaints	   on	   this	  
issue.	  Blue	  dots	  in	  Map	  2	  shows	  all	  reports	  in	  the	  region.	  
5.2.3 Voter	  register	  
By	  comparing	  the	  public	  voter	  lists	  on	  each	  county,	  the	  Carter	  Center	  report	  expresses	  
concern	  about	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  voter	  register.	  	  The	  differences	  are	  mainly	  registered	  
in	  two	  fields.	  First	  there	  are	  discrepancies	  on	  lists	  published	  before	  the	  election	  -­‐	  both	  
between	  the	  lists	  published	  in	  2012	  and	  those	  published	  days	  before	  the	  election.	  They	  
notice	   a	   difference	   of	   about	   100.000	   voters	   between	   the	   two	   lists.	   This	   suggests,	  
according	  to	  Carter	  Center	  that	  voters	  have	  been	  moved	  from	  one	  county	  to	  another	  and	  
the	   Center	   comments	   on	   the	   lack	   of	   transparency	   or	   explanation	   on	   what	   happened	  
(Carter	  Center	  2013:	  55).	  	  
After	  the	  elections	  the	  total	  number	  of	  voters	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  polling	  stations	  are	  sent	  to	  
the	  national	  tallying	  centre.	  The	  numbers	  from	  the	  polling	  stations	  "should	  have	  matched	  
the	  voter	  register,	   it	  was	  very	  often	  not	  the	  case"	  (Carter	  Center	  2013:	  110).	   Secondly	   -­‐	  
the	  total	  number	  of	  votes	  cast	  in	  each	  of	  the	  six	  ballot	  boxes	  should	  have	  been	  the	  same.	  
But	  as	  the	  observers	  note,	  they	  "differed	  by	  several	  hundred	  to	  several	  thousand"	  from	  the	  
same	  polling	  station.	  But	   there	   is	  no	  proof	   that	   these	  discrepancies	   led	  to	   favouring	  of	  
any	  particular	  political	  party,	  the	  Center	  concludes.	  
In	  the	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  -­‐	  there	  are	  two	  categories	  that	  correspond	  to	  the	  same.	  First	  are	  
the	  reports	  saying	  the	  voters	  didn't	   find	  their	  name	  in	  the	  register.	  Nearly	  every	  tenth	  
report	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset	  states	  that	  the	  voter	  didn't	  find	  her	  name	  in	  the	  register	  
(9,55%).	   	   Secondly,	  when	   the	   BVR	   kits	   didn't	  work,	   and	   the	   Carter	   Center	   had	   found	  
differences	   in	   the	  content	  between	   the	  electronic	  and	   the	  paper-­‐based	  voter	   registers,	  
these	  two	  major	  complaints	  might	  be	  connected.	  
5.2.4 	  Malpractice	  and	  fraud	  
Neither	  the	  Carter	  Center	  report	  nor	  the	  ELOG	  report	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  bribery	  on	  
electionday.	  The	  ELOG	  report	  mention	  the	  issues	  in	  connection	  with	  campaigning	  during	  
the	  pre-­‐election	  period	  (ELOG	  2013:	  39,	  44),	  but	  does	  not	  report	  specifically	  on	  this	  in	  
their	   election	   day	   observation.	   This	   may	   then	   constitute	   a	   major	   difference	   in	   the	  
observing	  method.	  Where	  traditional	  observation	  happens	  inside	  the	  polling	  station,	  the	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voters	  are	  lined	  up	  in	  a	  long	  queue	  or	  moving	  through	  town	  on	  their	  way	  to	  the	  polling	  
station.	  They	  are	  more	  likely	  both	  to	  observe	  such	  events,	  and	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  it.	  There	  
are	   several	   reports	   in	   the	  Uchaguzi	   dataset	   telling	   about	   pre-­‐election	   bribing,	   such	   as	  
this	  fatal	  one:	  	  
	  
01.03.2013,	  21:38,	  MATUNGU,	  KAKAMEGA,	  Person	  died	  on	  27/2	  after	  taking	  photos	  of	  bribery:	  One	  person	  
was	  injured	  and	  died	  on	  following	  day	  morning	  at	  munami	  mkt	  when	  taking	  photo	  after	  shitanda	  dished	  
cash	  worthy	  kshs40000	  this	  has	  been	  observed	  from	  almost	  all	  candidates	  on	  different	  occassions,	  including	  
rallies	  and	  homes	  the	  incident	  took	  place	  on	  27022013	  at	  1715pm	  (Uchaguzi	  ID:	  162)	  
	  
The	  report	  is	  not	  marked	  as	  confirmed,	  and	  I	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  confirm	  it	  through	  
other	  online	  sources	  either.	  
Chart	   8	   below,	   is	   showing	   reports	   on	   fraud	   and	  malpractice	   on	   election	  day,	   together	  
with	   reports	   containing	   information	   that	   the	   voting	   procedure	   actually	   worked	   fine,	  
with	   no	   noticeable	   disturbances.	   Issues	   included	   in	   the	   category	   "Fraud"	   and	  
"Malpractice"	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  3	  are:	  	  
04	   Fraud:	   Bribing,	   buying	   of	   ID	   cards,	   ballot	   box	   stuffing,	   etc.	   The	   definite	   majority	   of	  
reports	  in	  this	  category	  is	  concerning	  bribing.	  
04	   Malpractice:	   Unusual	   voter	   assistance,	   campaigning,	   intimidation,	   etc.	   Number	   of	  
reports	  in	  this	  category	  is	  more	  evenly	  distributed	  among	  the	  issues,	  campaigning	  (59)	  
and	  unusual	  voter	  assistance	  (60)	  being	  the	  largest	  group.	  
Unusually	  many	  voters	  getting	  assistance	  is	  noted	  by	  ELOG	  to	  have	  happened	  in	  54	  %	  of	  
the	  polling	  stations	  (Table	  7).	  	  
One	  must	  not	  forget	  however,	  that	  the	  election	  procedure	  was	  new	  to	  the	  voters.	  Casting	  
6	  different	  ballots	  in	  each	  their	  box	  might	  demand	  assistance,	  and	  the	  ELOG	  report	  does	  
not	  explicitly	  state	  that	  there	  was	  fraud	  or	  malpractice	  involved	  in	  the	  assistance	  -­‐	  but	  
that	  the	  numbers	  of	  voter	  getting	  assistance	  was	  unusually	  high.	  	  
Reports	   stating	   that	   the	   voting	   went	   on	   well	   is	   included.	   Although	   not	   asked	   for,	   76	  
reports	  specifically	  states	  that	  the	  voting	  process	  was	  handles	  properly.	  Some	  of	   these	  
are	  the	  same	  reports	  as	  those	  categorized	  as	  "Peace".	  But	  in	  this	  table	  the	  ones	  explicitly	  
mentioning	  the	  voting	  process	  have	  been	  extracted	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Chart	  8:	  Reporting	  on	  fraud	  and	  malpractice	  on	  election	  day..	  
	  
5.2.5 Comparing	  reports	  on	  closing	  and	  counting	  
As	  the	  Table	  8	  shows	  -­‐	  this	  is	  the	  part	  where	  the	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  hardly	  are	  useful.	  The	  
observers	  either	  did	  not	  report	  on	  the	   issues,	  or	  everything	  went	  smoothly.	  The	  ELOG	  
report,	   containing	  verifications	   that	   the	   issues	   listed	  were	  as	   they	  should	  be,	  creates	  a	  
more	  reliable	  picture	  than	  the	  very	  few	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  saying	  something	  was	  wrong.	  
The	  trained	  reporters	  had	  access	  to	  the	  counting	  process,	  where	  as	  the	  crowd	  did	  not.	  
No	  surprize	  then,	  that	  they	  did	  not	  report	  on	  it.	  	  
	  
ELOG	   Uchaguzi	  
5.4	   Integrity	  of	   closing	  poll	   streams	  and	  counting	  of	  
votes	  
Uchaguzi	  dataset/reports	  
Key	  Indicators	   (%)	  	   Uchaguzi	  Code	  cards	   N	  reports	  
Voters	  in	  the	  queue	  at	  5.00	  pm	  allowed	  to	  
vote	  
95.4	   27	  Polling	  Station	  Closed	  Before	  Time	   14	  
	   	   45	  Polling	  Station	  Closed	  Due	  To	  
Violence	  
3	  
Ballot	  box	  seals	  were	  intact	  before	  counting	   99.5	   28	  Selaed	  Ballot	  Box	  Tampered	  With	   6	  
Party	  agents	  requested	  a	  recount	  of	  
Presidential	  ballots	  
2.8	   35	  Party	  Agents	  Failed	  to	  Agree	  on	  
Disputed	  Ballot	  Papers	  
3	  
CORD	  agents	  present	  in	  polling	  streams	   87.9	   NA	   	  
CORD	  agents	  signed	  declaration	  of	  
Presidential	  results	  (in	  the	  87.9%	  of	  polling	  
streams	  where	  CORD	  agents	  were	  present).	  
94.9	   NA	   	  
JUBILEE	  agents	  present	  in	  polling	  streams	   90.0	   NA	   	  
JUBILEE	  agents	  signed	  declaration	  of	  
Presidential	  results	  (in	  the	  90.0%	  of	  polling	  
streams	  where	  JUBILEE	  agents	  were	  
present).	  
95.6	   NA	   	  
Other	  agents	  present	  in	  polling	  streams	   88.5	   32	  Party	  Agents	  not	  allowed	  in	  the	  Hall	  
during	  vote	  counting	  
2	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Other	  agents	  signed	  declaration	  of	  
Presidential	  results	  (in	  the	  88.5%	  of	  polling	  
streams	  were	  Other	  agents	  were	  present).	  
88.3	   36	  Agents	  failure	  to	  sign	  final	  results	  
form	  	  
37	  Agents	  decline	  to	  sign	  tally	  sheet	  &	  




Official	  Presidential	  results	  posted	  outside	  
polling	  streams	  after	  counting	  
89.1	   44	  Failure	  to	  announce	  Final	  Result	  by	  
IEBC	  official	  
2	  
	   	   54	  Citizen	  results	   97	  
	  
Table	  8:	  Source:	  ELOG	  2013	  PVT	  observation	  Data,	  Table	  5.4,	  National	  Sample	  (	  ELOG	  2013:	  61)	  	  	  
	  
The	   Uchaguzi	   dataset	   contains	   97	   reports	   transmitting	   preliminary	   results.	   To	   my	  
knowledge	   they	   were	   not	   collected	   in	   such	   a	   manner	   that	   they	   could	   be	   used	   as	   a	  
statistical	  relevant	  parallel	  vote	  tabulation,	  nor	  that	  anybody	  pick	  them	  up	  to	  do	  it.	  But	  -­‐	  
for	   the	   sake	  of	  documentation	   -­‐	   the	   fact	   that	   someone	   types	  and	   transmits	   the	   results	  
from	  a	  polling	  station	  to	  a	  central	  hub,	  is	  a	  documentation	  of	  events	  that	  match	  the	  very	  
logic	  of	  election	  observation.	  As	  such	  they	  are	  of	  value.	  Chart	  5	  visualises	  the	  timeline	  of	  
the	  reports	  as	  they	  started	  to	  come	  around	  5	  pm.	  
5.3 Mapping	  Peace,	  tension	  and	  violence	  
The	  Uchaguzi	  category	  called	  "Everything's	  Fine"	  does	  not	  really	  cover	  the	  content	  of	  the	  
reports	   shown	   in	   this	   category.	  Most	   of	   these	   reports	   tell	   that	   the	   elections	   are	   going	  
forward	  and	  there	  is	  no	  violence.	  They	  do	  not	  say	  that	  everything	  is	  working	  smoothly,	  
but	   there	   is	   absence	   of	   violence	   and	   presence	   of	   peace.	   Therefore	   the	   name	   of	   the	  
category	  have	  been	  altered	  for	  this	  study.	  
The	   Uchaguzi	   project	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Carter	   Center	   operates	   with	   the	   term	   "Security	  
issues"	   in	   which	   there	   is	   a	   large	   span	   from	   peace	   to	   severe	   violence	   -­‐	   which	   for	   our	  
discussion	  needs	  to	  be	  broken	  down	  in	  more	  detail.	  As	  we	  can	  see	  in	  Table	  4,	  only	  one	  
issue	   relates	   directly	   to	   security	   (No	   6)	   -­‐	   which	   ask	   if	   there	  were	   security	   personnel	  
present	  when	  the	  poll	  opened.	  The	  Uchaguzi	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  security	  list	  "rumors"	  and	  
"dangerous	  speech"	  as	  well	  as	  bombings	  or	  abductions	  under	  the	  same	  main	  category.	  
Therefore	  we	  have	  created	  three	  categories	  to	  differentiate	  security	  related	  issues.	  The	  
word	  "Peace"	  gives	  a	  more	  relevant	  description	  of	   the	  actual	  reports	   than	  "Everything	  
fine",	  "Tension"	  contains	  all	  reports	  about	  rumours,	  dangerous	  speech	  and	  threatening	  
behaviour,	  and	  the	  category	  "Violence"	  covers	  robbery,	  fighting	  or	  armed	  attacks.	  	  
The	  Carter	  Center	  report	  contains	  very	  few	  comments	  on	  violence	  during	  election	  day.	  
The	   report	   states	   that	   polling	   operations	   on	   election	   day	   was	   performed	   in	   "largely	  
peaceful	   atmosphere	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   two	   occurrences	   of	   violence	  with	   regrettable	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deaths	   in	   the	   Coast	   region"	   (Carter	   Center	   2013:	   45).	  Disturbances	   in	   Chumani,	   Kilifi	  
County	  are	  mentioned	  in	  their	  report	  as	  well	  as	  the	  violence	  occurring	  in	  Mombasa.	  The	  
ELOG	  report	  only	  mentions	  the	  Mombasa	  killings	  where	  13	  civilians	  and	  6	  police	  officers	  
were	  killed	  (ELOG	  2013:	  62,	  KPTJ:	  5).	  	  Below	  is	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  on	  how	  the	  
Uchaguzi	  reports	  show	  violence	  and	  tension.	  
5.3.1 Violence	  hotspots	  
As	   the	   map	   below	   show,	   the	   Uchaguzi	   reports	   contain	   statements	   of	   killings	   and	  
hotspots	  of	  violence	  and	  tensions	  in	  Kilifi	  and	  Mombasa	  by	  the	  coast,	  in	  Mandera	  in	  the	  
north,	   in	   Nairobi	   and	   in	   Kakamega	   in	   the	   western	   province.	   There	   are	   witness	  
descriptions	  on	  stabbing,	  torching	  of	  houses	  and	  cars	  as	  well	  as	  threats	  to	  public	  peace.	  
The	  dataset	  contains	  73	  reports	  on	  various	  types	  of	  violence	  occurring	  during	  two	  days	  
before	  and	  one	  day	  after	  the	  elections.	  
One	  reason	  for	  the	  underreporting	  of	  violent	  disturbance	  in	  the	  ELOG	  and	  Carter	  Center	  
reports	   might	   be	   found	   in	   the	   latter	   when	   media	   coverage	   is	   commented:	   "...media	  
houses	  were	   overly	   cautious	   in	   their	   coverage,	   focusing	   on	   the	   prevention	   of	   violence	   to	  
such	  an	  extent	  that	  they	  censored	  themselves	  while	  reporting	  news"	  (Carter	  Center	  2013:	  
41).	  	  
"04.03.2013,	  15:01,	  MATHARE,	  NAIROBI,	  Violence:	  Votin	  process	  is	  wel	  in	  mathare,but	  there	  are	  some	  gungs	  
in	  3c	  villege	  attacking	  pple	  wth	  knife,one	  man	  hd	  bn	  stubd,	  more	  security	  re-­‐enforcemnt	  on	  ths	  area	  around	  
sokomoko'n'Brdge	  2	  along	  mau	  mau	  road,plz	  help?"	  (Uchaguzi	  ID:	  1622)	  
	  
It	  seems	  therefore	  that	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset	  holds	  the	  most	  detailed	  picture	  of	  violence	  
and	  tension	  around	  election	  day.	  This	  was	  in	  contrast	  to	  international	  media	  arriving	  at	  
the	  scene.	  "The	  Carter	  Center	  regretted	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  international	  media	  on	  the	  risks	  
of	   violence	   did	   not	   reflect	   the	   peaceful	  messages	   being	   delivered	   by	   candidates,	   political	  
parties,	   and	   all	   stakeholders".	   (Carter	   Center	   2013:	   41).	   The	   statement	   is	   nicely	  
formulated	  in	  a	  tweet	  circulating	  and	  appearing	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  reports:	  	  
	  
04.03.2013,	  13:36,	  NAIROBI,	  @calestous	  	  BREAKING:	  Foreign	  reporters	  clash	  in	  #Kenya	  amid	  growing	  
scarcity	  of	  bad	  news.	  #kenyadecides	  (Uchaguzi	  ID:	  1948)	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Hotspots	  of	  violent	  events	  during	  the	  elections	  
	  
	  
Map	  2:	  Violence	  hotspots:	  Instances	  of	  reports	  on	  violence	  in	  Mandera	  in	  north	  east,	  Western	  areas,	  Nairobi	  in	  
central	  south	  and	  Mombasa	  and	  Kilifi	  by	  the	  coast.	  (Map	  by	  author,	  base	  layer:	  OSM,	  data:	  Uchaguzi)	  
	  
Reports	  on	  peace,	  tension	  and	  violence	  in	  Kibera	  and	  Mathare,	  Nairobi	  
	  
	  
Map	  3:	  Reports	  on	  Tension	  and	  Violence	  clustered	  around	  Kibera	  and	  Mathare	   in	  Nairobi.	  Orange	  stars	  mark	  
reports	  on	  tension,	  red	  stars	  are	  violence,	  green	  stars	  are	  reports	  on	  peace.	  (Map	  by	  author,	  base	  layer:	  OSM,	  
data:	  Uchaguzi)	   	  
	   65	  
Reports	  on	  peace,	  tension	  and	  violence	  in	  Mombasa	  
	  
	  
Map	  4:	  Reports	  on	  Peace,	  Tension	  and	  Violence	  in	  Mombasa.	  (Map	  by	  author,	  base	  layer:	  OSM,	  data:	  Uchaguzi)	  
	  
Reports	  tagged	  with	  Code	  6	  "No	  presence	  of	  security	  at	  polling	  station"	  can	  be	  read	  and	  
classified	  in	  different	  ways.	  Here	  is	  one	  example:	  
	  
04.03.2013,	  06:13,	  NYALI,	  MOMBASA,	  Code	  6,	  No	  Presence	  Of	  Security	  At	  Polling	  Station	  (Uchaguzi	  ID	  4376)	  
	  
It	   could	   be	   that	   the	   observer	   refers	   to	   a	   checklist	   for	   the	   setup	   of	   the	   polling	   station	  
before	   opening,	   and	   that	   the	   classification	   of	   the	   message	   therefore	   belongs	   to	   the	  
category	   "Opening"	   or	   "Administration".	   Reading	   the	   timestamp	   of	   the	  message	   (sent	  
06:13	  on	  polling	  day)	  support	  this	  idea.	  But	  noticing	  that	  a	  third	  of	  the	  messages	  using	  
this	  code	  are	  sent	  from	  Mombasa	  (7),	  a	  hotspot	  for	  violent	  disturbance	  of	  the	  elections,	  
and	  that	   they	  keep	  coming	  during	  the	  morning	  hours,	   indicate	   that	   the	  message	   is	  not	  
about	   opening	   procedures,	   but	   about	   the	   observer	   has	   a	   perception	   of	   insecurity	   or	  
tension.	  This	  is	  to	  illustrate	  a	  need	  for	  a	  high	  level	  of	  precision	  in	  predefined	  statements	  
when	   asking	   the	   crowd	   to	   report.	   The	   7	   reports	   with	   Code	   6	   from	   Mombasa	   are	  
categorized	  under	  "Opening"	  as	  the	  others	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  	  
The	   tension	   in	   Mombasa	   are	   confirmed	   by	   the	   ELOG	   observers.	   They	   report	   on	   the	  
attacks	  and	  senseless	  killings	  that	  happened	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  election	  and	  affected	  the	  
opening	   of	   the	   polling	   stations.	   The	   election	   reports	   tells	   the	   story:	   "However,	   our	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observer	  reports	  indicate	  that	  polling	  stations	  were,	  ...	  opened	  and	  voting	  commenced	  later	  
in	   the	  morning.	  The	  efforts	  by	   the	   security	  agencies	   in	   restoring	  calm,	   thus,	  enabling	   the	  
IEBC	  to	  commence	  polling	  were	  commendable.	  (ELOG	  2013:	  60-­‐62).	  
The	  word	  "No	  order"	  can	  also	  be	  interpreted	  in	  different	  ways.	  It	  could	  describe	  chaotic	  
queue	  due	  to	  poor	  setup	  of	  the	  polling	  station,	  or	  it	  could	  describe	  a	  tension	  among	  the	  
voters	  gathered.	  This	  one	  is	  also	  categorized	  as	  "Tension".	  
	  
"04.03.2013,	  10:48,	  MAVOKO,	  MACHAKOS,	  MLONGO	  WE	  NEED	  MORE	  SECURITY	  THERE	  IS	  NO	  ORDER"	  
(#2304)	  
	  
In	  total	  there	  were	  22	  reports	  filed	  with	  the	  "Code	  6",	  13	  of	  them	  from	  trusted	  observers	  
using	  the	  Code	  Cards.	  
	  
Reports	  on	  peace,	  tension	  and	  violence	  in	  western	  Kenya	  
	  
	  
Map	  5:	  Scattered	  reports	  on	  tension	  and	  violence,	  dominated	  by	  peace	  reports	  from	  Western	  province	  (Map	  by	  
author,	  base	  layer:	  OSM,	  Data:	  Uchaguzi).	  
	  
Although	  scattered	  and	  mostly	  observed	  on	   the	  evening	  before	  election	  day,	   there	  are	  
reports	  on	  violence	  also	  from	  the	  western	  areas	  of	  Kenya.	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04.03.2013,	  00:35,	  LURAMBI,	  KAKAMEGA,	  Burning	  car	  and	  tension	  near	  Kakagema	  Forest:	  "Reported	  from	  
kakamega	  Former	  shinyalu	  mp	  [NAME]	  narrowly	  eascaped	  and	  his	  car	  was	  burnt	  near	  kakamega	  forest	  	  
Tension	  seems	  to	  be	  raising	  following	  that	  incidence"	  (Uchaguzi	  ID:	  1311)	  
	  
Using	  maps	   as	   the	   above	   examples	   gives	   an	   geographical	   overview	   and	   enables	   to	   se	  
hotspots	   and	   clustering	   of	   individual	   reports.	   As	   such,	   they	   also	   represent	   a	  
characteristic	   of	   crowdsourced	   projects,	  where	  maps	   have	   become	   a	   standard	   part	   of	  
such	  projects.	  To	  bad	   then,	   that	   this	  paper	  version	   is	  not	   able	   to	   show	   the	   interactive	  
features	  of	  online	  maps.	  Clicking	  on	  each	  of	  the	  dots	  would	  reveal	  the	  full	  reports	  behind	  
it,	  and	  thereby	  reveal	  details	  impossible	  to	  visualise	  in	  a	  compact	  format	  on	  paper.	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6 Findings	  and	  Conclusions	  
A	   body	   of	   research	   investigating	   the	   advantages	   and	   perils	   in	   citizens	   engaging	   in	  
political	   processes	   using	   communication	   tools	   is	   emerging.	   Such	   tools	   represent	   a	  
channel	  for	  new	  groups	  to	  engage,	  different	  voices	  to	  be	  heard.	  	  
Whether	  it	  is	  the	  broad	  engagement	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  crowdsourced	  election	  monitoring	  
that	  creates	  value	  or	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  their	  reports	  needs	  more	  research	  to	  prove.	  
The	  collaboration	  between	  Uchaguzi	  and	  civic	  society	  organisations	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  
crucial	  to	  gain	  enough	  support	  and	  systematic	  reporting	  to	  the	  Uchaguzi	  platform.	  One	  
prerequisite	   for	  such	  projects	   to	  deliver	  a	   rich	  picture	  seems	   to	  be	   their	  coverage	  and	  
presence	  and	  an	  organization	  to	  handle	  the	  flow	  of	  information.	  	  
Most	  Kenyans	  have	  access	  to	  the	  use	  of	  mobile	  phones,	  and	  access	  to	  the	  communication	  
tools	  as	  such	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  major	  risk	  for	  potentially	  biases	   in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  
project.	  As	  shown	  -­‐	  the	  crowd	  can	  be	  directed	  in	  what	  they	  feed	  to	  the	  project.	  There	  is	  
still	  some	  reflection	  and	  refinement	  to	  do	  on	  which	  questions	  that	  should	  be	  asked,	  and	  
how	  they	  are	  formulated.	  	  
Despite	   this,	   the	  major	   comments	  on	  election	  day	  process	   from	   the	  Carter	  Center	  and	  
ELOG	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  reports.	  The	  latter	  contains	  a	  more	  detailed	  picture	  
of	  events	  not	  to	  deeply	  covered	  by	  the	  others.	  Disturbances,	  violence,	  peace-­‐efforts	  and	  
bribing	   of	   voters	   are	   the	   most	   important	   ones.	   The	   geographic	   orientation	   of	   such	  
projects	  can	  bring	  forth	  new	  understandings	  on	  not	  only	  what	  happened,	  but	  where	  -­‐	  in	  
which	   community	   the	   events	   are	   clustered.	   This	   might	   provide	   a	   foundation	   for	  
decision-­‐making	  on	  a	  local	  level.	  
Rather	   than	   commenting	   electoral	   technicalities,	   the	   Uchaguzi	   observers	   comment	  
situations	  where	  the	  voter	  experienced	  obstructions	  to	  the	  act	  of	  voting.	  The	  crowd	  did	  
not	  stick	  to	  the	  subjects	  presented	  on	  forehand,	  but	  reported	  several	  issues	  not	  usually	  
asked	  for	  in	  election	  monitoring.	  The	  workflow	  applied	  for	  the	  project	  represent	  on	  one	  
side	  a	  structure	   for	  delivering	  quality	  output.	  The	   time	  and	  energy	  used	  on	  a	  rigorous	  
workflow	   might	   however	   contradict	   another	   characteristic	   for	   such	   projects,	   namely	  
speed.	   This	   is	   a	   dilemma	   in	   crowdsourced	   projects	   and	   the	   reason	   why	   substantial	  
research	  is	  done	  to	  develop	  machine	  assisted	  methods	  for	  filtering	  noise	  from	  valuable	  
information	  and	  for	  verifying	  what	  is	  correct	  and	  not.	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The	   way	   of	   formulating	   issues	   on	   the	   Code	   Cards,	   gives	   the	   Uchaguzi	   reports	   a	   bias,	  
mostly	  containing	  reports	  on	  negative	  event	  or	  poor	  performance.	  It	  is	  therefore	  difficult	  
to	  understand	  if	  low	  number	  of	  reports	  on	  specific	  issues	  is	  because	  all	  was	  fine,	  or	  that	  
the	  observer	  did	  not	  notice.	  This	   is	   to	   some	  extent	  outweighed	  by	   the	  positive	  peace-­‐
reports,	   although	   they	   don't	   address	   technical	   or	   electoral	   processes,	   but	   confirm	   the	  
absence	  of	  the	  expected	  violence.	  
Utilizing	   timestamps	  and	  geographical	   information	   from	  single	   reports	   to	   create	  maps	  
or	   timelines	   add	   informational	   value	   to	   the	   reporting.	   The	   speed	   of	   crowdsourced	  
information	   also	   facilitate	   the	   ability	   not	   only	   to	   register	   what	   happened,	   but	   for	  
organizations	  and	  authorities	  to	  react	  on	  urgent	  information.	  
Unlike	  passive	  crowdsourcing	  -­‐	  where	  you	  harvest	  and	  analyse	  messages	  that	  by	  chance	  
are	   transmitted	   through	   social	  media	   -­‐	  meaningful	   crowdsourced	   election	  monitoring	  
demands	   more	   "skills"	   from	   the	   reporter.	   For	   an	   SMS	   to	   pass	   onto	   the	   Uchaguzi	  
platform,	  the	  message	  had	  to	  contain	  a	  description	  of	   the	  event	  as	  well	  as	   information	  
about	  the	  location.	  	  
To	   increase	   the	   number	   of	   meaningful	   messages,	   the	   crowd	   therefore	   had	   to	   be	  
informed.	   This	   information	   was	   transmitted	   through	   radio,	   via	   flyers	   and	   posters.	   In	  
addition,	  their	  trained	  reporters	  in	  the	  field	  contributed	  with	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  
reports.	  The	  project	  therefore	  resembles	  ordinary	  domestic	  observation,	  except	  the	  fact	  
that	  their	  messages	  are	  published	  online	  in	  near	  real-­‐time.	  
6.1 Conclusion	  
The	   emerging	   research	   on	   crowdsourced	   participation	   suggests	   that	   such	   methods	  
belong	  to	  the	  toolbox	  for	  governance,	  human	  rights	  monitoring,	  election	  observation	  or	  
democratization	  projects.	  There	  is	  however	  a	  need	  for	  further	  development	  to	  achieve	  a	  
better	   use	   and	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   potential	   in	   such	   the	   tools	   and	  
methodologies.	  
To	   measure	   whether	   election	   monitoring	   contributes	   to	   democracy	   and	   freedom	   is	  
certainly	   disputed.	   Corrupt	   and	   authoritarian	   regimes	   invite	   commissions	   to	   observe	  
their	  elections,	  and	  the	  reports	  conclusions	  are	  often	  vague.	  And	  as	  others	  -­‐	  the	  Uchaguzi	  
project	  aimed	   to	  contribute	   to	   free,	   fair	  and	  peaceful	  elections	   in	  Kenya	  2013.	  Did	   the	  
project	  give	  a	  relevant	  account	  of	  the	  elections?	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Compared	   to	   the	  massive	   coverage	   of	   the	  ELOG	  observation	   group,	   the	   reports	   of	   the	  
Uchaguzi	   project	   covers	   far	   less	   polling	   stations,	   and	   reports	   on	   fewer	   issues.	  Despite	  
this,	  the	  major	  findings	  on	  election	  day	  issues	  both	  in	  the	  Carter	  Center	  report	  and	  the	  
ELOG	  reports	  are	  recognized	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset.	  So	  yes,	  the	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  give	  a	  
relevant,	  but	  slightly	  different	  picture	  of	  the	  process	  on	  election	  day.	  	  
The	  comparison	  of	   issues	   listed	  both	  on	  the	  Carter	  Center,	   the	  ELOG	  and	  the	  Uchaguzi	  	  
Code	  Cards	  show	  that	  the	  intention	  of	  all	  three	  monitoring	  groups	  are	  similar.	  The	  two	  
traditional	   reports	   cover	   the	   whole	   electoral	   process	   where	   the	   latter	   only	   covers	  
incidents	  on	  election	  day.	  	  
Since	   the	   Uchaguzi	   platform	   seems	   to	   be	   an	   alternative	   for	   crowdsourced	   election	  
monitoring	   in	  a	  number	  of	   countries,	   the	  setup	  might	  also	  be	  modified	   to	  highlight	   its	  
advantages	  towards	  traditional	  observation	  systems.	  By	  opening	  up	  for	  an	  "alternative"	  
story	   on	   the	   electoral	   process,	   the	   concept	   might	   catch	   information	   on	   issues	   not	  
thought	  of	  on	  forehand.	  
Crowdsourced	   ICT	   assisted	   monitoring	   can	   communicate	   urgent	   stories	   faster	   than	  
traditional	   observation	   methods.	   Such	   projects	   therefore	   might	   support	   traditional	  
monitoring,	  enabling	  individual	  voices	  to	  be	  heard.	  	  
The	  level	  of	  accuracy	  can	  be	  disputed	  in	  all	  three	  reports.	  Where	  Carter	  Center	  and	  ELOG	  
summarize	   and	   generalize	   on	  major	   issues,	   the	   Uchaguzi	   reports	   highlight	   individual	  
events	  and	  generates	  the	  overview	  through	  its	  categories	  and	  geographical	  visualisation	  
of	  issues.	  When	  single	  events	  are	  clustered	  on	  a	  map,	  they	  show	  hotspots	  for	  particular	  
issues	   that	   are	   significant	   on	   a	   local	   level,	   but	   too	   small	   to	   show	   up	   as	   a	   general	  
phenomenon.	  The	  election	  was	  mainly	  peaceful,	  but	  not	  everywhere.	  
The	   time-­‐factors	   -­‐	   both	   the	   information	   in	   a	   time	   stamped	   report	   and	   the	   speed	   of	  
crowdsourced	  systems	  are	  significant	  differences	  to	  traditional	  reporting	  systems.	  Using	  
timelines	  both	  for	  verification	  and	  documenting	  the	  flow	  of	  events	  can	  add	  information	  
not	  usually	  seen	  in	  traditional	  reports.	  
The	   Code	   Cards,	   or	   checklists	   provided	   for	   the	   Uchaguzi	   observers	   might	   be	  
reformulated	  to	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  giving	  the	  observer	  an	  incentive	  to	  also	  report	  on	  
positive	  events	  and	  on	  things	  going	  well.	  	  An	  altering	  of	  the	  categorization	  system,	  from	  
a	  hierarchical	  structure	  towards	  a	  flat,	  tagged	  database	  would	  ease	  the	  possibilities	  for	  a	  
single	   report	   to	   cover	   information	   on	   several	   issues.	   One	   might	   suggest	   that	   further	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research	   is	   done	   to	   address	   the	   conflict	   between	   speed	   of	   reporting	   and	   a	   rigorous	  
process	  for	  quality	  check.	  	  
It	  is	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  civil	  society	  will	  stop	  interfering	  with	  democratic	  processes	  
given	   the	   communication	   tools	   available.	   	   The	   logical	   consequence	   is	   therefore	   for	  
scholars	  and	  experts	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  projects	  to	  enhance	  the	  quality	  of	  crowdsourced	  
monitoring	  projects,	  and	  familiarize	  themselves	  with	  the	  new	  formats	  for	  reporting	  the	  
events.	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8 Appendix	  
8.1 Facts	  and	  figures	  
Constituencies:	  290	  (Uchaguzi	  reports	  from	  234)	  
Polling	  stations:	  31	  977	  (Approx	  32	  400	  according	  to	  Carter	  Center)	  
Mobile	  phone	  users:	  38	  million	  of	  48	  million	  people.	  (Barkan	  2013)	  
ELOG	  observers:	  ~7	  000	  (some	  reports	  operate	  with	  7	  500)	  
CRECO	  observers:	  ~2	  000	  (some	  reports	  operate	  with	  2	  500)	  
8.2 Table	  of	  Hashtags	  
During	  the	  elections	  in	  Kenya	  a	  set	  of	  hashtags	  were	  used	  on	  twitter,	  created	  by	  media	  
houses	  or	   individuals.	   	  They	  were	  used	   to	  monitor	   the	  voting	  activities	   and	   release	  of	  
results	  (Sambuli	  et	  al.	  2013b).	  Very	  few	  of	  these	  tweets	  reached	  the	  Uchaguzi	  platform.	  
Observers	  wanting	  to	  use	  Twitter	  as	  their	  reporting	  tool,	  were	  encouraged	  to	  direct	  the	  
message	  by	  using	  the	  @Uchaguzi	  tag.	  This	  would	  lead	  the	  message	  directly	  to	  the	  team.	  	  
But	  the	  thematic	  and	  public	  tag	  #Uchaguzi	  was	  also	  monitored.	  	  
	  
1.	  #KenyaDecides	   10.	  #Elections2013KE	  
2.	  #Decision2013	   11.	  #KEPolls2013	  
3.	  #Ballot2013	   13.	  #Polls2013	  
4.	  #Maamuzi2013	   14.	  #KenyaDecides2013	  
5.	  #KEelections2013	   15.	  #KEpoll2013	  
6.	  #Elections2013	   16.	  #KenyaDecides13	  
7.	  #Choice2013	   17.	  #DefiningMoment2013	  
8.	  #Uchaguzi	   18.	  #Kinyanganyiro2013	  
9.	  #UchaguziBora	   	  
	  Table	  9:	  Hashtags	  used	  for	  searching	  Twitter	  during	  the	  elections.	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8.3 Diagram	  of	  the	  Uchaguzi	  Workflow	  
How	   information	   is	   flowing	   through	   the	   Uchaguzi	   project.	   At	   the	   top	   there	   are	   the	  
different	   sources	   -­‐	   or	   observers	   if	   you	   like.	   The	   Translation,	   Geolocation	   and	   report	  
teams	  can	  be	  online	  volunteers	  located	  anywhere.	  Emergency	  and	  verification	  usually	  is	  
handled	  in	  the	  situation	  room.	  
	  
Chart	  12:	  The	  chart	  shows	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  project.	  (Source;	  Uchaguzi)	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8.4 Table:	  N	  reports	  from	  each	  County/Constituency	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset	  
	  
County Constituency N County Constituency N County Constituency N 
         
Baringo Baringo Central 2 Kakamega Butere 3 Kisii Bobasi 3 
 Baringo South 6  Ikolomani 15  Bomachoge Borabu 31 
 Eldama Ravine 6  Khwisero 6  Bomachoge Chache 1 
 Mogotio 2  Likuyani 26  Bonchari 8 
SUM  16  Lugari 19  Nyaribari Chache 7 
Bomet Bomet Central 3  Lurambi 6  South Mugirango 1 
 Bomet East 2  Malava 12 SUM  51 
 Chepalungu 2  Matungu 4 Kisumu Kisumu Central 19 
 Sotik 11  Mumias East 20  Kisumu East 4 
SUM  18  Mumias West 22  Kisumu West 3 
Bungoma Bumula 10  Navakholo 9  Muhoroni 1 
 Kabuchai 14  Shinyalu 1  Nyakach 7 
 Kanduyi 14 SUM  143  Nyando 8 
 Mt. Elgon 3 Kericho Ainamoi 19  Seme 5 
 Sirisia 6  Belgut 6 SUM  47 
 Tongaren 12  Bureti 5 Kitui Kitui Central 3 
 Webuye East 4  Kaplelartet 1  Kitui East 5 
 Webuye West 7  Kipkelion East 32  Kitui Rural 8 
SUM  70  Kipkelion West 4  Kitui South 5 
Busia Budalangi 1  Konoin 4  Kitui West 1 
 Funyula 7  Sigowet/Soin 8  Mwingi Central 5 
 Matayos 20 SUM  79  Mwingi West 1 
 Nambale 3 Kiambu Gatundu North 5 SUM  28 
 Teso North 17  Gatundu South 8 Kwale Kinango 12 
 Teso South 18  Juja 4  Lungalunga 6 
SUM  66  Kabete 7  Matuga 17 
Elgeyo -Marakwet Keiyo North 1  Kiambu 29  Msambweni 11 
SUM  1  Kiambaa 5 SUM  46 
Embu Manyatta 1  Kikuyu 5 Laikipia Laikipia East 7 
 Mbeere North 3  Lari 2  Laikipia West 19 
 Mbeere South 1  Limuru 8 SUM  26 
SUM  5  Ruiru 46 Lamu Lamu East 5 
Garissa Garissa Townsh. 3  Thika Town 6 SUM  5 
SUM  3 SUM  125 Machakos Kangundo 5 
Homa Bay Homa Bay Town 5 Kilifi Ganze 3  Kathiani 6 
 Kabondo Kasipul 6  Kaloleni 7  Machakos Town 26 
 Karachuonyo 2  Kilifi North 27  Matungulu 3 
 Kasipul 16  Kilifi South 31  Mavoko 25 
 Mbita 10  Magarini 2  Mwala 7 
 Ndhiwa 6  Malindi 2 SUM  72 
 Rangwe 6  Rabai 7 Makueni Kibwezi East 3 
SUM  51 SUM  79  Kibwezi West 6 
Kajiado Kajiado East 2 Kirinyaga Gichugu 5  Kilome 4 
 Kajiado North 19  Kirinyaga Centr. 6  Makueni 3 
 Kajiado South 1  Mwea 3  Mbooni 1 
SUM  22  Ndia 5 SUM  17 
   SUM  19 Mandera Mandera East 2 
      SUM  2 
      Marsabit Saku 5 
      SUM  5 
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County Constituency N County Constituency N County Constituency N 
         
Meru Buuri 10 Nakuru Bahati 9 Taita Taveta Mwatate 9 
 Central Imenti 3  Gilgil 6  Taveta 9 
 Igembe South 1  Kuresoi North 4  Voi 2 
 North Imenti 3  Kuresoi South 2 SUM  20 
 South Imenti 4  Molo 5 Tana River Bura 5 
 Tigania East 1  Naivasha 14  Galole 4 
 Tigania West 3  Nakuru Town E 10  Garsen 10 
SUM  25  Nakuru Town W 16 SUM  19 
Migori Awendo 4  Njoro 9 Tharaka - Nithi Maara 6 
 Kuria East 5  Rongai 8  Tharaka 6 
 Kuria West 46  Subukia 7 SUM  12 
 Nyatike 8 SUM  90 Trans Nzoia Cherangany 20 
 Rongo 18 Nandi Aldai 19  Kiminini 13 
 Suna East 4  Chesumei 6  Kwanza 31 
 Uriri 5  Emgwen 10  Saboti 37 
SUM  90  Mosop 7 SUM  101 
Mombasa Changamwe 39  Nandi Hills 12 Turkana Loima 6 
 Jomvu 22  Tinderet 26  Turkana Central 5 
 Kisauni 29 SUM  80  Turkana North 9 
 Likoni 14 Narok Kilgoris 1  Turkana South 1 
 Mvita 7  Narok East 1  Turkana West 10 
 Nyali 31  Narok North 1 SUM  31 
SUM  142  Narok South 1 Uasin Gishu Ainabkoi 6 
Murang'a Gatanga 18 SUM  4  Kapseret 7 
 Kandara 25 Nyamira Borabu 12  Kesses 25 
 Kangema 2  Kitutu Masaba 13  Moiben 3 
 Kiharu 15  North Mugirango 9  Soy 6 
 Maragwa 9  West Mugirango 5  Turbo 22 
 Mathioya 11 SUM  39 SUM  69 
SUM  80 Nyandarua Kinangop 9 Vihiga Emuhaya 6 
Nairobi Dagoretti North 31  Kipipiri 1  Hamisi 4 
 Dagoretti South 16  Ndaragwa 2  Luanda 4 
 Embakasi Central 13  Ol Jorok 11  Sabatia 9 
 Embakasi East 7  Ol Kalou 11  Vihiga 2 
 Embakasi North 20 SUM  34 SUM  25 
 Embakasi South 10 Nyeri Kieni 9 Wajir Wajir East 12 
 Embakasi West 14  Mathira 2  Wajir North 1 
 Kamukunji 23  Mukurweini 3 SUM  13 
 Kasarani 15  Nyeri Town 2 West Pokot Kapenguria 1 
 Kibra 50  Othaya 8 SUM  1 
 Langata 34  Tetu 1    
 Makadara 5 SUM  25 Total reports  2333 
 Mathare 71 Samburu Samburu North 1    
 Roysambu 21 SUM  1    
 Ruaraka 24 Siaya  0    
 Starehe 33  Bondo 1    
 Westlands 31  Gem 4    
SUM  418  Rarieda 7    
    Ugenya 5    
   SUM  17    
	  
Table	  10:	  Number	  of	  reports	  from	  Counties	  and	  	  Constituencies	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset.	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8.5 Map:	  National	  coverage	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset	  	  
Map	  6	  shows	  the	  geographic	  distribution	  of	  total	  reports	  in	  the	  Uchaguzi	  dataset.	  
	  
	  
Map	  6:	  All	  Uchaguzi	  reports	  plotted	  within	  County	  borders.	  (Map	  by	  author,	  base	  layer:	  OSM,	  county	  borders:	  
Mikel	  Maron,	  Data:	  Uchaguzi)	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Voters Valid Votes Votes Cast 
Voter 
Turnout 
        
Baringo 16 555 561  50 173 653 156 349 157 494 90.69% 
Bomet 18 730 129  365 252 358 225 713 227 115 90.00% 
Bungoma 70 1 375 063  623 410 462 345 699 351 005 85.51% 
Busia 66 743 946  457 251 305 218 656 220 928 87.91% 
Elgeyo - 
Marakwet 1 369 998  121 134 568 122 453 123 474 91.76% 
Embu 5 516 212  202 227 286 197 918 199 645 87.84% 
Garissa 3 623 060  14 115 202 91 382 91 900 79.77% 
Homa Bay 51 963 794  306 325 826 305 666 30 672 94.14% 
Isolo 0 143 294  6 54 462 47 358 47 646 87.48% 
Kajiado 22 687 312  32 304 346 26 313 265 185 87.13% 
Kakamega 143 1 660 651  547 567 460 467 783 474 779 83.67% 
Kericho 79 752 396  307 290 458 260 973 262 902 90.51% 
Kiambu 125 1 623 282  663 861 828 776 672 781 735 90.71% 
Kilifi 79 1 109 735  91 336 132 215 792 218 174 64.91% 
Kirinyaga 19 528 054  438 265 290 239 881 241 548 91.05% 
Kisii 51 1 152 282  874 412 945 344 064 348 662 84.43% 
Kisumu 47 968 909  482 385 820 347 119 348 969 90.45% 
Kitui 28 1 012 709  42 324 673 273 475 276 104 85.04% 
Kwale 46 649 931  79 174 443 124 626 125 601 72.00% 
Laikipia 26 399 227  46 173 905 156 066 156 868 90.20% 
Lamu 5 101 539  16 52 346 43 534 44 171 84.38% 
Machakos 72 1 098 584  185 445 096 367 238 372 078 83.59% 
Makueni 17 884 527  110 298 221 250 048 252 223 84.58% 
Mandera 2 1 025 756  40 120 768 101 271 101 617 84.14% 
Marsabit 5 291 166  4 104 615 89 561 89 882 85.92% 
Meru 25 1 356 301  196 487 265 425 394 429 819 88.21% 
Migori 90 917 170  355 283 862 259 892 261 215 92.02% 
Mombasa 142 939 370  4421 408 747 269 314 272 318 66.62% 
Murang'a 80 942 581  405 452 841 421 283 423 635 93.55% 
Nairobi 418 3 138 369  4516 1728 801 1 398 476 1 410 663 81.60% 
Nakuru 90 1 603 325  184 695 319 610 803 616 318 88.64% 
Nandi 80 752 965  261 263 254 234 008 236 242 89.74% 
Narok 4 850 920  47 262 739 234 258 235 906 89.79% 
Nyamira 39 598 252  656 219 358 181 232 183 509 83.66% 
Nyandarua 34 596 268  192 255 984 237 975 239 747 93.66% 
Nyeri 25 693 558  294 356 380 328 559 331 024 92.89% 
Samburu 1 223 947  11 61 114 53 772 53 949 88.28% 
Siaya 17 842 304  337 311 919 286 712 288 447 92.47% 
Taita Taveta 20 284 657  17 113 862 91 333 92 356 81.11% 
Tana River 19 240 075  7 79 454 64 080 64 589 81.29% 
Tharaka - Nithi 12 365 330  152 155 487 137 942 138 984 89.39% 
Trans Nzoia 101 818 757  331 244 640 195 286 199 947 81.73% 
Turkana 31 855 399  12 132 885 100 876 101 284 76.22% 
Uasin Gishu 69 894 179  303 330 618 281 862 284 728 86.12% 
Vihiga 26 554 622  1044 202 822 165 494 167 573 82.62% 
Wajir 13 661 941  12 118 091 99 695 100 239 84.88% 
West Pokot 1 512 690  61 120 986 108 062 108 783 89.91% 
SUM 2 333 38 610 097   14 349 896 11 924 246 11 960 671  
Table	  11:	  Number	  of	  Uchaguzi	   reports	  pr	  County.	  Population	  and	  density	  are	  derived	   from	  Kenyan	  Bureau	  of	  
Statistics,	  voting	  data	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  Carter	  Center	  Report.	  
